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Introduction to the Portfolio
This portfolio represents a formal record of my experiences as a trainee on the PsychD 
Psychotherapeutic and Counselling course at the University of Surrey. My aim in this 
introduction is to provide the reader with some information about my personal and 
professional development; in particular I hope to make clear the links between the 
contents of the portfolio and my own personal journey towards qualification as a 
counselling psychologist.
The journey has been shaped by my personal life experiences. The most fundamental 
of these was a serious and life threatening illness that I suffered fifteen years ago. At 
this time I entered my first course of psychological therapy, which I found invaluable 
in not only helping me to cope with my illness, but also in helping me to make major 
changes in my life. Both my academic career and my working life up to this point 
were firmly rooted in a logistic and scientific tradition. At school I specialised in the 
sciences and my first job was a scientific officer researching road traffic accidents. 
Immediately prior to my illness I had spent sixteen years building a career in the 
computer industry, working for various financial institutions. My therapy helped me 
to understand that I was not doing any of the things I wanted to do with my life. With 
the help of my therapist I drew up a list of goals for the future. The most important of 
these were to travel the world and to change my career. I wanted to work with people 
instead of machines.
The next few years were spent travelling, to South America, Asia and the Middle East, 
and between travels, to support myself, working as a self employed gardener. During 
this time I undertook a one-year evening class in ‘co-counselling’, learning basic 
counselling skills in order to work with others equally, half the time as therapist, half 
as client. For two years I belonged to a co-counselling group, which elicited much 
personal change and showed me the value of working therapeutically in a group. At 
this time I also helped to set up a breast cancer support group, which I helped to run 
until starting my degree course. This group offered help and support, both practical 
and emotional, to women undergoing the trauma of breast cancer. These experiences,
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along with my own personal therapy, led me to the conclusion that I would like to 
work in the therapeutic field.
I chose to do a degree course in ‘counselling and psychology’ as I was interested in 
both the theoretical and research sides of psychology and counselling. The degree 
course was academically oriented although practical counselling skills and personal 
development modules were included. We studied different models of counselling and 
associated research. I felt instinctively drawn to the humanistic models of therapy, 
feeling less comfortable with psychodynamic principles, which appeared to focus on 
the past to the exclusion of the present. On reflection this is probably because of my 
prior experience in co-counselling, which is based on client centred principles, and the 
influence of my personal Gestalt therapist.
On completion of my degree, the first step towards achieving my goal of working 
within the therapeutic field had been achieved. However, in order to practise, more 
training was required. I was drawn to the PsychD course by the primacy of the 
humanistic value system purported to underpin the profession of counselling 
psychology. I was also attracted by the variety of models covered and by the 
emphasis on integration. I particularly liked the mix of theory, practice and research, 
possibly because of my scientific background. Thus I embarked on my studies.
Within this portfolio the academic, therapeutic and research dossiers demonstrate a 
familiarity with a range of theoretical and methodological approaches and their 
application to clinical practice. They also reflect some of the debates and conflicts 
that I have participated in as I strive to find my own place within a profession that 
encompasses a variety of possible theoretical approaches and a range of 
epistemological stances.
In this endeavour, the cultural and historical environment I am embedded in have 
inevitably influenced both the values I bring to my practice and research, and the 
topics I have chosen for enquiry. My own socio-cultural position in terms of class and 
culture, and being educated to a high standard in western society have all influenced 
my value system such that I have tended to favour individuality, action, logic and self­
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reliance. This was also confirmed by my upbringing, in a family that regarded these 
values highly.
As an undergraduate I was introduced to postmodern ideas and as a result began to 
question both my own fundamental values and beliefs, and the epistemological basis 
of our psychological knowledge. Governed by a predominantly modernist 
epistemology, psychology and traditional models of therapy grant primacy to 
individual isolated minds and focuses enquiry upon internal states, structures and 
processes within the individual. Social, political and historical contexts appear to be 
removed from people’s lives and actions. Reflecting on this in relation to my own 
values caused me to question whether I too placed an overemphasis on individuality 
within my therapeutic practice.
This questioning is evident throughout the dossiers. I first explore social 
constructionism, which restores a sense of an individual’s embeddedness within 
external contexts. However, whilst researching the topic of agency for my first year 
literature review, I became aware of certain limitations of this approach. As a result I 
now believe that a hermeneutic postmodern perspective, from an ontological stance of 
critical realism, offers a view of people’s lives that does justice to external contexts, 
without undermining conceptions of individual freedom and responsibility. Notions 
of intentionality, meaning and the storied nature of human lives then become central 
concepts for enquiry. This stance is particularly apparent in the research dossier.
The structure of the portfolio combines assessments in a way that demonstrates a 
range of my abilities across the three domains of my training, academic work, 
therapeutic practice and research. A key task of training is to integrate these three 
areas. At times I struggled with this and evident throughout the dossier is my attempt 
to immerse myself in modernist theories whilst having an interest in postmodern 
ideas. This was especially problematic as I attempted to integrate research into my 
practice, the scientist-practitioner approach. However Strieker (2000) says of this 
approach that it is “often not expressed through the sole and rigid use of 
experimentally validated approaches, although these are certainly known and used 
where appropriate, but rather through application of available scientific knowledge
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and the adoption of the attitudes of scepticism, curiosity, and inquiry about practice 
that typify a good scientist” (p. 253). It is these attitudes that I have aimed to develop.
The portfolio begins with a selection of four essays, contained within the academic 
dossier. The first essay was submitted as part of the Lifespan Development course. 
This course was of particular relevance as my first year placement was working with 
older adults. From a theoretical point of view the essay considers how social 
constructionist theories can help us understand identity issues in old age. It stems 
from an interest in the current philosophical debates raised by post-modern theorists. 
How can I as a therapist best deal with the postmodern proliferation of theoretical 
perspectives? I find these philosophical debates fascinating, a fact reflected in the 
apparent distance between my discussion of theory and my discussion of practice.
By the time I came to write the second essay. Context of Counselling Psychology, my 
own relationship with the therapeutic practice, as a therapist, had deepened. The 
philosophical debates are fascinating but how do they translate to my own practice? 
The essay expands on the themes first raised in the previous essay but focuses on a 
particular challenge I faced in my first year placement, working with individuals with 
dementia. In both essays the dominant epistemological stance is social 
constructionism. By including these debates in my academic work, I hope to be able 
to take responsibility for the knowledge base of my professional work.
The next two essays illustrate a grasp of psychodynamic and cognitive behavioural 
principles respectively and to some extent they relate theoretical issues to matters of 
clinical practice. In the context of the dossier it seems more difficult to introduce 
these, as both approaches adopt a realist epistemological stance. However, this also 
reflects a more general difficulty I experienced in creating the link between my 
academic/scientist role and my practitioner role. I certainly felt more skilled in the 
former. To some extent I was ‘contained’ in the later, as my practice was placed 
within a number of NHS contexts that required adherence to a particular model. 
However my positivist-scientific background was to the fore and my personal 
challenge at the time was to learn to be more situated and to trust my intuition in order 
to combine the use of logic and intuition in practice.
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To a certain extent the psychodynamic essay continues a postmodern theme by 
questioning our taken for granted assumptions, in this case the concept of 
transference. The fourth essay examines what it means to use the therapeutic 
relationship to facilitate change. In particular I explore how cognitive models of 
therapy, which traditionally focus on the technical components of change, have 
integrated ideas relating to the importance of the therapeutic relationship into their 
theoretical understanding. In this way the essay also considers concerns about the 
professional identity of counselling psychologists and the emphasis placed upon the 
therapeutic relationship in our development as a specialist discipline.
The therapeutic practice dossier introduces the context of my clinical work. It begins 
with a short description of the four clinical placements undertaken with a brief 
account of other therapeutic work and professional activities specific to each. The 
main focus of this dossier however, is the final clinical paper that provides a more 
detailed account of the development of my identity as a counselling psychologist so 
far, and an account of the integration of theory and research into my own practice. In 
this aim it includes accounts of my clinical work and I hope it serves to expand upon 
some of the earlier comments I made in relation to various debates and conflicts I 
have engaged in. In a similar way, the research dossier provides a more detailed look 
at my own stance in these debates.
The three research reports represent the assessed research component in each of the 
three years of the PsychD course and comprise a literature review, a systematic 
qualitative investigation and a systematic quantitative investigation. The theme that 
links all three is the topic of human agency.
The research dossier begins with a review of the literature concerning human agency 
and psychotherapy. . My interest in the area of agency came about gradually, starting 
as an undergraduate when I read a paper by Bohart and Tallman (1996) entitled ’ The 
Active Client’. This paper was a theoretical exploration of what brings about change 
in therapy, and the authors argue for the agency of the client as being the active 
ingredient in therapeutic change. My motivation to research this area also stems from
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my practice as a trainee counselling psychologist, attempting to understand what 
brings about change in my clients and why the therapeutic relationship is so critical in 
this process. During the course of this work the topic of enquiry evolved into 
‘locating personal agency’.
The research impacted upon me personally and professionally. On a personal level I 
tried to examine my own biases prior to embarking on this research. For instance 
being female means I may be subject to culturally defined roles of what it means to be 
female and have a sense of my own agency. I grew up in the period of ‘woman’s 
liberation’ and consider myself a feminist. This inevitably impacts upon my own 
views. During the course of the research I was forced to think about my own sense of 
agency and what enables or blocks it. Certainly my personal therapy has helped me 
overcome blocks that in the past may have prevented me from taking effective action. 
However I am aware that my fear of failure or of not being ‘good enough’ can prevent 
me from ‘getting on’ with things. This is particularly evident in written work. I have 
a tendency to procrastinate, as the task of writing the ‘perfect’ paper is overwhelming. 
This has been problematic for me throughout course and has resulted in some late- 
submission of course work. This is a problem I continue to struggle with.
The second paper in this dossier is an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of the 
process of therapy and personal agency. This paper reflects my epistemological 
stance not only in the research method used but also in its aim to investigate the 
subjective nature of the participants’ experience. In the final research paper I was 
back on familiar territory, quantitative research methodologies. This project aimed to 
examine links between an individual’s sense of their own agency and the quality of 
their relationships. Given my previous epistemological stance I do have some 
reservations as to whether we can rely on group statistics to tell us anything 
‘meaningful’, indeed postmodernism appears to eschew positivist science. However 
by treating the questionnaire data as the participants’ subjective interpretation of their 
interpersonal relationships I was able to investigate the topic using a modernist 
methodology.
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Thus the reader leaves the portfolio after an active consideration of how interpersonal 
relationships affect an individual’s sense of who they are. This consideration has 
helped me to develop an integrative stance to my practice; by confirming that what is 
important in the therapeutic endeavour is the unique human relationship whose 
outcome depends on the quality of the interpersonal transactions between the two 
participants.
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ACADEMIC DOSSIER
Essay: To what extent do social constructionist theories help us understand 
identity issues in old age? How useful might this perspective be for counselling 
psychologists working with older adults?
For social constructionist theorists’ identity is inherently a lifespan concern, “who we 
are, at the various points in our passage through the life course, bears some systematic 
relation to our experience of, and participation in, language and social interaction” 
(Coupland, Nussbaum & Grossman, 1993, p. x). Identity then is not a fixed entity but 
an ongoing project throughout the life course, never finally achieved or fully formed, 
but always in the process of construction through social interchange (Shorter, 1997).
This essay will examine this social constructionist view of identity and see to what 
extent it may help us understand identity issues in old age. Two main points will be 
considered. How historical and cultural contexts can help construct the category ‘old 
age’, and how older adults maintain or change their identities within historical and 
cultural contexts. The application of this perspective will then be considered for 
counselling psychologists working with older adults.
The term identity is highly problematic and the distinction between it and other terms 
such as ‘the self is difficult to define. Breakwell (1986, p. 10) says, “where one 
theorist refers to identity another will talk about the self and yet both are seeking to 
understand the same fundamental processes and phenomena”. More significantly she 
says, “the theory evolved seems to dictate the definition of the term used”.
To understand a social constructionist definition of identity it is therefore necessary to 
understand the philosophical and methodological foundations of their theories. It is 
important to realise that social constructionism is not a single theory but a movement, 
one of a variety of constructivist approaches found within psychology. Common to all 
constructivist approaches is the “proposition that meaning is a constructed product of 
human activity, rather than an innate characteristic of the mind” (Mascola and Pollack, 
1997, p. 1). Within this constructivist movement, social constructionist theorists 
place a special emphasis on the role of language in social interchange; they share the
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assumption that ideas, concepts and memories arise from social interchange mediated 
through language. “The things supposedly in our ‘inner’ lives are to be found not 
within us as individuals, but in momentary relational spaces occurring between 
ourselves” (Shorter, 1993, p. 12). Social constructionists therefore reject psychology’s 
traditional focus upon internal states, structures and processes of the individual (Burr, 
1997). Instead they focus on the communicative interaction, the discourses, between 
people (Shorter, 1993), to find out what people are ‘doing’ with their talk.
From a social constructionist viewpoint identity is defined in terms of “our changing 
knowledge of who we are and how we are placed as a person in relation to those 
around us” (Shorter, 1998, p. 272). Identity is thus seen as a dynamic social product 
that is constantly being produced or ‘constructed’ by people in everyday interaction 
with each other. An important point is that throughout the life course our participation 
in language and social interactions affect ‘who we are’. Identity then is a lifespan 
developmental concern, as relevant to the end of the lifespan, old age, as at any other 
point along it.
If we adopt this perspective, that identities are at least in part a function of our forms 
and practice of talk, then we need to think critically about the categories we take for 
granted, categories such as ‘old age’. Is our view of old age and hence identity of 
older adults constructed and maintained by the social, cultural and historical context 
we live in and by the discourse we use?
Studies of ageing in discourse analysis have found that certain images, models and 
assumptions about the nature of aging lie behind everyday speech, and how the veiy 
language we use may restrict and inhibit older people and even promote their decline 
(Coupland, Coupland and Giles, 1991). In research to analyse health communications 
with the elderly it was found that in response to perceived deficits of the elderly, 
communication to the older individual changes, becoming patronising or paternalistic. 
The elderly in turn tend to develop passive patterns of responding (Cicirelli, 1993). 
Research has shown that ageism and stereotyping of the old leads to a lowering of 
self-esteem (O’Leaiy, 1996). Social constructionists would see this as the individuals’ 
knowledge of ‘who they are’ and ‘how they are placed’ in relation to those around
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them, that is their identity, as being shaped and constrained by language, society and 
individual others. “We cannot just position ourselves as we please; we face 
differential invitations and barriers to all the ‘movements’ (actions and utterances) we 
might try to make” (Shotter, 1993, p. 6).
In our present historical and cultural context the questions of independence of action 
and of power are firmly fixed according to chronological age, in socially constructed 
stages that include ‘old age’. The social constructionism of post-modern psychology 
would place less emphasis upon age specific role transition and identity development 
(Featherstone & Hepworth, 1989), thus removing at least some of the social 
constructed constraints that limit people’s identity.
Within both western culture and in gerontology, there has been a strong tradition of 
seeing the essence of ageing as decline, as a unidirectional process of loss. If a 
lifespan developmental approach is taken, then this view is rejected and ageing is 
viewed as part of a framework of development, with expectations of both gains and 
losses (Baltes, 1987). Old age is a time when changes take place but despite some 
biological and intellectual decline, development can continue to the end of life, 
bringing with it opportunities for enrichment, growth and satisfaction (O’Leary,
1996). The lifespan approaches acknowledge change and loss that occur with 
advancing years but challenge the assumption of an inexorable downhill course in old 
age, emphasizing the ability of the individual to change and develop.
For the elderly the change and loss that occur with advancing years produce life 
circumstances which can change rapidly, possibly more so than at any other time in 
the life course. Some researchers do claim that old age is a time of radical uncertainty 
for older people (Coupland, Nussbaum & Grossman, 1993). The older adult faces 
changes in lifestyle due to retirement. They may face the loss of their spouse or other 
significant people in their lives. There may be threats to their health or a decline in 
their physical abilities. And they face the greatest loss of all, the anticipation of death, 
the loss of self (O’Leary, 1996).
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For social constructionist theorists these transitions or lifespan boundaries change both 
who we are and how we are placed as a person in relation to those around us. It is at 
these times in particular that the processes that generate selfhood are triggered, the 
individual engages in ‘reflexive activity’ (Coupland, Nussbaum and Grossman, 1993). 
This reflexive activity should not be likened to cognitive psychologists’ view of 
thinking or deliberating; it is not computation functioning wholly within the 
individual. “It involves dialogical processes -— it is in adopting different ‘voices’ 
addressed or directed towards others, and spontaneously calling out from them 
responsive understandings of one kind or another, that we essentially argue within 
ourselves as to how best we may formulate and respond to our sense of how we are 
situated or positioned in relation to the others around us and our circumstances” 
(Shotter, 1997, p. 13). This process of reflexive activity attempts to revise the sense 
of identity in line with the transition and also to maintain a coherent sense of self. 
Any lifespan theory of identity has to explain how a sense of continuity of identity is 
achieved, for both a sense of personal distinctiveness and a sense of personal 
continuity are important principles of identity (Harre, 1998).
The sense of personal continuity is sustained in this model by a ‘life narrative’ of the 
self. As we age we ‘construct’ a story of our already lived lives (Coleman, 1999) 
which may help to impose a relatively enduring sense of self and help to resist 
reflexive reappraisal and reduce the threat of instability at times of transition 
(Coupland, Nussbaum and Grossman, 1993). This narrative metaphor has a central 
belief that narrative structures lives, people organize their experience in the form of 
stories (Bor, Legg & Scher, 1996). These stories are not individually written but are 
the consequence of societal discourses that influence our everyday relationships with 
others and which become the themes of our individual narratives (Swan, 1999).
The idea of a life narrative as a model of identity throughout adult life has been 
questioned by some gerontologists, who suggest that older adults may finally move 
beyond story making and shift from a rational to a transcendent perspective (Coleman,
1999). Certainly when ageing reaches the point of frailty more serious challenges to 
an individual’s identity are posed and this shift may protect the individual from too 
great a threat. This view takes into account the unavoidable biological aspect of
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existence; humans have an embodied existence that inevitably involves birth, 
maturation and death (Featherstone and Hepworth, 1989). Cicirelli (1993), from a 
social constructionist perspective suggests a ‘threshold’ model of later life, which 
takes account of our embodied existence.
This model assumes that the individual is represented by an organismic metamodel in 
early and late segments of the lifespan and by a contextual/dialectic metamodel in the 
middle segment of the lifespan. Both metamodels represent the person and the 
environment as a system in which meaning is constructed. In the contextual/dialectic 
model the individual and the environment are inseparable; in the organismic model the 
environment is secondary and the construction of meaning is determined from 
components within the individual. Intrinsic to this model is an assumption of 
biological thresholds and after the later life threshold (approximately age 85 on) there 
is a predetermined décrémentai change toward the end point of death (Cicirelli, 1993).
A major criticism of social constructionist theories of identity is the loss of individual 
agency. The emphasis on identity as outcomes of constructive processes and the focus 
on the constructive force of discourse means that the person as an agent is lost (Burr,
1997). Fisher (1995) concurs with this point, arguing that in social constructionist 
accounts selves are objects, not agents. This argument is countered by the 
constructionist view that all meaning is continually being co-created through language 
in interaction with others. Providing the individual ‘has a voice which is heard’ then 
the individual will be both constructing their meaning, and having meaning 
constructed in the social realm (Shotter, 1993). There are constraints on where we 
may place ourselves but the problem of lack of agency may be greatest when an 
individual has to struggle to have their voice heard. This may indeed be a struggle for 
older adults who are living in a fast changing society which challenges their values 
and who may have lost many of their peers who defended those values with them 
(Coleman, 1999).
When considering how useful this perspective might be for counselling psychologists 
working with older adults, to allow an individual’s ‘voice’ to be heard may be one of 
the most important aspects of therapy. Older adults may come to therapy at times of
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major or successive lifespan boundaries or transitions. The older adult who is heard 
telling their life narrative or heard in the co-constructing of their identity, may find, 
develop and change their ‘voices’ in order to play an active part in creating their own 
meaning and thereby maintaining their sense of self.
Narrative therapy, as incorporated within the constructionist movement, is the name 
given to the approach initially developed by White and Epston (1989). It uses the 
notion of story as a metaphor to understand the process of how discourse reproduces 
particular power relationships and how this acts to construct certain meanings around 
our lives and the events that take place in them. These stories become the themes of 
our individual narratives. If a person finds these stories problematic to their lives, it is 
the therapist’s role to bring these difficulties to awareness, to notice the stories and the 
ideas that support (Swan, 1999).
Older adults may come to therapy with identity issues at times of major lifespan 
transitions. It is important for the counselling psychologist to realize that within social 
constructionism identity is always in the process of construction; it is both partially 
constructed and open to further construction, or even re-construction (Shotter, 1997). 
Counselling psychologists must be aware of the constraints which limit the client’s 
actions and utterances and which prevent them from positioning themselves as they 
please. Some of these constraints are external realities, illness or physical decline or 
poverty for example, which impose conditions on the viability of their constructions 
(Neimeyer, 1997). Other constraints may be due to the way the client has constructed 
their own meanings; these need to be challenged and re-constucted where possible.
Reminiscence therapies and life review therapies may be useful for older clients with 
identity issues. Reminiscence in old age is now valued as an essential component of 
successful ageing (O’Leary, 1996). Within social constructionism these therapies 
offer an opportunity for the individual to tell their life story, to help them recognize 
their individuality and identity and if they are stuck in a negative aspect of their 
narrative to jointly co-author their life narrative with the therapist.
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Social constructionists would point out that therapeutic action, like all action, is a 
political act. The psychologist must be aware of the inequality of power within the 
relationship and the possibility of promoting their own meanings and values. To 
avoid this counselling psychologist must continually question how they talk to their 
clients and continually question their own stories. Because identities are not fixed 
entities but continually co-constmcted in and through the way we act and talk 
together, a counselling psychologist who works from a social constructionist 
perspective has to have a string sense of ‘what his/her doings are doing’. The primary 
function of the social constructionist theories “is not to prescribe a set of interventions 
but instead to provide an orienting framework for the orchestration of techniques in 
clinically appropriate circumstances” (Neimeyer, 1997, p59). The therapist working 
within this perspective must therefore be prepared to give good ethical reasons for 
why they have conducted themselves as they have.
In conclusion the social constructionist perspective of identity, although a radical 
challenge to existing positivist theories, is of theoretical interest and can help us 
understand identity issues in old age. The post-modern constructionist view that 
everything is socially constructed within a particular social, cultural, historical and 
linguistic context means there is no objective truth about identity, only the stories we 
tell about it which help us to generate explanations of ourselves. Counselling 
psychology, within this perspective, can help older adults to ‘have a voice’ in order 
that they may play an active part in the creation of their own meanings and identity.
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Essay: The challenge of dementia for counselling psychologists
Counselling Psychologists working within the context of a CMHT for older adults will 
almost certainly see clients diagnosed with dementia. Woods (1999) reports that 
dementia and depression are the major mental health problems encountered in older 
people. Dementia has such a wide spread effect on the functioning of individuals, 
with consequences for those around them, that the needs of the individual are wide, 
varied and ever-increasing as the disease progresses. The lack of effective therapeutic 
approaches and the intractability of some of the problems associated with dementia 
have led to a multiplicity of strategies for assessing and dealing with dementia. This 
means, “it can be hard for clinicians to know what to do for the best” (Watson, 2000,
p. 6).
This paper will discuss what counselling psychologists ‘can do for the best’ when 
working with clients with dementia. The interest in these issues arose out of the 
author’s work with clients with dementia and the awareness of the real problems of 
working psychotherapeutically in such cases. The traditional bio-medical model of 
dementia will be examined and the need for a psychosocial model of dementia 
discussed. It will then be argued that a social constructionist approach to therapeutic 
work with this client group has a lot to offer both the therapist and the client in this 
context. This approach means that the individuals’ subjective experience of dementia 
and the nature of personhood and the self are the primary concern of therapy rather 
than the neuro-psychological deficits of the disease process.
Individuals with dementia have typically been viewed and represented within a 
biomedical deterministic model (Harding & Palfrey, 1997), with the basic assumption 
of a straightforward linear causal relationship between neuropathology and dementia 
(Kitwood, 1990,). But the term ‘dementia’ or ‘dementing illness’ does not describe a 
disease, rather it describes a progressive deterioration in cognitive functioning, it 
refers only to a set of symptoms, forgetfulness, disorientation or non-rational speech 
which are the result of some underlying cause. Among the probable causes that 
produce the syndrome of dementia in old age, the three most common disorders are
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Alzheimer’s disease, multi-infarct dementia and a mixed dementia resulting from a 
combination of the first two. There are differences in clinical presentation and 
progression of these organic brain diseases, but the only reliable way to make a 
diagnosis is to examine the brain by autopsy (Stokes, 1992). A diagnosis before death 
is only a ‘probable’ diagnosis, but for the individual concerned it is a diagnosis that 
has only negative implications, medical science has no ‘cure’ for dementia, almost 
nothing can be done apart from meeting the individuals physical needs as the 
‘dementing illness’ progresses.
In the last ten years this biomedical model has been challenged by a number of critical 
gerontologists who advocate alternative approaches to the understanding of dementia 
(Cheston, 1998; Kitwood, 1990; Kitwood & Bredin, 1992; Sabat & Harre, 1992). As 
a result there has emerged a new culture within dementia care, one that recognises that 
the individual with dementia has psychological and emotional as well as physical 
needs. This has led to a growing clinical interest in the use of psychotherapy and 
counselling techniques for use with clients with dementia. Many of the interventions 
used are derived from established theoretical approaches, from cognitive-behavioural, 
psychodynamic and humanistic schools of therapy. Cheston (1998), in a literature 
review of interventions derived from these established psychotherapeutic principles, 
concluded that there has been little research into the effectiveness of this work with 
people with dementia and what research does exist often uses methodologies that are 
inappropriate for such an early stage of clinical development.
In a review of empirically validated psychological treatments for older adults (Gatz et 
al., 1998) the goals of interventions with dementia patients are listed as: to minimise 
disruptive behaviours and increase or maintain positive behaviours, to improve 
memory or teach coping skills to manage cognitive deficits, and to alleviate symptoms 
of depression and anxiety. They concluded that although many of the therapies were 
empirically valid the benefits afforded the dementia sufferer were often short lived.
However critical gerentologists are more concerned with the subjective experience of 
the individual with dementia. Dementia is seen by many as a stigmatising affliction, 
and is often treated in silence; Stokes (1992) titles his chapter on dementia as the
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‘silent epidemic’. Yet a diagnosis of dementia and subsequent deterioration is a 
profound experience for the individual in psychological terms, they have to contend 
with not only the impact of neurological breakdown but also the social consequences 
of the diagnosis (Cheston, 1998).
Foremost of these critical gerentologists is Kitwood (1990) whose writings focus on a 
social-psychological theory of dementia care. He argues that in dementia the origins 
of behaviour remain complex, brain pathology alone is not sufficient to explain the 
behaviour observed in dementia, and the correlation between the degree of dementia 
and extent of neuro-pathological change at post mortem leaves some 80% of the 
variance unexplored in moderate and severe dementia. “Therefore without doubt 
dementing illness is inextricably woven into pattern of an individuals life history, 
personality, physical health, social relationships and environmental circumstances” 
(Stokes, 1992, p. 4).
Kitwood and Bredin (1992) argues that the key psychological task in dementia care is 
that of keeping the individuals ‘personhood in being’ and that this requires us to see 
personhood in social rather than individual terms. The nature of personhood “refers to 
the human being in relation to others” but also has ethical implications: “to be a 
person is to have a certain status, to be worthy of respect” (Kitwood et al, 1992, p275). 
This is in contrast to the typical representations of dementia as not just a loss of 
cognitive functioning but also involving a loss of identity (Cheston, 1998), the loss of 
self, a social death or transformation of identity (McColgan, Valentine & Downs,
2000). And it is in stark contrast to the goals of therapeutic work detailed by Gatz et 
al (1998), described earlier. As Coleman (1999) says “of all the disabilities of aging, 
dementia poses the greatest challenge for the self’.
A psychological model is needed which offers greater explanatory power for the 
process of dementia, and any such model needs to adopt a lifespan developmental 
perspective. The clinical psychology of ageing lacks effective models, some classical 
models such as cognitive-behavioural and psychodynamic etc. have been extended to 
encompass older people, but little of the theorising is based on evidence. Erickson’s
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theory is among the few to provide an integrated model of life-span development 
(Britton and Woods, 1999).
Erickson’s theory of lifespan development is the major premise used in validation 
therapy, a humanistic approach used for disoriented older adults. The underlying 
principle of validation therapy is to combat Erikson’s (1959) late life stage of 
development, ‘despair versus ego integrity’, by giving individuals a sense of identity, 
dignity and self-worth. This is achieved by validating and supporting their feelings in 
whatever time or location is real to them, without analysing or interpreting their 
behaviour (Babins, Dillon and Merovitz, 1988). Their confusion may serve an 
adaptive function by providing a defence mechanism against anxiety, fear and painful 
realisations (Babins, 1988), indeed living in the past may bring psychological rewards 
of re-experiencing times when the individual felt a stronger sense of ‘personhood’. 
Indeed the goals of validation therapy, identity, dignity and self-worth for the 
individual are similar to Kitwood’s (1990) and Kitwood and Bredin’s (1992) theory of 
keeping the individuals ‘personhood in being’, that he sees as the key psychological 
task in dementia care. Validation therapy may therefore be a useful model for 
counselling psychologists to adopt in their work with clients with dementia. There are 
very few published studies documenting its efficacy. One study by Babins, Dillon and 
Merovitz (1988) suggests that validation therapy indeed be may be effective in 
allowing disoriented elderly to express themselves.
A lifespan developmental model which is closer conceptually and practically to the 
work of Kitwood, is social constructionism (Chester, 1998; Harding & Palfrey, 1997; 
Sabat & Harre, 1992). Social constructionism, one of a variety of constructivist 
approaches found within psychology, proposes that meaning is a constructed product 
of human activity, rather than an innate characteristic of the mind (Mascola and 
Pollack, 1997). Ideas, concepts and memories arise from social interchange mediated 
through language, identity is thus seen as a dynamic social product that is constantly 
being produced or ‘constructed’ by people in everyday interaction with each other.
If as Kitwood and Bredin (1992) say, the main psychological task in dementia care is 
to maintain personhood, what does social constructionism offer the counselling
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psychologist in their work with clients with dementia? The answer is both theoretical 
and practical; it can provide new insights into the effects of dementia and the reactions 
of others, on the personhood of the sufferer (Sabat and Harre, 1992). These ‘others’ 
include counselling psychologist. If we adopt this perspective, that identities are at 
least in part a function of our forms and practice of talk, that personhood is created 
primarily in the process of engaging in certain types of discourse, then we need to 
think critically about the categories we take for granted, categories such as ‘old age’ 
and ‘senile dementia’ and the way in which we talk with our clients. Is our view of 
old age responsible for constructing the identity of older adults we work with, 
maintained by the social, cultural and historical context we live in and by the 
discourses we use?
Studies of ageing in discourse analysis have found that certain images, models and 
assumptions about the nature of aging lie behind everyday speech, and how the very 
language we use may restrict and inhibit older people and even promote their decline 
(Coupland, Coupland and Giles, 1991). In research to analyse health communications 
with the elderly it was found that in response to perceived deficits of the elderly, 
communication to the older individual changes, becoming patronising or paternalistic. 
The elderly in turn tend to develop passive patterns of responding (Cicirelli, 1993). 
Social Constructionism would see this as the individuals’ knowledge of ‘who they are’ 
and ‘how they are placed’ in relation to those around them, that is their identity, as 
being shaped and constrained by language, society and individual others. “We cannot 
just position ourselves as we please; we face differential invitations and barriers to all 
the ‘movements’ (actions and utterances) we might try to make” (Shorter, 1993, p6).
This is especially true for our clients with dementia. Perhaps the challenge for 
counselling psychologists working with this client group is that of the negative aspects 
of ageism endemic within western culture. Deterioration in old age is often viewed as 
inevitable. Memory loss and confusion are often associated with old age as the terms 
we use, such as ‘senile’ dementia, show. It is important for psychologists to realise 
the myth of severe psychological decline in terms of memory, intelligence and 
personality change in old age (Watson and Somerville, 2000). Unless a pathological 
process takes place there is only minimal decline, which has little adverse effect on
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the everyday life of an older person. Only 5% of population will be victims of true 
dementia, another 10-15% will experience mild to moderate memory loss, but 75% of 
the population can expect to retain sharp mental functioning (Butler, 1984).
If a lifespan developmental approach is taken, then ageing is viewed as part of a 
framework of development, with expectations of both gains and losses. If our 
dominant discourses focus attention on highly developed cognitive powers to the 
exclusion of other human faculties the construction of dementia will be one of terrible 
and progressive loss (Kitwood and Bredin, 1992).
Sabat and Harre (1992) examined the traditional view of the loss of self in 
Alzheimer’s disease from a social constructionist view of the nature of the self. They 
derived empirical evidence from the discourse and behaviour of three Alzheimer’s 
sufferers to show that the ‘self of personal identity’ persists far into the end stage of 
the disease, even when there is severe deterioration in other cognitive and motor 
functions.
This ‘self of personal identity’ is experienced as the continuity of our point of view in 
the world of objects in space and time; and is also linked with our sense of personal 
agency. We take our self as acting from the same point. What can be lost is the other 
self, the multiple selves that are presented through interpersonal interactions in 
everyday life and which our personal identity persists behind. They argue that this 
loss of self is not as a result of the disease process, but is caused in the ways that 
others view and treat the sufferer.
Constructionists argue that the cooperation of these ‘others’ is required in order for the 
selves that are socially and publicly presented to come into being. The ‘loss’ can be 
“prevented if, and only if, the caregivers and other significant individuals in the 
sufferer’s social world can refrain from the ad hoc positioning of the sufferer as 
helpless, confused, etc., and can refrain from interpreting speech acts and other non­
verbal forms of communication as being indicative of confusion on the part of the 
Alzheimer’s sufferer” (Sabat and Harre, 1992, p 460).
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Here then the counselling psychologist has a way of helping, through mutual 
cooperation, the dementia sufferer to maintain their personhood, both through their 
direct relationship with the client and also through educating other caregivers in their 
forms and practices of discourse. As Sabat and Harre (1992, p461) say this would 
mean a lessening of social isolation, continuation of personal relationships and dignity 
for the person with dementia so “that the only prison in which the sufferer would 
dwell would be that created by the boundaries of brain injury and not, in addition, the 
confinement that is brought about by the innocently misguided positioning and story 
lines created by others” (p. 461).
That the ‘self of personal identity’ persists far into the end stage of dementia has 
important implications for therapeutic work with individuals who are severely 
cognitively impaired and for whom it may be thought that psychological needs are no 
longer relevant. An interesting approach for communicating with the severely 
demented elderly is ‘snoezelen’ a term coined from two Dutch words, which mean 
‘doze’ and ‘sniff (Moffat, Barker & Pinkey, 1993). Originally developed for working 
with the mentally disabled, it is a technique that uses materials and devices that 
stimulate specific senses. A key aspect of the technique is that the experience is 
shared in order create a means of communication which allows the individual to 
become involved in personal, human relationships. From a constructionist viewpoint 
it can be seen as a technique that promotes a form of discourse and thus helps to 
maintain the ‘personhood’ of the individual, despite their severe cognitive impairment.
Clients who come to therapy in the early stages of a dementing disease are likely to 
have greater insight while still only mildly impaired by the illness. For social 
constructionist theorists’ severe life events change both who we are and how we are 
placed as a person in relation to those around us. This is especially true for the 
individual with a diagnosis of dementia. These transitions, or lifespan boundaries, can 
trigger the processes that generate selfhood and the individual engages in ‘reflexive 
activity’ (Coupland, Nussbaum and Grossman, 1993) to revise their sense of identity 
in line with the transition whilst also maintaining a coherent sense of self. The sense 
of personal continuity is sustained in this model by narratives or life stories we
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‘construct’ of our already lived lives that may help to impose a relatively enduring 
sense of self (Coupland, Nussbaum and Grossman, 1993).
Usita, Hyman and Herman (1998) carried out a study to assess how the progressive 
memory and language losses experienced by individuals with Alzheimer’s disease 
influenced their ability to share a personal narrative. They listened to the narratives of 
six people with Alzheimer’s disease and six people without cognitive losses. “One of 
the most striking finding was that individuals with varying levels of dementia were 
able to participate in the assignment. Although many deficits were evidenced in their 
narrative abilities, persons with Alzheimer’s disease were often able to produce 
comprehendible, sometimes richly textured life stories. Hence, social interaction 
through narratives can be used with individuals with mild to severe cognitive 
impairments” (p. 195).
Within social constructionism, narrative therapies use the notion of a narrative 
metaphor to understand the process of how discourse acts to construct certain 
meanings around our lives and the events that take place in them (Swan, 1999). It is 
within individual narratives that we become aware of self and others, set priorities, 
and find meaning The personal meaning systems of older adults are constructed from 
their unique experiences, and the internalisation of the social eras in which they lived. 
“From a developmental perspective, the major task of late adulthood is to synthesise 
one’s history into an integrated narrative that has personal meaning” (Kropf and 
Tandy, 1998, p.7). For the elderly then, more than any other age group, and for the 
dementia sufferer in particular, narrative is the primary form by which experiences are 
made meaningful. For although memory loss is usually dominant in dementia, it is 
usually memory for recent events that is lost, the ability to remember the past is well 
preserved. Work within narrative therapy can therefore focus on the abilities of the 
client with dementia rather than confronting them with their disability (Norris, 1986).
These therapies offer an opportunity for the individual to tell their life story, and if 
they are stuck in a negative aspect of their narrative to jointly co-author their life 
narrative with the therapist. Reminiscence therapies and life review therapies 
(O’Leary, 1996) may be useful for clients with dementia. Although individuals
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usually have several stories about their lives, there tends to be a dominant one and it is 
usually in the context of this dominant story that problems are conceptualized. 
Problems can be seen as mismatches between the lived experience and the dominant 
story in which experience is represented (Bor, Legg & Scher, 1996). It then becomes 
the counseling psychologist’s role to bring client’s awareness to the themes and stories 
problematic to their lives, and to place these ideas and beliefs in the wider context of 
our society that support them. This process of ‘externalising’ ideas and problems 
hopefully allows a person to see themselves as separate from the problem and its 
effect on their lives (Swan, 1999), allowing the generation of an alternative story.
Social constructionist approaches to the talk of older adults with dementia have 
emphasised the importance of such talk in terms of its social function. Buchanan and 
Middleton (1993) have applied this approach to analyse the association between 
reminiscence and old age. Reminiscence is generally viewed as a normal part of old 
age and even as an essential component of ageing (O’Leary, 1996), such that it has 
become established as an activity through formal systems of therapy. Such is the 
popularity of reminiscence groups and the growth of this work that some have 
characterised it as a ‘social movement’. Buchanan and Middleton (1993), as a result 
of their analysis, argue that the activity of reminiscence should be decoupled from a 
developmental framework “in which it is represented as a generic activity of specific 
relevance to a particular stage of lifespan development” (p.57). Such an analysis 
shifts the research focus from the possible benefits of the generic activity 
‘reminiscence’ in ‘old age’ to the role of discourse about reminiscence in the practice 
place, and how it may further marginalize older adults.
Cheston (1996) uses a social constructionist approach to analyse the social function of 
narratives produced during a psychotherapy group for people with dementia. The 
narratives were seen as having two related functions; they enabled individuals to 
explore the significance of their experience of having a dementing illness through the 
use of metaphors, and they acted as a means of creating social identities. This is in 
contrast to the dominant story told about people with dementia, that their talk is 
meaningless and their memories are defective. Cheston argues that there are other
27
stories to be told about the narratives produced by people with dementia if we only 
allow ourselves to listen to the metaphorical aspects of the language they use.
A social construction approach bypasses issues to do with the nature of internal states 
and consequently makes no distinction between psychotherapeutic work with people 
with or without a dementing illness. It forces us to listen to how meaning is created 
within a social context and by doing so it may enable us to provide a true psychology 
of dementia (Cheston, 1996).
Social constructionists would point out that therapeutic action, like all action, is a 
political act. The counselling psychologist must be aware of the inequality of power 
within the therapeutic relationship and the possibility of promoting their own 
meanings and values. This is especially true for clients with a diagnosis of dementia. 
They may be unable to give informed consent to undertake therapy, and as the disease 
progresses they will be less able to make an informed choice to terminate the therapy. 
To overcome these problems the therapist must continually question how they talk to 
their clients and continually question their own narratives.
To approach the challenge of working with clients with dementia from a social 
constructionist perspective means that the individuals’ subjective experience of 
dementia and the nature of personhood and the self are the primary concern rather 
than the neuro-psychological deficits. Dementia is also placed in its cultural and 
social context which highlights that in our contemporary society, which is ‘hyper- 
cognitive and values intellect, reasoning and self-control, a person with dementia is 
denied their essential humanity (McColgan et al, 2000).
Counselling Psychologists working within a CMHT have the potential to be major 
contributors to the formulation of care plans and packages for clients diagnosed with 
dementia. Whilst there is much to learn from colleagues, a counselling psychologist 
working within the theories of social constructionism has valuable knowledge to 
impart to other caregivers, who may be immersed in a bio-medical culture. Perhaps 
we will then feel privileged to share in the stories told by our clients with dementia.
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Essay: Discuss an aspect of the Therapeutic relationship in relation to 
psychoanalytic ideas: The Transference
For most psychotherapists the relationship between therapist and client is considered 
the most fundamental element in the psychotherapeutic process (Spinelli, 1994). Gelso 
and Carter (1994) offer a working definition of this therapeutic relationship as the 
feelings and attitudes that the participants have toward one another and the manner in 
which these are expressed. They suggest that all psychotherapy relationships, 
regardless of theoretical orientation, consist of three components: a working alliance, 
a transference configuration (including therapist countertransference), and a real 
(person to person) relationship. The salience and importance of each component 
during therapy will vary according to the theoretical perspective of the therapist.
Some approaches (such as the cognitive-behavioural approach) emphasise the 
importance of the development of a therapeutic relationship largely as a means to a 
specified goal-directed end. For these therapists the working alliance is emphasised. 
Other approaches (such as person-centred or psycho-analytic models) view the 
properties or the possibilities of the relationship as themselves being the catalyst to 
beneficial change and growth. But even in this group the meaning, function, essential 
defining characteristics, and the therapist’s role within the relationship differ widely. 
The person centred therapist emphasises the real relationship by placing importance 
on features such as unconditional positive regard, congruence and empathy. For 
therapists working with psychoanalytic ideas the emphasis is placed on the 
possibilities found within the transference configuration of the therapeutic 
relationship. Indeed it could be argued that the hallmark of psychoanalysis is the use 
of transference and countertransference as a guide to understanding the inner world of 
the client (Bateman & Holmes, 1995).
This essay will discuss the transferential component of the therapeutic relationship. 
First a definition of the phenomenon will be offered with a brief review of the 
historical context. The concept will be discussed both in terms of its theoretical value 
and its function within the therapeutic process. How can it be recognised and handled 
in order to bring about change in the clients mode of behaving and thinking? What
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problems can it create? And with the current paradigm shift in psychological theory to 
a constructionist point of view, is there a place for the phenomenon of transference.
To offer a lucid account of transference is not straightforward and we have to tolerate 
some of the ambiguities and paradoxes that necessarily accompany such a complex 
field. The aim of this essay, to borrow a phrase from Clarkson (1995), is to look at 
transference with a wider lens rather than study it down a microscope and to this end 
the phenomenon will be looked at from both psychoanalytic ideas and also from some 
of its critics.
In modern-day usage transference is defined as something displaced, projected or 
transferred onto another from one’s past (Spinelli, 1995). When the term is used in 
the therapeutic community it is generally taken to be transference onto the therapist 
from the client. It is an unconscious process in which the client places upon the 
therapist both positive and negative qualities belonging to another significant person 
in the clients’ life and behaves towards the therapist as if they were that person 
(Shlien, 1984).
Countertransference is essentially the same phenomenon, the prefix simply indicates 
its different direction, namely from analyst to client. Some theorists describe it as the 
whole of the therapist’s unconscious reactions to the individual client, others as only 
those unconscious processes that are brought about in the therapist by the transference 
of the client. Broadly speaking the term applies to thoughts and feelings experienced 
by the analyst which are relevant to the client’s internal world and which may be used 
to understand the meaning of the client’s world.
The concept of transference was originally introduced by Freud to explain why it was 
that clients become emotionally preoccupied with their analysts. He defined it quite 
specifically, to denote in particular the patients reactions to the therapist that are based 
on unconscious infantile feelings and attitudes, reactions that are quite out of touch 
with reality because they belong to other significant relationships in the client’s life 
(Handley, 1995). In particular these infantile feelings belong to early relationships in 
the client’s life such as those with primary care givers. According to Freud we have a
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‘compulsion to repeat’, a need to create for ourselves repeated replays of situations 
and relationships that were difficult, especially in our earlier years. These replays or 
transference’s also turn up in therapy either repeated or as a wish of the way it could 
have been. Eventually all major relationships are transferred onto the therapist (Kahn, 
1991) and thus the transference contains in living form the very difficulties in 
relationships that contribute to neurosis (Spinelli, 1995). The working through of the 
transference, by therapist interpretation, gives the client insight into their unconscious 
motivations and is the main process that enables client’s to recognise and then 
disengage from their infantile fixations (Portnoy, 1999).
The concept and description of transference was one of Freud’s great contributions, 
“we live in others and they live in us” (May, 1983, p. 18). The concept played a 
central theoretical role in Freud’s model of the mind, as it is only by virtue of the 
hypothetical process of transference that the unconscious can have an impact on 
conscious mental life. It also makes the relationship between therapist and client 
central as Freud covered the interpersonal aspect of the psychoanalytic process by the 
term transference (Smith, 1999).
Freud attached enormous importance to the transference phenomenon but Jung (1969) 
takes issue with the idea that it is absolutely necessary for a cure. He says that Freud’s 
theory limits and closes down the phenomenon as there is more than one type of 
transference and what you do with it varies, sometimes it can be worked with and 
sometimes it can be ignored.
Other theorists within the psychoanalytic tradition have expanded and refined the 
concept, arguing that therapeutic gains from analysing the transference are primarily 
from re-experiencing; the client must have an opportunity to relieve emotionally the 
experiences from his past, in particular in the presence of the person toward whom 
they are now directed. Others have placed more emphasis on the relational aspect 
involved in therapy, arguing that empathy is important for the working through of 
transference. Kohut argues from a psychoanalytic notion that it is the task of the 
therapist to provide a corrective emotional experience, and that the main component 
of that experience is empathy (Kahn, 1991).
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In psychoanalytic practice then, transference is useful in therapy and leads to 
therapeutic success mainly from a complex process in which the client re-experiences 
these unconscious infantile wishes, realises they are determined by pre-existing 
desires and is then able to experience ‘something new’ (Handley, 1995). This comes 
about by therapist interpretations of the transference, offering the client ideas about 
the unconscious basis of the transference that has come into play. The ‘working 
through’ of the transference feelings is essential in order for the client to gain 
understanding and control over unconscious impulses. Psychoanalysts regard this 
process, the understanding and analysis of the transference phenomena, as the heart of 
their therapeutic technique (Bateman & Holmes, 1995).
The terms transference and countertransference are used by therapeutic practitioners 
as if they refer to a consensually validated phenomena and yet as Clarkson (1995) says 
‘the enormous literature on the subject of transference and countertransference 
involves an astonishing variety of contradictions, ambiguities and disputes and is also 
marked by a relative paucity of research. Some argue that given this fact it is 
surprising that “the hypothesis of transference has become such a fundamental 
assumption for many therapeutic practitioners that it is rarely questioned, either in 
terms of its theoretical value or its function” (Spinelli, 1995, p. 269).
It is important to realise that Freud mainly used the concept to designate a 
‘hypothetical intrapsychic process’. Transference serves as a term for the ‘cause’ of 
these phenomena and as such there is a clear distinction between the observed 
phenomenon (the client’s behaviour) and the hypothetical cause (the transference). 
But this clear distinction between the explanatory hypothesis and the phenomenon that 
it is intended to explain can become obscured and many therapists today seem to have 
missed the point such that transference appears to have become the equivalent to the 
observed phenomenon (Spinelli, 1995). In theory then there can be alternative 
hypothesis to explain the phenomenon.
So how else could the phenomenon be explained? It is important to recognise that the 
phenomenon of transference is a natural and necessary component of our everyday
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lives. Transference means ‘to carry across’ and for any individual it is natural that 
information carries across from past experiences into the present and future. These 
past experiences are used to help us predict, manage and inform our future behaviour. 
In this sense transference is a normal part of our learning process and it is natural for 
us to expect similar experiences to those we have had in the past from similar people 
and similar places (Clarkson, 1995). The important factor is that transferences are 
usually changed or updated in terms of here and now information. A problem arises if 
an individual resists or refuses to change or update their transferences in terms of 
emotions, perceptions or reactions and the tendency to force contemporary 
relationships into old patterns is likely to cause difficulty (Kahn, 1991).
This description fits with the argument of Spinelli (1994) who re-interprets 
transference by arguing that all encounters always contain elements of transference in 
that every encounter expresses similarities or resonance’s with previous experiences in 
our lives, and also with Boss (1963) who argues that clients openness to his world is 
restricted by perceiving it in a certain narrow way with the inevitable distortions 
which follow. Shlien (1984) goes further, arguing that transference theory is illogical 
in assuming that any response duplicating a prior similar response is necessarily 
replicating it. What these three seem to be arguing is that focus should be maintained 
on the present, and as Handley (1995) says, that the emotions experienced and 
expressed by the client are his genuine responses to the current situation, however 
inappropriate they may appear to be.
If we were to accept these arguments then perhaps it is no longer necessary to 
differentiate between the ‘real’ and ‘transferential’ aspects of the client’s behaviour. 
This is an important consideration as even as expanded by later theorists the 
traditional transference approach presents difficulties and problems in practice (May, 
1983), problems linked to the split between what is termed the real relationship and 
the transferential relationship and which reflect a gap between theory and practice.
The first of these is the Achilles heal of the transference theory, how to recognise it 
(Smith, 1991). If the transference were an inappropriate emotional response by the 
client then we would expect to be able to distinguish it from an appropriate emotional
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response (Spinelli, 1995). The first sign of transference is often taken to be the 
client’s or therapist’s feelings of incongruity in the relationship, but even some 
therapists who believe transference is a relevant principle admit there is no current 
acceptable means that exist for distinguishing the responses associated with it from 
non-transferential responses. Secondly if the therapist is the arbiter of what is and 
what is not transference then the therapist has all the power, especially with a concept 
such as transference that is unfalsifiable. Rogers (1980) picks up this theme arguing 
that psychoanalysts tend to transform transference attitudes into the full development 
of a transference relationship that can lead to a dependent relationship.
So should we give up trying to make a distinction between which components of the 
relationship are real and which are transferential? Many therapists from non-analytic 
orientations would argue that the concept of transference provides therapists with a 
unique tool for absenting themselves from the analytic situation (Smith, 1991). May 
(1983) points out two factors. The first is that transference can be a handy and ever 
useful defence for the therapist who can hide behind it to protect himself from the 
anxiety of direct encounter and secondly that the concept can undermine the whole 
experience and sense of reality in therapy. He argues that what is missed by 
emphasising the transferential relationship is a concept of encounter within which the 
transference has genuine meaning. The concept of encounter is actually covered up 
by Freud’s’ concept of transference. Yalom (1980), like May from an existential 
viewpoint, also argues that to view the therapeutic relationship primarily in terms of 
transference negates the truly human and healing nature of the real relationship. He 
says “ there is enormous potential benefit in the patient developing a ‘real’ as opposed 
to ‘transferential’ relationship to the therapist, rather than the relationship being an ‘as 
i f  phenomenon the therapist helps to heal by developing a genuine relationship with 
the client” (p. 21).
Therapists from analytic orientations would argue that many of these problems might 
be overcome as long as the therapist allows the transferential responses to be open to 
discussion. Perhaps problems arise in clinical practice when the therapist uses the 
concept of transference to constantly refer back to the past, instead of examining how 
the process sheds light on the relationship between themselves and the client. By also
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remaining aware of countertransferential feelings the therapist’s own contribution to 
the relationship is emphasised. In this way the notion of encounter is met without 
abandoning the hypothesis of transference, and the intersubjectivity of the relationship 
is acknowledged. As the author has found in her own practice, this is not an easy 
process; it can create anxiety in the therapist as it brings the focus onto the present 
moment and the relationship in the room.
Client C, an 82-year-old woman, presented with a long history of anxiety and 
recurring panic attacks. In therapy Mrs C. was very passive, sitting quietly in her 
chair and speaking in a monotone voice. This was typical of her way of ‘being’ in our 
sessions and possibly representative of her relationship style outside of therapy. 
Certainly the client described herself as very passive in her relationships with others 
and the long-term nature of Mrs C’s problems may be explained by her apparent 
dependent personality. In response I experienced strong countertransferential feelings 
of annoyance and irritation. I find myself thinking that if only Mrs C. would get angry 
or show some real emotion she would not experience panic attacks. As a result our 
therapeutic relationship appeared to be composed of predominantly a working alliance 
and a transferential relationship (Clarkson, 1995). There was rarely a real (I-thou) 
relationship, possibly because neither of us was emotionally involved in the 
relationship. I was particularly aware of this after we touched on a real relationship at 
the end of session seven.
During this session Mrs C’s psychiatrist interrupted us. After she had left the room 
the client seemed agitated. Mrs C. said, “alright I’ll be assertive” (we had discussed 
assertiveness in previous sessions) and told me that she was fed up with experts telling 
her “things which were obvious”.
At this point I could have interpreted her comment in terms of her past relationships. 
She often allowed others to direct her life and tell her things that were obvious and she 
rarely expressed any feelings about this process. However I was aware that my 
immediate reaction was to respond defensively, I don’t take well to criticism and felt 
indignant and defensive, a characteristic response of mine. With some difficulty I 
managed to curtail these feelings and reflected that maybe this statement, supposedly
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directed at the psychiatrist, was also meant for me. So I asked Mrs C. if she meant 
me?
The client replied yes. This lead to a discussion in which we agreed that in future 
sessions she would tell me when I did this. The fact that Mrs C. said what she felt and 
I accepted her rebuke and said that I was looking forward to seeing her the following 
week (and felt genuine warm feelings towards her) seemed to produce a moment of 
true meeting between us. I was aware of a change in the way the relationship felt and 
there seemed to be more energy in the room. I allowed my countertransferential 
feelings to shed light on our relationship.
Freud himself did not speculate about what would become of the therapeutic 
relationship once the transference was resolved. Later analytic theorists do in fact 
suggest that eventually a real relationship, based on healthy, reality based interactions 
between the therapist and client would take its place. Neo-Freudian theorists, in line 
with current thinking, believed that there is both a reality-based attachment and 
transferential components of the relationship present from the start of therapy. They 
viewed the therapeutic process as one where the client moves back and forth between 
the two components, using the strength of the real relationship to resolve neurotic 
attachment patterns (Horvath, 2000).
Within psychoanalytic circles evolutionary changes have also had an impact on the 
traditional view of the non-transferential aspects of the relationship. The development 
of time-limited dynamically oriented therapies and the impact of the object relations 
theorists like Bowlby have each emphasised the importance of the social context of 
therapy. As a result the role of real relationships and real experiences (as opposed to 
wishes and fantasies) assumed an increasingly important role (Horvarth, 2000). There 
is indeed some consensus amongst object relations-influenced therapists that 
transference interpretations are not as helpful in short term work and that sustaining 
focus on present behaviour and minimising regressive invitations and negative 
transference is preferable (Pearson, 1995).
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Despite the enormous literature on the subject of transference there is a relative 
paucity of research into the phenomenon. This major discrepancy between the 
amount of clinical theory and the amount of research is probably due to the 
complexity of the subject and also because of the reliance on the case history as a 
basis for psychoanalytic theorising. This method has great difficulty in fitting the 
scientific paradigm of agreed data, methods for manipulating the data and refutable 
hypothesis, a problem for counselling psychologists were the scientist-practitioner 
model and the pursuit of an empirical research base remain at the core of training and 
practice. It does mean that the gap between research and practice continues. Research 
studies which are carried out into psychoanalytic practice are more usually outcome 
studies, looking at the results of treatment, rather than process studies which look at 
what goes on in the psychotherapeutic process itself (Bateman & Holmes, 1995). One 
exception is a study by Gelso, Hill, Mohr, Rochlen and Zack (1999) who carried out a 
qualitative study to explore transference. Eleven psychodynamic therapists were 
asked for their recollections about transference in cases of successful long-term 
therapy. They addressed questions such as: how does transference operate? How is 
the transference dealt with and resolved? What problems do therapists encounter with 
transference?
Their findings suggested, perhaps unsurprisingly, that transference operated in a 
complex manner in terms of source, valence, themes, and the events influencing it. 
Therapists used a wide range of techniques, both analytic and non-analytic to deal 
with transference and the working alliance, the real relationship, and the client’s 
emotional insight importantly influenced the resolution of transference. They also 
found that a wide variety of countertransference reactions and mistakes were 
encountered when dealing with transference.
This research appears to confirm that transference and countertransference are 
exceedingly complicated concepts and their use in the therapeutic relationship should 
always be in a way that leaves the responses by both parties open to discussion. It is 
always worth remembering that critics of the transference hypothesis say that it allows 
the therapist to deny the impact that they may have on their clients. This is especially 
important in our postmodern world in which the changing view of therapy is from
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uncovering past traumas to re-storying life narratives. In this view of therapy there is 
no one true meaning of events waiting to be found, meanings are constructed by both 
the client and the therapist and the client’s life story is just one possible narrative. 
This life narrative may be dysfunctional and the process of therapy may transform it 
by the replacement of inadequate meanings with new ones (Omer & Strenger, 1992). 
Therapist interpretations and meanings cannot be imposed on the client; the therapist 
is seen as an involved partner and co-creator of new narratives rather than as an 
objective observer of the client’s distorted reality.
However, if we abandon the hypothesis of transference altogether we loose something 
of immense value, which, although complex and problematic in practice, does 
enhance our understanding of interpersonal interaction (May, 1983). The theory of 
transference makes the relationship between therapist and client central to the 
psychoanalytic process. As long as we remember that it presents a particular 
theorisation of that relationship, and a theorisation that runs the risk of neglecting the 
role of the external world because of the emphasises placed on the role of internal 
factors (Smith, 1999) then there will be no danger that the theory of transference can 
block and hinder us as therapists. The danger is always that we see what we want to 
see.
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Essay: In cognitive therapy, therapeutic change is not dependent upon the 
therapeutic system of delivery but on the active components which directly 
challenge the client’s faulty appraisals. Discuss
Cognitive therapy is concerned primarily with meaning. That is the meaning that an 
individual constructs about themselves and the environment as a result of processing 
information about their world. For the cognitive therapist how the individual 
appraises a situation will ultimately determine how they experience life in emotional 
and behavioural terms (Corrie & Milton, 2000). The assumption is that psychological 
distress results from faulty appraisals i.e. the individual’s assessments, evaluations and 
judgements of situations and experiences, and it is these faulty appraisals that 
cognitive therapy aims to challenge. To this end a range of intervention techniques, or 
active components, have been developed which the cognitive therapist employs, often 
within a structured stage-by-stage programme (McLeod, 1993). These techniques, 
which include; Socratic questioning, graded exposure, modelling, guided discovery, 
rehearsal and reality testing (Powell & Lindsay, 1987), are orientated towards client 
action to produce therapeutic change by modifying and changing faulty cognitions. 
Thus, theoretically, the main agent of change in effective cognitive therapy is specific 
techniques and skills (Ellis, 1999).
In this respect cognitive approaches differ from approaches such as the 
psychodynamic and person-centred that place a great deal of emphasis on exploration, 
insight and understanding. In these therapies the assumption is that the main agent of 
change is the relationship between therapist and client (Howe, 1999). Relationship 
factors (the therapeutic system of delivery) are considered to be more important than 
technical factors.
Within cognitive therapy the therapeutic relationship has received much less attention 
than the technical aspects of therapy such that the role of the relationship continues to 
be relatively poorly defined (Clark, 1995, Scott & Dryden, 1996). This is one of the 
major criticisms levelled against cognitive therapy. Kahn (1997) argues that there are 
two main reasons for making a careful study of the therapeutic relationship. First, it is
44
risky not to, as much that goes on between therapist and client is subtle and secondly, 
that awareness of the changes and subtleties in the relationship provides the therapist 
with a powerful tool, perhaps the most powerful therapeutic tool. Ellis (1999) 
disagrees. He argues that a good therapeutic relationship is usually important to help 
people feel better but theory and technique are more crucial to help them get better. 
What is being argued here is a key theoretical issue; what brings about therapeutic 
change. In other words how does therapy work?
This question opens up many areas of discussion, only some of which can be 
addressed in this essay. The main questions posed by the title are whether the 
reduction or elimination of key faulty cognitions is the critical element in cognitive 
therapy or whether therapeutic change is brought about by relationship factors. This 
essay will therefore discuss these questions by; taking a brief look at the aims of 
cognitive therapy, examining research findings, and looking more closely at what is 
meant by ‘the therapeutic relationship’ and what it means to ‘use’ the relationship to 
facilitate therapeutic change.
Clients come to therapy for a variety of reasons but they usually hope to feel better, be 
better able to cope, be happier in their working and personal relationships, and so on 
(O’Brian and Houston, 2000). The way that these aims are achieved will be 
determined by the particular theoretical orientation within which the therapist works. 
Cognitive therapists target client’s key cognitions as the vehicle of change. Negative 
automatic thoughts, underlying dysfunctional assumptions and extreme, over­
generalised values are identified and modified by helping the client to refashion the 
patterns of meaning which reinforce their psychological distress (Corrie and Milton, 
2000).
Whether the reduction/elimination of key cognitions is the critical element in this form 
of therapy is a difficult question to answer (Rachman, 1997). That cognitive therapy 
is effective has been shown in many outcome studies but it is still unclear which 
components of this complex treatment account for its positive effects (Jacobson, 
1989). Outcome studies aim to demonstrate the effectiveness of particular therapies. 
Whilst it has not been demonstrated that cognitive therapy is efficacious for all
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psychological disorders, studies have shown that for depression and anxiety, cognitive 
therapy produces a high percentage of recovered clients. Specific disorders such as 
phobias and compulsions seem to be more effectively treated by targeted interventions 
such as those used in cognitive therapies (Bergin and Garfield, 1994). However 
research results based on meta-analysis of many studies show that an outcome 
difference between different schools is negligible, the ‘equivalence of outcome’ 
results (Lambert and Bergin, 1994).
This research suggests that a global comparison between models may not be the best 
way of finding out what works in therapy. If the difference between models is 
negligible then a possible explanation is that there must be some common or non­
specific factors that occur in all therapies (O’Brian and Houston, 2000). As a result 
research has moved in the direction of seeking to identify the processes within the 
therapy that seem to be associated with good outcomes (McLeod, 1994), in other 
words what brings about change in therapy. Results show in particular that the 
interaction between client, therapist and technique is what is important (O’Brian and 
Houston, 2000). Orlinsky, Graw & Parks (1994) carried out a review of process 
research based on a search of the literature. They conclude, “after a period of 
continued intensive study —  the therapeutic bond still looms large as an aspect of 
process consistently associated with outcome. As a whole and in its several parts, the 
bond of relatedness between patient and therapist seems to be a central factor both in 
individual and in group psychotherapies” (p. 339). This conclusion is confirmed by 
other studies that demonstrate that it is the relationship between the client and 
therapist, more than any other factor, which determines the effectiveness of 
psychotherapy (Clarkson, 1995).
What does this conclusion mean for cognitive therapists who work within a model that 
traditionally views the therapist as a skilled technician whose abilities to help stems 
from expertise in the technology (Jacobson, 1989) and which typically emphasises 
cognitive changes over the relative importance of affective and relational elements. 
Most of the literature and research on cognitive therapy has focused on the importance 
of technical skills and has paid less attention to the significance of the relationship
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such that the role of the therapeutic relationship in cognitive therapy continues to be 
relatively poorly defined (Clark, 1995).
This is not to say that the therapeutic relationship is ignored in cognitive therapy, 
rather that it is seen as a means to an end rather than of being of value in and of itself 
(Spinelli, 1994). The model of the relationship within cognitive-behavioural therapy 
is one of collaborative empiricism, the therapist and client work together as a team to 
identify and test out specific predictions and beliefs. However as Frank and Frank 
(1991) say “Unlike evocative therapists, who use examination of the therapeutic 
relationship itself as an integral feature of therapy, directive therapists use the 
relationship primarily as a source of therapeutic leverage” (p. 213). For the cognitive 
therapist the relationship is an important element but it is primarily the ‘instructional 
quality’ of the relationship that is considered essential. They emphasise the 
importance of the development of a therapeutic relationship largely as a means to a 
specified goal-directed end unlike other approaches (such as person-centred or 
psychodynamic models), which view the properties or the possibilities of this 
relationship as themselves being the essence of beneficial change.
This point can be elaborated by exploring what is meant by ‘the therapeutic 
relationship’ and what it means to ‘use’ the relationship in therapy to facilitate 
therapeutic change. Gelso and Carter (1994) suggest that all counselling and 
psychotherapy relationships, regardless of theoretical orientation, consist of three 
components: a working alliance, a transference configuration (including therapist 
countertransference), and a real (person to person) relationship. Clarkson (1995) adds 
two more components: The reparative/ developmentally-needed relationship and the 
transpersonal relationship, which she has identified as being present in any effective 
psychotherapy. For this discussion the three-component model will highlight the 
differences between the evocative therapies and the directional therapies in the use of 
the relationship.
All therapeutic relationships consist of these three components, although the salience 
and importance of each part during therapy will vary according to the theoretical 
perspective of the therapist and the particulars of a given therapy. The working
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alliance is the most fundamental component of all psychotherapeutic work no matter 
what the orientation of the therapist. An effective working alliance contains the 
necessary agreements between therapist and client, without which psychotherapeutic 
work could not take place (Clarkson, 1995). Cognitive therapy in particular lays great 
emphasis on the working alliance, informed consent, agreed goals of therapy and 
clear, explicit techniques for reaching these goals. Indeed this emphasis on the 
alliance works well within the cognitive paradigm which views the individual as 
rational and which traditionally address conscious aspects of psychological 
functioning (O’Brian and Houston, 2000).
It is when we examine the other two components of the therapeutic relationship, the 
transference and real relationship, that difference between models and the way they 
utilise the relationship for change is highlighted. The transference configuration 
consists of both client transference and therapist counter-transference. In modern-day 
usage transference is defined as something displaced, projected or transferred onto 
another from one’s past (Spinelli, 1995). It is an unconscious process in which the 
client places upon the therapist both positive and negative qualities belonging to 
another significant person in the clients’ life and behaves towards the therapist as if 
they were that person. Countertransference is essentially the same phenomenon, the 
prefix simply indicates its different direction, namely from analyst to client. Broadly 
speaking the term applies to thoughts and feelings experienced by the analyst which 
are relevant to the client’s internal world (Kahn, 1997).
The transference relationship is considered an essential part of the psychodynamic 
therapeutic process since the therapy consists in inviting the transference and 
gradually dissolving it by means of interpretation. The counter-transferential 
relationship is also viewed as a useful tool that can be used to further understand the 
meaning of the client’s world. Firstly in that sometimes the process can teach the 
therapist something about the client’s problem and secondly that the more aware the 
therapist is that there are two ‘unconscious dramas’ being played out within the 
therapy, the safer the client will be, and the richer the therapist’s sources of 
information (Kahn, 1997).
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Traditionally cognitive therapy deals almost exclusively with attempts to correct 
conscious thoughts and images and to make them more rational by the collection of 
information and intellectual analysis, persuasion and encouragement. This is curious 
as although cognitive therapy was developed during a time in which psychology as a 
whole was moving strongly in the direction of cognitive explanations, there is a gap 
between these two movements. In cognitive psychology it is assumed that the 
majority of cognitive processing is experienced as consciously accessible thoughts or 
images (Rachman, 1997). Although using terms such as transference violates the 
principles of cognitive therapy in that it diminishes the active role played by the client 
in constructing meaning (Rudd and Joiner, 1997), the neglect of non-conscious 
processes is a serious omission.
More recently a number of cognitive therapists have acknowledged the critical role of 
unconscious processing in psychopathology and this can be seen in the rise of schema- 
focused therapy (Bricker and Young, 1993, Padesky, 1994). The term ‘unconscious’ 
should not be thought of in terms of the psychodynamic notion of the unconscious, 
which cognitive therapists would refute. Rather it is an acknowledgement that certain 
material lays outside of conscious awareness.
Schemas are deep mental structures that develop as part of normal cognitive 
development and incorporate unconditional core beliefs about the world and 
ourselves. They provide a basis for screening and interpreting experiences in a 
meaningful way (Padesky, 1994). Schemas are not always in conscious awareness. 
Usually they operate out of awareness and when triggered by events an individual’s 
thoughts and feelings are dominated by these core beliefs. If the schema is 
maladaptive, for instance, a belief that one’s emotional needs will never be met by 
others, then the individual will tend to experience negative emotions and have 
dysfunctional thoughts (Bricker and Young, 1993). Techniques of cognitive therapy 
help the client to identify and change maladaptive schema so that alternative meanings 
are attributed to experiences. Identification of schemas is more difficult than the 
identification of automatic thoughts since schemas represent ‘core’ cognitive 
structures’ which are more difficult to access and modify since they are deeply
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ingrained and central to the way in which we apply meaning to ourselves, others and 
the world (Padesky, 1994).
Cognitive Transference and cognitive countertransference are terms being used 
within schema-focused work, for instance the idea of transference cognitions, where 
the therapist is seen through the Tens’ of pre-existing schema (Safran, 1990). Within 
therapy, interpersonal techniques focus on the role of the schema in relationships. 
Either the therapist attempts to provide a therapeutic relationship that contradicts the 
early relationship experiences of the client, or they may focus on the therapist-client 
relationship as it is, in order to explore patterns in relationships and to try out different 
ways of interacting (Bricker & Young, 1999).
Although seen as critical to our understanding and treatment of mental distress schema 
processes are still thought to be accessible and amenable to restructuring by 
intervention techniques. So do they change the technique versus relationship balance?
In the past the epistemological stance of cognitive therapy has the therapist as a 
detached, objective observer of the client rather than as an empathic-introspective 
immersion into the patient’s subjective world. Suler (1995) argues that it is only 
within this Tntersubjective field’ that the self can be explored. The use of schema- 
focused therapy goes some way to addressing this, but some theorists argue that the 
concept of the impact of the ‘self of the therapist on the therapeutic relationship is 
still under defined (McLeod, 1993). This is a serious criticism and one that is again 
raised when examining the real relationship component of the therapeutic relationship.
The real relationship refers to the dimension of the total relationship that is non- 
transferential. Buber called it the I-Thou relationship and it is characterised by the 
here and now existential encounter between two people. It is characterised by 
genuineness and realistic perceptions and awareness that the real person of the 
therapist can never be totally excluded from the interactions within the relationship 
(Clarkson, 1995). Within cognitive theory it has been highlighted that for 
collaborative empiricism to work well the therapy has to be underpinned by Rogers’ 
core conditions of empathy, congruence and unconditional positive regard (Overholser
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& Silverman, 1998) and in this respect the impact of the ‘self of the therapist on the 
therapeutic relationship is considered.
However cognitive therapy could be termed a one-person psychology (with its 
emphasis on the psychology of the client) rather than a two-person psychology (how 
the psychological make-up of both the client and the therapist mutually influence each 
other) (Kahn, 1996). In the latter the ‘intersubjective field’ is emphasised whereby the 
reciprocal interplay between the subjectivity of the patient and the subjectivity of the 
therapist becomes important. In a two-person relational psychology the therapist has 
to be reflectively aware of their own subjectivity and how they may inadvertently 
influence their clients because of their own unique history. With its one-person 
psychology rooted in an objectivist epistemology cognitive therapy has no 
requirement for trainee therapists to undergo personal therapy that aims to facilitate 
the development of appropriate self-awareness in the therapeutic relationship. The 
absence of a real appreciation of the impact of the self or person of the therapist is all 
the more regrettable when it is realised that the approach gives therapists permission 
to challenge their clients (McLeod, 1993).
If therapists move from technique-focused to relationship-focused interventions they 
could be described as ‘being’ rather than ‘doing’ in pursuit of therapeutic goals 
(O’Brian and Houston, 2000). Spinelli (2001) describes this ‘being’ as the ‘something 
more’ that brings about change in therapy. It requires a knowing about interpersonal 
and intersubjective relations and takes the form of a psychological act rather than 
psychological words. It refers to various unexpected, special moments in therapy 
when the client and the therapist experience an authentic person-to-person connection 
that alters the relationship and, as a consequence, the client’s sense of self. Spinelli 
suggests that therapies fail because of missed opportunities for a meaningful 
connection.
In conclusion it is worth returning to the essay title. There is no clear yes or no 
answer. Empirical research, whilst showing the effectiveness of cognitive therapy is 
not able to ascertain what the effective components of the therapy are. Process 
research points to the relationship between the therapist and client, more than any
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other factor, being the main determinant of effective psychotherapy. Cognitive 
models of therapy, through schema-focused therapy’ have certainly integrated ideas 
relating to the impact of the therapeutic relationship into their theoretical 
understanding.
Perhaps, what these various factors point to is that models of therapy cannot be said to 
be the key factor for therapeutic change. Models are important because they provide 
the therapist with a ‘belief. Spinnelli (1994) suggests that the issue here lies precisely 
in the kind of relationship that any particular therapist will have with his or her model. 
If the model overwhelms the therapist then the therapist’s ability to ‘be’ in the 
relationship with the client will be restricted. If, on the other hand, the therapist not 
only accommodates to the theory but also ‘assimilates’ it to his or her ‘being’ 
structures, then the relationship with the client is allowed to be one where the therapist 
‘is there’ (Spinnelli, 1994). Therapeutic models are maps of the terrain; they are not 
the terrain itself.
And finally, a return to the argument made by Kahn (1997) as to why a careful study 
of the therapeutic relationship should be made by all therapists. It is risky not to as 
much that goes on between therapist and client is subtle.
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THERAPEUTIC PRACTICE 
DOSSIER
56
Introduction to the Therapeutic Practice Dossier
This dossier contains information about the clinical work I have undertaken during my 
psychotherapeutic training. It includes a description of each of my clinical placements 
followed by a final clinical paper, which provides an account of my professional 
practice, including the integration of theory and research into my clinical work.
Further details of client studies, process reports, placement logbooks and supervisors’ 
evaluation forms pertaining to this dossier are available to the examiners in a separate 
appendix. Due to the confidential nature of the material it is not available for public 
access.
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First-year placement: A Community Mental Health Team, Older
Adults service
The placement context was a Community Mental Health Team, part of the NHS Older 
Adult Mental Health service. The specific setting was a health service clinic, which 
served a large, demographically diverse population, and which comprised inpatient 
facilities, a day-care hospital, and outpatient services. The work was based primarily 
at the day care hospital, which provided support for clients with either organic or 
functional mental health problems. Occasionally attendance was at the acute 
psychiatric hospital, also for older adults.
I worked as part of a community mental health team under the supervision of a 
clinical psychologist. Referrals were taken from consultant psychiatrists, clinical 
psychologists, Community Psychiatric Nurses, and day care staff of the hospital. The 
client group were both patients of the day hospital and the acute psychiatric hospital, 
and also their carers.
A large proportion of the clients were older adults and it was therefore important to 
adopt a lifespan perspective to development. Whilst this client population have 
essentially the same needs as everyone else it was important to remember that certain 
issues, such as loss, are a universal experience in this age group. Clients may suffer 
from either functional or organic mental health problems. For clients with organic 
disorders specific therapeutic techniques, because of their application to people with 
cognitive impairment, had to be adopted.
There were many opportunities for becoming involved in a wide range of placement 
activities, some of which were requirements of the placement and others were 
optional. I attended bi-monthly multi-disciplinary team clinical meetings, and weekly 
departmental psychology meetings. On two occasions I accompanied my clinical 
supervisor on her ward rounds at the acute psychiatric hospital, and attended six 
clinical review meetings for clients and their families. The day hospital ran a support
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group for carers of people with organic disorders. I made a presentation to this group 
on ‘roles and relationships and how they are affected by caring for a spouse or parent 
with dementia’ and then lead a group discussion on this topic. A fellow trainee 
clinical psychologist and I set up a group therapy activity for day care clients suffering 
from functional (mainly depression) disorders. This group met weekly for eight- 
sessions.
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Second-year placement: A Psychotherapy Outpatient Department
This placement was within a Psychotherapy Outpatient Department, part of the NHS 
mental health services. The head of the psychotherapy department, who also acted as 
the placement supervisor, was a consultant psychiatrist and a psychoanalytic 
psychotherapist. In addition the department consisted of 2 full time psychotherapists, 
1 trainee psychotherapist, 2 part time psychotherapists, and one full-time secretary.
The client group was adult, with referrals taken from consultant psychiatrists, clinical 
psychologists, and members of the local CMHT within the same NHS trust.
Due to the tertiary nature of the referrals, clients often had chronic or severe mental 
health problems and had frequently undergone prior treatments. The waiting list stood 
at approximately 2 months. Clients were initially assessed within the department and, 
depending on their suitability, offered one-to-one psychodynamic therapy, a 
psychodynamic group, or one-to-one integrative (CAT) therapy. If deemed not 
suitable for psychodynamic work clients were referred for CBT therapy or to the 
CMHT for supportive work.
Other placement activities included attendance at the psychotherapy team business 
and clinical meeting and observing initial assessments.
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Third -year placement 1: An Assertive outreach service
This placement was within an Assertive Outreach Service (AOS), an integrated Health 
and Social Services service for people with severe and enduring mental health 
problems. The service provided psychiatric, psychological and social support and the 
team consisted of psychiatrists, psychologists, community psychiatric nurses, social 
workers, occupational therapists and community support workers. The head of the 
service, a consultant clinical psychologist, provided placement supervision
Clients of the AOS usually have a diagnosis of schizophrenia, severe bipolar 
disorders, or resistant depression. They often have additional diagnoses and/or 
associated drug and alcohol problems. Clients are severely disabled by their mental 
health problems either by enduring psychiatric symptoms, poor level of functioning or 
poor personal reaction to illness. In addition clients are likely to have difficulties 
characterised by passive resistance to services, disengagement from services or active 
resistance to services. As a result clients often need pro-active interventions to help 
them engage with professionals and the service offered has to be flexible and creative 
in its approach.
Clients were also referred to psychology from within the NHS trust as an adjunct to 
the adult mental health outpatient services. These clients had less severe mental 
health problems.
Other placement activities included meeting with client’s care co-coordinators (social 
workers, CPNs), attendance at social events run by Assertive Outreach Service for 
clients and carers, and meeting with community support workers to gather information 
of activities and clubs run for the clients of the service.
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Third -year placement 2: Primary Schools
The context of this placement was within a pilot project to set up a primary care 
counselling service in primary schools in a disadvantaged area of a major city. The 
project was run by a private charity and the local council. The placement was based 
within two primaiy schools, one day a week being spent at each school during term 
time. Supervision was taken with a private clinical psychologist with experience of 
working with children. The client group served have a number of risk factors that 
may increase the probability of a child developing a mental health problem. The 
schools are based in an area of socio-economic disadvantage with a high immigrant 
and refugee population, the children have diverse multi-cultural backgrounds which 
may increase the risk of discrimination and there are high levels of family breakdown 
(Department of Education, 2001).
Children were referred to the service (by school staff or parents/carers) about a wide 
range of concerns including problems over learning and behaviour, problems over 
getting on with friends and about personal and emotional development. Once a child 
has been referred an assessment meeting was held with parents/carers in order to 
obtain consent for therapy. Children were provided with individual or group 
therapeutic support across the school year and therapeutic outcomes were reviewed in 
collaboration with the child and the school. A lunchtime drop-in service was available 
for any child previously seen for therapy.
The role of counselling psychologist in schools involves forging good working links 
with members of the school team and outside agencies (educational psychologists, 
behaviour support team, social services and voluntary services i.e. half stone project 
gives help and advice to abused woman, Winston’s Wish gives support to those caring 
for bereaved children) in order to aid onward referrals and to support children known 
to other services. In this context other placement activities included Social Services 
case reviews. Pastoral Support Plan meetings and a presentation to parents at a school 
coffee morning to explain the role of the counselling service. I attended a full-day 
workshop on child protection issues, and a series of four lectures, run by the mental 
health charity Young Minds, on promoting mental health in children.
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Final Clinical Paper: A Journey Towards Integrative Practice.
“This is a paradoxical and perplexing profession because the therapist must be able 
to deeply empathise with the client -  must be able to enter into the client’s world and 
feel the world from the client’s perspective -  and yet the therapist is always 
professionally challenged to understand the client’s experience in the rational format 
o f theory”
Hycner (1991, p. 14).
Introduction
As a trainee counselling psychologist, I derive my understandings of clients and their 
problems from a variety of sources: from formal psychological theory and research, 
from literature and philosophy, and from my personal experiences (Wilkinson & 
Campbell, 1997). This paper represents an overview of my journey towards becoming 
a counselling psychologist and in particular demonstrates my attempts at integrating 
these diverse sources of knowledge into my therapeutic practice. I have begun with 
the above quotation because it emphasises the paradoxical nature of the profession of 
counselling psychology and foregrounds other areas of integration. The struggle to 
find a balance between the professional role and the human meeting, the need for a 
substantive amount of knowledge about humans in general and yet to be able to 
deeply appreciate the unique experience of the client, the need to confront issues in 
other’s lives which the therapist may not have resolved in their own life. It is these 
paradoxes I have struggled with throughout my training and in so doing have realised 
that they are inherent in the practice of psychotherapy irrespective of theoretical 
orientation (Hycner, 1991), and that as a therapist I must continue to strive to integrate 
these opposing qualities whilst recognising I will always fall short and the task will 
never be complete.
In my journey towards integrative practice the main elements of post-graduate training 
have been covered, “namely theory (of development and its vicissitudes, of the 
context of difficulties, and of means of intervention), basic foundational skills,
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personal development, graded experiences of practice, research skills, consultation 
skills and psycho educational skills” (Farrell, 1996, p. 589). Counselling 
psychologists are required to be competent to practice from more than two 
perspectives, and to have an understanding of the application of the three major 
theoretical traditions of therapy (humanistic, psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioural). 
My clinical placements over the three-year course have allowed me to practice within 
these theories and, especially in year three, to consider whether I choose to work 
primarily from one perspective or to take a more integrative approach to my practice.
The profession of counselling psychology is relatively new, full professional status 
having been achieved in 1994 when a Division of Counselling Psychology was 
established (Woolfe, 1996). Ongoing debates in the literature centre on the identity of 
the profession and differences between it and other applied branches of psychology 
(Farrell, 1996; Ryder and Shillito-Clarke, 1998; Spinelli, 2001; Woolfe, 1996). This 
paper will therefore begin with an examination of these debates. Following this, I will 
present some of my thoughts about integration, including integration of theoretical 
approaches in practice and the integration of theory and research into practice. Finally 
I will discuss my work as a trainee counselling psychologist, presenting examples of 
both my clinical work and of personal challenges that have contributed to my current 
way of working.
The Profession of Counselling Psychology
In considering what makes counselling psychology distinct from other areas of 
applied psychology Woolfe (1996) argues that this is its philosophical orientation and 
value system rather than its knowledge base or professional practices. The Division of 
Counselling Psychology of the British Psychological Society highlights this value 
system in a statement defining the profession:
“The profession of counselling psychology is distinctive in its 
competence in the psychological therapies, being firmly rooted 
in the discipline of psychology whilst emphasising the
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importance of the therapeutic relationship and process” (British 
Psychological Society, 2001).
There is, then, an emphasis on giving primacy to the therapeutic relationship. 
Psychologists in other disciplines argue, rightly, that this is an important factor in their 
work (Ryder & Shillito, 1998). However it is the central focus on the use of the 
relationship between counselling psychologist and client, and the use of the 
relationship to facilitate change, that is fundamentally different in the profession of 
counselling psychology (Farrell, 1996). Intrinsic to this is a humanistic value system 
that highlights the uniqueness of individuals and the importance of their 
phenomenological world and the continual process of ‘being with’ rather than ‘doing 
to’ (Woolfe, 1996).
The DCoP statement goes on to say that counselling psychologists are concerned with 
the integration of theory and research with therapeutic practice, i.e. scientist- 
practitioners, and with the choice of whether to integrate models or work from the 
perspective of one core model. Counselling psychologists are also expected to be 
versatile to respond to a wide range of clinical organisational problems with 
confidence. I have been fortunate that my clinical placements have been in a number 
of different settings providing me with an opportunity to work with a range of clients. 
I have worked in a CMHT within NHS older adults services, in a Psychotherapy 
department within NHS adult services, an Assertive outreach service for clients with 
chronic and enduring mental health problems, and in primary schools as part of a local 
council pilot scheme to introduce a primary care counselling service in schools.
What is Integration?
Many possible interpretations of the word ‘integration’ exist in the practice of 
counselling psychology and so there is no one generally agreed answer to the question 
what is integration? During my training two areas of integration have been attended 
to; theoretical integration and the integration of research into practice, the scientist 
practitioner approach.
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Two debates are ongoing in the literature around the subject of theoretical integration. 
One is concerned with whether such integration is possible or desirable (Alford, 1997; 
Castonguay & Goldffied, 1994), and the other with issues of training (Feltham, 1999; 
Wheeler, 1999). As regards to training, the debate centres around whether courses 
should define and adhere to one core theoretical model, the argument being issues of 
time-limits of courses and the need of a secure base on which therapists may begin 
their practice (Wheeler, 1999). However Feltham (1999) argues that core theoretical 
models infantilise our clients, and us, they deny us our autonomy. I do not profess to 
have an answer to this debate but during my training I have appreciated the chance to 
work with different models and to be able to think thoughtfully and constructively 
about integrative practice. I certainly hope that this process is one that can make me a 
more sensitive therapist.
That there are challenges in theoretical integration is certain and any discussion on 
working integratively within counselling psychology has to consider the value of such 
integration and also whether it is desirable and indeed possible. Is such a system of 
counselling psychology more comprehensive and more adequate than our current 
therapies and if so, are such claims justified? (Messer, 1986). Some argue that it is 
not possible to integrate models of therapy given their different underlying 
philosophies, which result in opposing assumptions about mental health and hence 
ways of working. But a more persuasive argument is that “no one theory does justice 
to the complexity of human beings. Integrating means recognising and valuing many 
different aspects of what it is to be a person including the body, affect, cognition, 
behaviour and spirituality. Which of these is focused on varies between models” 
(O’Brien & Houston, 2000, p. 20).
Theoretical integration can be formal and structured, as in Cognitive Analytic Therapy 
and multimodal therapy, or ‘informal’, allowing for the creativity and subjectivity of 
the therapist. I experienced the course as encouraging the development of a 
considered and critical individual style of integration, with an acknowledgement that 
the way that I perceive the world will influence the outcome of this process. Practising 
in this way allows a therapist to be more flexible, however it also means the therapist
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has to be accountable, through ongoing evaluation of their work and by adopting a 
reflexive stance to their practice.
As an undergraduate studying counselling and psychology I began to explore different 
theories of therapy. I had a natural inclination towards the humanistic theories, which 
seemed to value the person and ‘being with’ the client more than other theories. Over 
the three year course I have changed position many times, often feeling an unease 
about the individualistic nature of many theories of psychotherapy. For example in 
humanistic theory ‘the other’ appears to be reduced to providing the core requirements 
for development towards a ‘self-actualised’ person, in object relations ‘the other’ is 
restricted to an internal relationship between self, image of self and the internal image 
of the other (Portnoy, 1999). I value the input of post-modern approaches which 
foreground the historical and social context our clients find themselves in and the 
constructed nature of our ‘meanings’. Towards the end of the course I have once 
again returned to humanistic principles as the underpinning of my work, but I feel 
now that this choice is less naïve, less of a gut instinct and more considered. The 
central tenets of this approach lend themselves to incorporation into most 
psychotherapeutic models and encourage a number of practical skills that can usefully 
be employed with a diverse range of theories and clients.
The alternative to integration is to follow a theory led model, which offers the 
therapist more certainty and can help the therapist to face the anxiety of the 
therapeutic process. My own anxiety was to some extent ‘contained’ as my practice 
was placed within a number of NHS contexts that required adherence to a particular 
model. However I believe strict adherence to one model may lead to the danger of 
fitting the client to the theory, of trying to predict events and assign meaning to them 
in advance. To address this problem in regards to my practice I have found it useful, 
when working with one particular model, to formulate ideas from various theoretical 
perspectives and to keep these ‘in mind’ during sessions with clients. My personal 
challenge at the time was to learn to be more situated and to trust my intuition in order 
to combine the use of logic and intuition in practice and to tolerate the anxiety of not 
knowing.
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Of use in this process was Clarkson’s (1995, 1997) five relationship framework as an 
integrative principle. The quality and nature of the relationship between the client and 
practitioner, has been widely accepted as the most important and effective influence 
on personal change in therapy (Elton-Wilson, 1995) but Clarkson’s model highlights 
the many different facets of this relationship which raises many different kinds of 
issues, including questions round the working alliance, the transferential relationship 
and the real relationship. This frame provides an integrative principle that focuses on 
similarities and differences between different approaches to psychotherapy and 
differentiates which relationships each approach tends to favour. All therapeutic 
relationships consist of these components, although the salience and importance of 
each part during therapy will vary according to the theoretical perspective of the 
therapist and the particulars of a given therapy (Gelso and Carter, 1985). Using this 
framework also enabled me to foreground the relationship between my client and 
myself during the therapeutic process and to reflect on the processes between us.
From a Humanistic perspective the philosophy of Martin Buber has allowed me to use 
a concept to help find a way of ‘being with’ my clients in the therapy room. Buber’s 
distinction between two forms of human relating, T-It’ relating, in which the other 
becomes my object, to be used or observed contrasts with T-Thou’ relating, in which 
two subjects meet in a fully human way, such meeting being an end in itself 
(Friedman, 1992). This is not to say that we must continuously strive for T-Thou’ 
moments. Our self-reflective consciousness will not allow it because when we are 
self-aware we are in T-It’ moments, allowing for other forms of relating to be 
attended to in therapy i.e. the working alliance and the transferential relationship 
(Wheyway, 1999).
During my third year I became more confident in the eclectic use of techniques in the 
therapy process. The challenge was for me to integrate on both a theoretical and a 
practical level, so that in a considered and critical way I could develop my own style. 
I acknowledge that the way I perceive the world has a powerful influence on this 
process and the aim is to reflect on this and develop an awareness of what these 
influences are. In this way I hope to guard against what Yalom (1989) describes as “ 
the powerful temptation to achieve certainty through embracing an ideological school
68
and a tight therapeutic system is treacherous: such belief may block the uncertain and 
spontaneous encounter necessary for effective therapy” (p. 13). I try to remember that 
the therapeutic process is anxiety provoking because it deals with the problems of life 
and I have to gain the confidence to tolerate the anxiety of not knowing, to not be the 
expert. I remind myself that theories are maps, not the terrain.
Counselling psychologists are also defined as scientist-practitioners. This involves 
assimilating research into practice and also engaging on an ongoing basis in the 
process of researching our work. There are many salient reasons for involvement with 
the research process including accountability, gaining a wider perspective and, 
personal and professional development and developing new ideas and approaches 
(McLeod, 1994). Psychotherapeutic research has progressed through three 
generations; efficacy of treatment methods, common processes and the relationship 
between process and outcome, and cost-effectiveness and change pathways. Despite 
this there remains ‘a gap’ between research and practice (Rennie, 1994). One reason 
for this is explicitly stated in the DCoP statement:
“Counselling Psychology has developed as a branch of professional psychological 
practice strongly influenced by human science research. Its relationship with 
mainstream academic psychology has been mutually challenging because Counselling 
Psychology has drawn upon and developed phenomenological models of practice and 
enquiry which have been at odds with the dominant conceptions of scientific 
psychology” (British Psychological Society, 2001).
This points us to the conflicting conceptual framework of positivist and interpretative 
research paradigms. Woolfe (1996) calls for methodological diversity within the 
profession so that counselling psychologists can occupy a pivotal position between the 
two research paradigms. However in a paper questioning the term scientist- 
practitioner, Spinelli (2001) says the problem is at a fundamental level and that such 
an ‘uncertain identity’ will not help counselling psychology advance as a profession. 
He asks, “how do we, as counselling psychologists, understand and apply the notion 
of scientist-practitioner?” (p. 4.). I found this paper thought provoking and wondered
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if I had ‘the courage’ to examine my fundamental assumptions to see if the notion of 
scientist-practitioner was useful to my practice.
Spinelli (2001) notes that the sort of knowledge that helps in our understanding of the 
therapeutic relationship tends to be derived from a qualitatively based form of enquiry 
“which is unavailable to Natural Science methodologies” (p. 8). Thus the notion of 
human-scientist-practitioner is emerging as a more appropriate stance, where respect 
for the personal subjective experience of the client is emphasised and 
phenomenological methods for understanding human experience is encouraged. I also 
believe that at times the notion of philosopher-practitioner is relevant as many of the 
underlying values of our theories are philosophical in origin. Counselling 
psychologists are also reflexive-practitioners, in that our fundamental skills include 
reflexivity in practice on which inquiry can be based.
The impact of these developing ideas about integration will be evident in the 
following sections. Here, I provide an account of each year of my training with a 
focus on my theoretical approach at each stage and the impact of my personal 
development on my integrative approach.
Year One
My first year placement was within a Community Mental Health Team, part of the 
NHS Older Adult Mental Health Service. A clinical psychologist, who practiced from 
an integrative stance, supervised my clinical practice. During the first year of training 
the theoretical focus of the course was mainly generic with person-centred skills 
training. My supervisor encouraged me to work in this way, at least initially, and then 
later in the year to consider integrating techniques from other models.
My first challenge was to find a way of being with my clients in the room, to contain 
my anxiety of being a ‘first-time therapist’. My focus was on trying to form a strong 
therapeutic relationship and a safe environment for clients to be able to share their 
struggles and difficulties with me. In this endeavour I was helped by the principle 
tenets of the person-centred approach, genuineness, unconditional positive regard and 
empathie understanding (Rogers, 1980).
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These tenets were particularly useful in my work with Mrs. O. a client suffering from 
the effects of brain damage (either due to a dementing illness or meningioma) and the 
traumatic experience of its symptoms. At the time of her referral she was low in 
mood and very anxious. It seemed important to create a safe containing space for the 
client to explore the things that were concerning her. As our work together progressed 
and our therapeutic relationship developed I became increasingly aware of repeating 
themes within Mrs. O’ narratives, that her life was over and that she had lost ‘all’ her 
personality and memory. Apparently she used to take great care of her appearance but 
felt that now ‘there was no point’. At this stage I found it useful to conceptualise Mrs. 
O’s problems from the perspective of post-modern narrative approaches to therapy. 
She was experiencing a severe life event (her illness) that changed both who she was 
and how she was placed in relation to those around her. As a result she had come to 
doubt the point of her existence.
When, as in Mrs. O’s case, an individual is suffering a dementing illness, remote 
memory appears to be preserved. Narrative therapy, in which the client tells their life 
story in order to play an active part in creating their own meaning, was therefore 
considered a suitable model to work with, also sitting well with the person centred 
approach. This is similar to the reminiscence therapies where the importance of the 
life story to identity has been recognised and it is seen as a healthy and beneficial 
activity for older adult, functioning to help maintain self-esteem in the face of 
declining mental abilities (Coleman, 1996).
As our work progressed I encouraged Mrs. O. to tell me her life story. She appeared 
to find this work enjoyable and stimulating (often bringing her own ‘prompts’ to 
sessions such as pictures or jewellery) and over time, as I could begin to share in the 
reminiscences our relationship seemed to strengthen. It seemed clear that Mrs. O. was 
trying to re-organise her self-image, as the majority of her narratives were about what 
a strong and capable person she had been, but gradually she started to talk about some 
more negative aspects of her life (such as her wish to have had another baby and her 
‘poor’ relationship with her daughter), possibly in an attempt to resolve these issues. 
Towards the end of therapy Mrs. O. raised topics such as her illness and her life
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coming to an end. It was difficult for her to ‘remain’ with these difficult issues and 
she often reverted to reminiscing after a short time. I remained non-directive and 
attempted to demonstrate empathie understanding, allowing her to return to these 
topics when she felt able.
At times I found this work difficult, wondering if our time together was serving any 
useful function, as we appeared to go over the same ‘stories’ each week. But on 
reflection I realised that this was my anxiety about whether the therapy was ‘working’. 
A basic beginners mistake perhaps. I reminded myself to relax about the process of 
therapy and allow it to ‘happen in its own time’. By the time therapy came to an end 
Mrs. O’s self-esteem appeared to have improved as she was taking more care of her 
appearance and other members of the CMHT were commenting on the apparent 
improvement in her mood. More importantly the dominant theme in her narratives 
had changed to “I’ve had a good life”.
Ethical issues were raised in this work, around the client giving informed consent for 
therapy and whether she fully understood that our time together was ending and the 
impact this might have on her. As regards the issue of consent Mrs O jumped up 
eagerly when I entered the day hospital room to collect her for our sessions and 
appeared happy to attend. By using the non-directive person centred approach I felt 
that the client had autonomy in the room. My concerns about the ending of the 
therapy were raised and discussed in the CMHT team meeting and it was agreed that 
as I was leaving the trust the nursing manager would be assigned to watch Mrs O’s 
progress.
I greatly valued the experience of working with humanistic principles and came to see 
that the central tenets of the approach lend themselves to being integrated into most 
psychotherapeutic models. However it could be argued that there are limitations in 
the approach. In particular ‘the other’ appears to be reduced to providing the core 
requirements for development towards a ‘self-actualised’ person, the ‘others’ 
subjective experience is not considered and so we lose something of the fundamental 
relational quality of existence (Spinelli, 1994). So, although my work is informed by 
humanistic principles, I am not a humanistic practitioner.
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Year Two
I approached my second year ‘psychodynamic’ placement with feelings of 
nervousness and a certain amount of hostility towards psychodynamic theories, 
although attempting to articulate either of these feelings was difficult. I knew that I 
did not feel naturally drawn to psychodynamic theories and wondered if it was 
unconscious processes at work. Being aware of these feelings I decided to ‘immerse’ 
myself in the model to see how it worked. In fact the context of the placement, a NHS 
psychotherapy department, meant that integration of models was not an option. 
Clients referred to the service were initially assessed for their suitability for 
psychodynamic work. Assessments were discussed in the departments weekly team 
meetings (of which I was a part) and clients not considered suitable were referred on 
to other services.
During course lectures and through my reading on psychodynamic theory I became 
aware of the number of varying approaches labelled psychodynamic and the 
possibility of becoming confused in attempting to practice them. Which approach 
should I adopt? My supervisor, a psychoanalytically trained psychotherapist and 
psychiatrist, helped me with this question. When I posed my dilemma to him and 
asked which approach he practiced he advised me to “not worry” but instead to 
concentrate on psychodynamic principles of practice, maintaining the frame, attending 
to and working with the transference and countertransference and thinking more about 
the process of therapy, especially the ending.
Psychodynamic approaches take a developmental perspective on psychological well­
being, looking to early childhood experience to explain behavioural patterns of 
relating in the present. The client/therapist relationship is itself the subject of analysis 
as it is the ‘present relationship’ during the therapeutic process. In order to orient 
myself to this approach I found the integration of psychodynamic principles with the 
person centred values helpful. In particular Kohut’s self-psychology, a 
psychodynamic theory, values empathy and has “done more than anyone else to bring 
psychoanalysis and humanism together” (Kahn1997, p. 88). For Kohut, one goal of 
therapy is to help clients become more and more able to get their emotional and
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psychological needs met. In this endeavour the therapist should not meet these needs 
themselves but through empathie understanding of the client’s world they should 
communicate that the client’s way of being is understandable and understood.
I worked for the year with client Mr F, a 44-year-old man, referred with symptoms of 
recurring depression and anxiety. Much of our early work was concerned with trying 
to understand the client’s experience and letting him know that it had been 
understood. From a psychodynamic perspective, Mr. F’s current symptoms appeared 
to be linked to the experiences of his childhood, in which he suffered a number of 
traumatic difficulties, in the context of what sounded like very minimal parental 
containment of his emotional state. He had a preoccupation with an idealised previous 
relationship to his marriage, which may be linked, to his early infantile loss of 
mother’s attention as the first-born child, a loss that I think he had never fully come to 
terms with.
An opportunity to help the client see that his reactions to me were in part determined 
by the attitudes and expectations he carries everywhere came as a result of a two-week 
break in the therapy. Mr F patient admitted how difficult the end of therapy would be 
for him (an event still five months away). I tentatively made an interpretation that our 
relationship seemed to mirror his relationships ‘outside’ of therapy in that he becomes 
dependent on people and appears to idealise the women in his life (his mother, wife 
and former girlfriend and perhaps me). We spent time exploring how these attitudes 
and expectations had come to be part of his life and that given the facts of his early 
experiences they were fully understandable. He appeared to find this insight useful 
and over the remaining months of therapy we continued to discuss the impact of the 
ending of our sessions.
Part of my task in the therapy was to contain this anxiety by acknowledging and 
understanding that the ending would be a painful loss for him. Resisting the urge to 
comprehensively gratify his needs (by suggesting an extension to the therapy) I had to 
tolerate my own recognition that I wouldn’t always be there for him but by keeping 
him in mind and showing that I could ‘bear’ the feelings he was in fact able to 
experience an ‘ending’ which did not feel like an abandonment.
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Throughout this work I found it invaluable to discuss in supervision aspects of the 
process between the client and myself. The process of supervision was challenging 
and I had to guard against not being overwhelmed by feelings of T can’t do it’. 
However the combination of seeing the impact of the work on my clients and the 
belief of my supervisor that this seemed to be a natural way for me to work increased 
my confidence for being with the clients.
During this year I faced a number of personal challenges. My beloved grandmother, 
who was ever present in my life, died. Two months later my father had a heart attack 
and spent some time in hospital. I was facing a lifespan transition of my own, which, 
as social constructionist theorist posit, changed both who I was and how I was placed 
in relation to important people in my life. When I also failed an important clinical 
assignment my fear of failure or of not being ‘good enough’ again came to the fore 
and made me question my ability to complete the doctorate. This combination of 
issues impacted on me in supervision and my client work. At college I experienced 
minor criticism as reflective of permanent and detrimental flaws. A number of 
processes allowed me to tackle these problems.
The difficulties were attended to individually, with peers and within personal therapy. 
At my placement I was open and honest with my supervisor about the difficulties I 
was facing and with his help I contained my anxiety within supervision rather than 
letting it Teak’ out with my clients. I also made the decision to change from full-time 
to part-time study, and successfully realised that this did not mean that I was not ‘good 
enough’.
Year Three
The focus of the course in year three was Cognitive Behavioural, but I was also keen 
to think about integration within my therapeutic practice. I worked at two placements; 
a NHS Assertive Outreach Service for adults with chronic and enduring mental 
illness, and in primary schools in an inner city, working with school children aged five 
to eleven.
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Because of the importance of relationship processes for humanistic and 
psychodynamic therapists I was tentative about CBT work that appeared as somewhat 
mechanistic. I carried out some brief interventional work that fore grounded practical 
interventions and psychoeducational work and discovered the usefulness of this work 
in certain cases. I also undertook some longer-term schema-focused work and it was 
here that I had the opportunity to work with relational processes, the power of the 
transference (in the idea of transference cognitions) and attending to my own 
responses and processes. One of my schema-focused therapy clients, Mrs C was a 51 
year old woman with a long history of social phobic difficulties.
Before I met with Mrs B. she had undertaken a year of cognitive-behavioural therapy 
using techniques to challenge her negative automatic thoughts about the feared events, 
but she reported that this had little impact on the frequency or severity of her 
symptoms. The client and I agreed a new program to meet her therapeutic goals: 
schema-focused cognitive therapy to identify and modify core beliefs and assumptions 
developed during her childhood, and behavioural exposure work. This seemed 
appropriate, as Mrs B’s social anxiety appeared to centre on the fear of negative 
evaluation. Ultimately she feared that the catastrophic consequences of this behaviour 
would be the loss of the things she valued most, husband, home or job. We 
hypothesised that these beliefs and feelings were linked to her childhood in which she 
had experienced a number of losses.
During our initial sessions it became obvious that Mrs B. avoided discussing her 
childhood because she felt that she became too emotional and ‘could not really see the 
point of it’. She carried out her homework assignments meticulously, made notes of 
suggested techniques during our sessions and was eager to try ‘new things’, 
apparently as long as this did not involve getting too close to her feelings. But we 
came no closer to identifying her core schemas. I found myself becoming frustrated 
with the process and hypothesised that this might be the way Mrs B. was feeling too. 
I struggled to interpret this and the opportunity came at the end of one of our sessions 
when she commented “you have not given me my homework, I need to have it so I 
can work on things during the week”. I asked her if she felt the homework was
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helping resolve any of her difficulties and she said no. In our discussions on her 
apparent lack of progress I hypothesised with Mrs B. that perhaps she needed her 
homework each work so that she could ‘be doing’ perhaps at the expense ‘of being’ 
and that the being was needed, especially in the therapeutic situation. I decided to try 
and work with a greater sense of flexibility and over the next weeks I was more 
prepared to abandon techniques if something else in the communication seemed more 
meaningful. During one session Mrs B. commented that during our discussions she 
felt as if she was talking about ‘someone over there’ (pointing to the comer), rather 
than about herself. This struck me and allowing myself to be situated and trusting my 
instincts I suggested the Gestalt two chair exercise. During the exercise Mrs B. made 
a real connection with her ‘self over there’ in the other chair. I pointed out how she 
had sounded angry when talking to the ‘other’, an emotion she previously denied 
feeling. She seemed surprised at the insight this gave her and also at her ability to 
carry out the exercise. Over the next few weeks, as a way to encourage ‘being’ rather 
than ‘doing’ and to overcome Mrs B’s use of intellectualisation as a defence against 
painful feelings we focused on visualisation and imagery work and the feelings these 
exercises evoked. This was a difficult process for the client but for the first time the 
client appeared to get in touch with painful emotions and was eventually more willing 
to talk about her childhood.
As a result of this work we managed to identify Mrs B’s maladaptive core schemas as 
abandonment/instability and emotional inhibition. Together we built up a cognitive 
model of her anxiety that was used to help her understand and hopefully begin to 
modify these maladaptive beliefs. The ending of therapy was a difficult process for 
Mrs B., which was understandable given her fear of loss and abandonment. However 
both the client and I felt that she had made progress over our ten months of working 
together. She reported successfully thinking differently on some occasions, used 
techniques learnt in therapy to help her cope with anxiety provoking situations and felt 
more positive about the future. Mrs B. planned to join a self-help group shortly after 
our work together finished. Joining this group would be a major step and likely to 
create high levels of anxiety for this client, who usually ensured that others, including 
her husband, were unaware of her problems.
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My view on integration of the various models of therapy is that sound clinical 
strategies should underpin client work and inform therapeutic interventions in a 
coherent and consistent manner. For me, integration can be an unsettling process, 
particularly when a client is unsure about what they would like to achieve in therapy. 
This was especially apparent in my work with primary school children who were often 
unclear about the reasons for their referral and often found it hard to formulate or 
articulate goals. There is a need for developmentally appropriate theoretical models 
however the theoretical base and research evidence for this client group is more 
limited than that for adults. My work with client S. illustrates the use of different 
aspects of the therapeutic process to inform my work using the client’s beliefs and 
presenting issues as a guide for the application of different theoretical ideas.
Client S., a nine-year-old girl, was referred for individual therapy because of her 
violent outbursts in the classroom. On one occasion she had a sudden explosive 
outburst, which resulted in her hurting another child, pulling her off the chair and 
hitting her. CBT has demonstrated positive effects in the treatment of a number of 
common psychological problems of childhood (Stallard, 2002) and in previous work I 
had seen how the basic component of education about the link between thoughts, 
feelings and behaviour can be useful and promote change in children’s behaviour. 
However as with all the children I worked with my first aim was to allow S. to tell me 
her story. Using humanistic principles I aspired to be genuine, respectful and 
affirming of S’s reality. It became clear that these were not conditions S. experienced 
at home and I wondered if S. had experienced frustration in two of her developmental 
needs, to be shown that she is special and the need to have a parent to idealise. In 
terms of Kohut’s self-psychology she had not received adequate ‘mirroring’ from her 
parents and was lacking an ‘idealised parental imago’. This was not explored 
explicitly but I attempted to provide these functions myself in the therapy, providing 
elements of a reparative relationship (Clarkson, 1995). In this process it was 
important that I acknowledged explicitly my failures in this attempt, such as when S. 
felt I had let her down by missing a session due to illness, thus providing an 
opportunity for S. to develop her own ability to be her own mirror and ideal.
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An agreed goal of our work together was to try and change S’s unacceptable 
behaviour in class. We used CBT worksheets to identify and distinguish different 
emotions such as anger, anxiety and unhappiness and S. monitored her strong feelings 
Our work together concentrated on exploring these feelings and the links between 
them. We practiced strategies S. could use to control her behaviour when she is angry 
or sad and different ways of expressing these emotions. Over the course of therapy it 
became apparent that S. appears to split off her angry feelings treating them as coming 
from her 'bad side' which is somehow separate from her and thus possible to make go 
away for good. One of the aims of therapy was to allow S to see that her anger is just 
another feeling that is part of her and as such will never go away for good. Using a 
flexible integrative approach allowed us to work fruitfully together and allowed me to 
keep S. at the centre of my thoughts rather than the ‘rules’ of a particular theoretical 
model.
Conclusion
My attempts at developing as an integrative counselling psychologist have been 
cautious. Because a diverse range of theories inform my work with clients I consider 
myself an integrationist although the approach taken in therapy varies according to the 
particular needs of the individual client and the context in which the therapy takes 
place. Within this I especially value the notion of learning to value emptiness in order 
that a more situated, perhaps intuitive, approach is taken within the therapeutic 
process, attending closely to the response of the client to evaluate the work. At 
present, I see myself as ‘cultivating my intuition’, rather than relying on singular 
approaches, which offer more certainty.
Baillie (1995) says that any course actually traversed will not be fully predictable in 
advance. This seems apt as a description of the therapeutic process, both in terms of 
the problems the client ‘brings’ to therapy and also to the way that the client may 
impact on the therapist. There is no correct way of assigning meaning to events. As I 
continue my development as a counselling psychologist I hope to gain new 
understandings of the journeys that we embark on with our clients.
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RESEARCH DOSSIER
Introduction to the Research Dossier
The research dossier contains three research reports, all presented in the format of 
journal articles suitable for submission to the publication Counselling Psychology 
Review. The three reports represent the assessed research component in each of the 
three years of the PsychD course and comprise a literature review, a systematic 
qualitative investigation and a systematic quantitative investigation. The theme that 
links all three is the topic of human agency.
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Human Agency and Psychotherapy.
Abstract
The idea that individuals can be autonomous actors and agents of their own lives 
features in most psychotherapeutic approaches. A broad range of clients’ difficulties 
can be understood, in a fundamental way, as a disruption of some sort in the 
experience of agency in their lives. In this view the very essence of psychotherapy 
may be increasing clients’ agency. Human agency is therefore a fundamental concept 
in the practice of psychotherapy. This paper reviews the literature on human agency 
and psychotherapy looking at approaches to understanding human intentionality and 
action from both modem and postmodern viewpoints. An important reconceptualising 
of agency from the hermeneutic tradition is then reviewed. The author suggests this 
has implications for empirical research into how the process of psychotherapy affects 
individual agency. It is also suggested that in order to do justice to this concept of 
agency a postmodern approach to psychotherapy is required.
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Introduction
The concept of human agency is fundamental to psychotherapy. Firstly without such a 
concept the self would be completely determined; all mental states and acts, including 
choices and decisions, and all individual actions would be effects and part of a causal 
chain with no possibility of change. Thus our futures would be fixed and unalterable 
(Honderich, 1995), and the practice of psychotherapy would be pointless (Hall, 1998). 
But the possibility of personal change is a presupposition of the practice of 
psychotherapy and the idea that individuals can be autonomous actors and agents of 
their own lives features in most psychotherapeutic approaches (Brewery & McKenzie, 
1999). Personal agency is also a psychological resource long believed to be 
associated with mental health. A number of theorists take the view that the broad 
range of clients’ difficulties can be understood, in a fundamental way, as a disruption 
of some sort in the experience of agency in their lives (Baillie & Corrie, 1996; Pollock 
& Slavin, 1998; Rennie, 1992). In this view the very essence of psychotherapy may 
be increasing clients’ agency so that they have a sense of personal control, optimism 
and the ability to find meaning in their lives. Clients also have an agentic influence on 
the therapeutic process (Elliot & James, 1989; Martin, 1990; Rennie, 1992) with some 
theorists arguing that what matters for therapeutic change is what the client does 
actively both inside and outside the therapy session (Bohart & Tallman, 1996,1997).
Human agency is then an important therapeutic issue. But within theories of 
psychotherapy there are expressed different views of human nature and different 
understandings of human action, views that influence the practice of therapy (Hall, 
1998). Modernist psychotherapeutic theories, developed from the natural sciences, 
aim at providing causal explanations of human phenomena, the causes operating 
beneath the surface of the phenomena of action (Guignon, 1998). Of necessity these 
theories take a position on the issue of determinism and free will: are we masters of 
our own fate able to consciously choose the direction of our behaviour or victims of 
past experience, unconscious forces, biological factors or external conditions? Within 
the social sciences the concept of agency also has a long history; various theories have
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defended, attacked, buried and resuscitated the concept in often contradictory and 
overlapping ways (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). What is certain is that there is 
confusion about the nature of human agency.
Into this confusion is now thrown a radical reconceptualising of human agency that 
has sweeping implications for counselling and psychotherapy (Neimeyer, 1998). 
Postmodern and poststructuralist ideas of agency are based on the notion that our 
realities are socially constructed and language-constituted. Human action is therefore 
situated in this socially constructed world and language provides the medium for 
human experiencing (Kaye, 1999). The practice of psychology is increasingly 
integrating ideas from postmodernism (Chen & Noosbond, 1997) and within 
psychotherapy this can be seen in the turn towards narrative and discursive therapies.
This paper will review the literature on human agency and psychotherapy to explore 
how counselling psychologists in practice can make sense of this confusion about the 
nature of human agency and to see if postmodern ideas of agency help or hinder this 
endeavour. A brief historical review of views of human agency will be followed by a 
look at how different modem and postmodern approaches to psychotherapy 
understand human action and the implications that these understandings have for 
therapy. Within this context it is acknowledged that psychology may be considered a 
form of cultural discourse with particular assumptions and ways of knowing. 
Psychology and psychotherapy need to be placed in their historical and social context 
and to see them as evolving along with socio-cultural change and internal changes in 
the profession (Hoshmand, 2001).
Views of the self or human agency
Human agency, the means by which an individual deliberately brings into being 
his/her desires, goals and projects is a central defining feature of human beings 
(Baillie, 1995) and yet the present day conceptions of human agency are rife with 
tensions which can be traced back to the Enlightenment debate over the problem of 
free will and determinism (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). The term itself is highly 
problematic and the distinction between agency and other terms is difficult to define.
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Agency is the action of an agent, a person that acts, and an action is defined as 
someone’s doing something intentionally (Honderich, 1995). Agency can therefore be 
associated with a long list of terms: self-hood, motivation, volition, will, intentionality 
and choice. What is clear is that agency is about human intentionality and action and 
that this definition ties it closely into the concept of the ‘self. A self is conceived to 
be a subject of consciousness, capable of thought and experience and able to engage in 
deliberate action (Honderich, 1995). Another concept central to agency is self- 
efficacy; an individual’s belief that they can produce desired effects by their actions. 
Bandura, (1998) argues that it is the foundation of human agency. “Unless people 
believe they can produce desired effects by their actions, they have little incentive to 
act or to persevere in the face of difficulties” (p. 6).
Historically four broad notions of human agency or the self can be identified 
(Richardson, Rogers & McCarroll, 1998). The first is a ‘traditional’ self, the pre­
modem view of the self as defined by and playing a part in a meaningful cosmic 
order. The second or ‘modem’ notion of the self has been termed ‘self-contained 
individualism’ and arises as a direct result of positivist thinking during the modem 
age. At the heart of modernism is the belief that by using empirical methods the truths 
about a knowable world and the causal networks in which it is embedded can be 
discovered (Gergen, 1992). The modem notion of the self is a highly individualised 
and autonomous being. Postmodern constructionist theorists have developed the third 
notion of agency and self. It is the ‘decentred’ self. This view deconstructs personal 
causation and relocates it to external context over internal dynamics; the activity and 
nature of the self are products of language systems and relations of power that firmly 
place human action in the context of culture and history. The fourth notion is a 
‘dialogical’ understanding of self and agency developed by hermeneutic thinkers that 
claims to combine many of the insights of the other three perspectives. This is 
achieved by embedding human action in its social and historical context whilst 
retaining conceptions of freedom and responsibility (Richardson et al., 1998).
Guignon (1998) details three approaches to understanding human intentionality and 
action that have appeared in psychotherapy over the years that tie in closely with 
Richardson et al.’s (1998) last three notions of agency. The first approach he calls the
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naturalist model as it is drawn from methods of the natural sciences and aims at 
providing causal explanations of human action. This is the ‘modem’ individualistic 
self (as above) and this model of explanation lies at the root of dynamic, cognitive and 
humanistic therapy models. It is argued that the difficulty that these naturalistic 
approaches have in doing justice to human agency has given rise to constructionist 
conceptions of psychotherapy where action is structured by narrative. This is the 
‘decentred’ self of Richardson et al. (1998). Guignon too calls for a ‘dialogical’ view 
of agency. He suggests that the constructionist approach involves a number of 
excesses and shortcomings and argues for a therapeutic approach that draws on the 
ideas of ontological hermeneutics.
‘Modernist’ Agency and Psychotherapy.
Models of therapy based in a modernist epistemology aim at providing causal 
explanations of human phenomena and of necessity these theories take a position on 
the issue of determinism and free will. Psychoanalysis and humanistic therapies fall 
within the modernist tradition but take different positions on this issue; therefore it is 
relevant to briefly explore their views on human agency and the therapeutic process.
Psychoanalysis: One of the basic premises of classical psychoanalytic theory, psychic 
determinism, implicitly denies the possibility that human beings can be agents who 
make decisions and are responsible for their own actions (Rycroft, 1968). According 
to Freud at the core of our motivation are basic forces or drives with all human 
behaviour being expressions of these drives. What goes on in our unconscious mind 
are forces and structures beyond our conscious control, and in this deterministic view 
any notion of autonomy, individual choice, will, responsibility, and rationality appears 
to be undermined; we do not control our lives in the most fundamental sense 
(Chodorow, 1999).
And yet the paradox exists that classical psychoanalytic models have long been 
focused on understanding the experiencing and personal motivated self -  the self as 
agent -  and yet through repression and dissociation the self, through its unconscious
89
system, can dismantle its own agency (Pollock & Slavin, 1998). In Freud’s later 
structural model the primary source of personal motivation is the id, separate and 
distinct from the experiencing part of the self, the ego. The task of the clinical project 
of psychoanalysis is to restore wholeness to the fragmented self, to develop individual 
autonomy and control in the self by replacing id with ego. Instead of agency related to 
a punitive unconscious superego, id or unconscious ego defences, it is related to a 
conscious ego. As Chodorow (1999) says, “all analysts probably want to restore a 
certain wholeness and agency to the self’ (p. 112).
Freud’s view of agency as purely intrapsychic is challenged by ‘object relation’ 
theorists, who take as their starting point the individual’s relations with other people 
(Brewer, 1998). This perspective gives us a different notion of the construction of 
individuality and agency than does the classical analytic account. Psychological 
disorders, the problem of the fragmented individual, are seen not only in terms of 
conflict and defences but also in terms of problematic self-other relationships, which 
themselves initially constitute low self-esteem and lack of individual control. In this 
view the self is intrinsically social and we see the historical progression of 
psychoanalytic theory and practice from rigid notions of autonomous separateness 
towards a relational individualism (Chodorow, 1999).
In the classical/structural model, agency was represented by the capacity to be, in 
some sense, the owner and master of one’s drives and motives. In more current 
relational psychoanalytic thinking agency is represented by the internalised experience 
of being able to have an impact on one’s relational world. But Pollock and Slavin 
(1998) argue that “in contrast to the classical perspective, current relational 
psychoanalytic thinking has focused its attention more directly on the clinical process, 
leaving the fundamental questions of the origins of personal agency and its role in the 
treatment process un-addressed or, at best, implicit” (P. 859).
Hall (1998) concurs with this view saying that a problem of psychoanalytic views of 
the self is that they rarely account for agency. They do deal with agency but there 
ought to be a theoretical concept that corresponds to the reality. Understandings of 
such questions are critical to understand how change occurs. Pollock and Slavin
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(1998) suggest answers. They believe that the ability to experience oneself as an 
agent emerges from complex interpersonal and intrapsychic processes in infancy and 
early childhood. The development of agency is dependent on recognition and mutual 
impact with parents early in life and when this process goes awry the child’s capacity 
for agency can be disrupted. Therapy facilitates the restoration of the client’s sense of 
personal agency not only in relation to internal impulses but also in the relational 
world. This is facilitated by the therapist articulating his or her own agency in the 
context of the therapeutic relationship, thus acknowledging the impact the client has 
had. In the process of reciprocal vulnerability clients can reclaim their own agency.
A conception of psychoanalysis that breaks with modernist views of agency is 
Schafer’s narrative analysis. In this version therapy is seen as an interpretive 
discipline rather than a natural science and analytic theory consists not of causal 
hypothesis but of narrative structures for retelling life stories (Guignon, 1998). 
Agency is restored by transforming the client’s experiences into an action narrative in 
which they are things the client does rather than things that happen to him or her. But 
the narrative is retold along psychoanalytic lines i.e. from the standpoint of repetitive 
re-creations of infantile situations and basic drives.
Humanistic Therapies: The humanistic-existential paradigm consists of a number of 
discrete approaches to counselling psychology each with distinct theory, practice and 
research, but all of which draw on a core set of philosophical and psychological 
assumptions. The two most important of these therapies are client-centred therapy and 
existential therapy (McLeod, 1996).
A search of the literature reveals little on the specific subject of agency within 
humanistic models of psychotherapy but the philosophical assumptions on which is it 
based point to individuals having free will in creating their selves. In client-centred 
therapy there is one natural motivational force in human beings that is constructive 
and growth directed; that is the actualising tendency (Bozarth, 1997). All behaviour 
reflects directly or indirectly the striving of the individual to actualise, an innate 
tendency that is only impeded or twisted by negative environmental influences
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(Spinelli, 1994). In clinical practice this natural constructive potential can be realised 
once the therapist adopts a stance of unconditional positive regard towards the client, 
expresses congruent or genuine attitudes, and is able to accurately reflect empathy for 
the subjective experience of the client (Rogers, 1980).
The argument that the actualising of innate potentialities motivates a person towards 
behaviour that is ultimately constructive seems rather simplistic and takes no account 
of moral or ethical responsibility (Bozarth, 1997). Client-centred therapy has its 
philosophical roots in phenomenology and existentialism in that it considers 
individuals not as objects of study but as experiencing beings. But it is argued that it 
takes the ideas of existentialism, with its exploration of anxiety and despair, and make 
it fit its own basic cultural assumptions which emphasis an optimistic individualism 
and freedom, thus taking its terminology but not its substance (Spinelli, 1994). 
Freedom is one of the givens of existence but for existentialists it is limited by an 
individual’s context.
An important feature of the humanistic approach to agency and therapy lies in its 
emphasis on the client’s freedom and ability to choose how to ‘be’ and what meanings 
to live by. The therapist is not assumed to be more capable than the clients of 
interpreting their experiences (Spinelli, 1994). This theme is taken further by Bohart 
and Tallman (1996, 1997). They argue that humanistic approaches share the 
assumption that it is ultimately the clients who change themselves in therapy. They 
propose a meta-model of therapy, the ‘active client’ model, where the active 
ingredient in therapy is the clients themselves. This theoretical model, derived from 
an existential-humanistic perspective, assumes that it is ultimately the clients who 
change themselves in therapy by exerting their own agentic influence on the 
therapeutic process. What matters for therapeutic change is what the client actively 
does both inside and outside of the therapy session in order that they go through a 
cyclical process of thinking, exploring and experiencing. The effective therapist in the 
‘active client’ model facilitates the change process by offering the client three things: 
working space and time, techniques or tools that the client may utilise, and their 
interactive presence (Bohart & Tallman, 1996). A criticism of this model is that it
92
does not explain how the therapists’ interactive presence facilitates the change 
process.
More serious criticisms are raised against the modem view of human agency.
Pilgrim (1992) argues that psychological reductionism takes different forms and:
In the case of the psychodynamic therapies the problem resides 
in the limitations of interpretive systems which focus narrowly 
on intra-psychic events or group processes to the exclusion of 
their wider social context. In the case of humanistic therapies 
the problem mainly resides in overvaluing human agency and 
understating material constraints on our ability to choose our 
destiny (p. 225).
As a result he says that psychotherapy is condemned to political ignorance.
Smail (1997) raises a similar criticism of these individualistic theories. In his writings 
on community psychology he says that the causes of personal distress have their 
origin in economic and political factors. He acknowledges that the person’s close 
relationships play a part in mediating this distress, but social factors are more 
important. If this is indeed the case then the modernist concept of the separateness of 
self and society is seriously flawed (Spinelli, 1994). The burden of responsibility for 
relieving distress is placed on the client but according to Smail (1997) the solutions to 
their problems may be outside of their control.
Richer (1992), from a postmodern perspective, is also concerned about social and 
political factors and especially the question of power and knowledge. In an 
unequivocal criticism he likens all of psychology to a branch of the police and 
psychodynamic and humanistic psychologies to the secret police. By this he means 
that with their emphasis on self, freedom and potential the modernist approaches to 
psychotherapy normalise and encourage individuals to conform to a capitalist 
enterprise via the “racism of self-control” (p. 111).
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This is an extreme view. For the purposes of this review it is probably more pertinent 
to look at some of the features of human action that distinguish it from mere physical 
movement and see if the modem viewpoints can account for these features. Human 
action has a number of characteristics; it is directed towards realising projected 
outcomes that constitute the agent’s goals in acting; the context of the action must be 
grasped in terms of how it matters for the agent; and because human action generally 
involves interaction with others, and because action takes place against a backdrop of 
standards and conventions accepted by a social group actions have evaluative 
significance for people (Guignon, 1998). Psychoanalytic and humanistic therapies 
appear to address the first of these features but not the other two. They ignore the 
meanings that things have for agents in their goal-directed undertakings.
Postmodern Agency and Psychotherapy.
A telling critique of this modem view and a certain radical 
deconstruction and decentering of human agency or the self 
comes on the scene with today’s poststructuralist or postmodern 
viewpoints (Richardson et al, 1998, p. 496).
Two postmodern theories of agency and self will be discussed. The first, from social 
constructionist theorists points to the ‘decentred’ self and the second, from 
hermeneutic theorists points to a ‘dialogical’ understanding of self.
Social constructionism is not a single theory but a movement (Shotter, 1993), one of a 
variety of constructivist approaches found within psychology and which increasingly 
influence the practice of psychotherapy. Common to all constructivist approaches is 
the proposition that meaning is a constructed product of human activity, rather than an 
innate characteristic of the mind. Within this constructivist movement social 
constructionist theorists place a special emphasis on the role of language in social 
interchange. They share the assumption that ideas, concepts and memories arise from 
social interchange mediated through language. “The things supposedly in our ‘inner’
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lives are to be found not within us as individuals, but in the momentary relational 
spaces occurring between ourselves” (Shotter, 1997, p. 12).
Social constructionists therefore reject psychology’s traditional focus upon internal 
states, structures and processes of the individual (Burr, 1997). Instead they focus on 
the communicative interaction, the discourses, between people (Shotter, 1993), to find 
out what people are ‘doing’ with their talk. Discourse is all those activities which are 
intentional, that make use of devices that point beyond themselves, and which are 
normatively constrained, that is they are subject to standards of correctness and 
incorrectness. Language is just one among the many discursive activities (Harre, 
1998).
What then is the social constructionist view of human agency? If we adopt this 
perspective we accept the view that concepts such as the self and identity are not fixed 
entities but ongoing projects, never finally achieved or fully formed, but always in the 
process of construction through social interchange (Shotter, 1995). Similarly our 
ways of being an agent are socially constructed. There is a deconstruction of personal 
causation resulting in a relocation of agency to external context over internal 
dynamics (Fisher, 1999). It is a conception of agency as located not within the 
individual but in shared discursive practices (Harre, 1998); agency in this case “is 
neither ‘in here’ nor ‘out there’ but is realised within the doing of a relationship” 
(Gergen, 1999, p. 114).
A major criticism of social constructionist theories is that the concept of individual 
agency is lost. The emphasis on identity as outcomes of constructive processes and the 
focus on the constructive force of discourse means that the person as an agent is lost 
(Burr, 1997). Fisher (1995) concurs with this point, arguing that in social 
constructionist accounts selves are objects not agents. This argument is countered by 
the constructionist view that all meaning is continually being co-created through 
discourse in interaction with others. Providing the individual has ‘a voice’ which is 
heard then the individual will be both constructing their meaning and having meaning 
constructed in the social realm (Shotter, 1993). There are constraints on where we
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may place ourselves but the problem of lack of agency may be greatest when an 
individual has to struggle to have their voice heard.
When considering how useful this approach might be for counselling psychologists, to 
allow an individual’s ‘voice’ to be heard may be one of the most important aspects of 
therapy. The individual who is heard telling their life narrative or heard in the co­
construction of their identity may find, develop and change their ‘voices’ in order to 
play an active part in their own meaning. Therapy is then a collaborative process of 
negotiation over the meaning in a person’s life.
Social constructionist conceptions of psychotherapy thus involve the therapist moving 
away from interpreting the utterances of the client in terms of hypothesised internal 
entities such as schemas, unconscious processes and the like and instead their role is 
to help the client rewrite a self-narrative or to leave a ‘space of not knowing’ within 
which the client can create themselves afresh. Narratives act as a means for 
communication and a focus for exploration and the therapist is forced to concentrate 
on how meaning is created within the social context of the therapy. Issues to do with 
internal states are bypassed (Cheston, 1996). It is through clients’ self-narratives that 
the T  creates a story in which the ‘me’ is the protagonist and is able to be agentic 
(Gergen, 1992).
From this narrative perspective of therapy (not to be confused with narrative analytic 
therapy discussed earlier; in this approach narratives are socially constructed, not 
constructed from a-priori theories) when clients’ enter therapy they tell stories about 
what they are trying to achieve which do not position them with sufficient agency to 
act upon the problem. A therapeutic conversation has the objective of changing the 
problematic positioning of the individual, re-establishing an agentic position in 
relation to the area of concern (Drewery and McKenzie, 1999).
Criticism of social constructionist attempts to get past modem individualism come 
from critical realists who agree with the postmodern stance that we have no direct 
access to the ‘real’ world independent of our interpretation of things (Richardson et al, 
1998) but take a different position about ontology, the nature of the way things are in
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the world (Pilgrim, 2000). Social constructionists take a relativistic stance; meaning 
stands free of any ties to reality (Guignon, 1998). Critical realists believe that a reality 
does exist which socially causes events but that our representations of the world are 
socially constructed. As Baillie (1995) says “there is a big difference from a logical 
point of view in recognising that something is the case and arguing that it is 
exclusively the case” (p. 2).
Social constructionist thinking assumes that discourse is the only resource available 
for the construction of meaning but it could be argued that the on-going flow or train 
of events that the individual is immersed in also yields a source of meaning that can be 
potentially read. The exercise of agency in the form of goal-directed action has 
therefore to involve a requirement to fit actions to their context in order to be 
successful. Three sorts of things have to be accommodated: the values, 
predispositions and discursive positionings we bring to the situation, the material 
devices and tools to hand and the physical setting. Baillie (1995) calls these three 
things the agent’s ‘local practical order’. Agency is both discursive and enactive. In 
common parlance this is ‘getting our act together’ and implies the mobilising of an 
individual’s own agentic potential (Baillie and Corrie, 1996).
The hermeneutic tradition, from an ontological stance of critical realism, also opens 
up the possibility to conceive of moral and practical issues regarding human agency. 
They conceive of human existence as ‘being-in-the-world’, agency and activity are 
interwoven and meanings are not in our heads but in the world (Richardson et al, 
1998). Human existence has a tripartite temporal structure in that our lives are always 
future directed; the way of projecting into the future defines the past; and actions in 
the present are defined by the anticipated completion and by the unfolding flow of 
what has gone before (Guignon, 1998; Richardson et al, 1998).
Human agency in this dialogical view of self both exercises a high degree of 
individual responsibility and is also intimately woven into the fabric of culture and 
history. Change in therapy is the dialogical creation of new narrative and therefore 
the opening of opportunity for new agency. The transformational power of narrative 
rests in its capacity to re-relate the events of our lives in the context of new and
97
different meanings. The client as author is able both to imagine the future and 
reconstruct the past (Cheston, 1996).
Within the field of sociology Emirbayer and Mische (1998) have reconceptalised and 
analytically disaggregated agency into its several component elements and the 
resulting concept is strikingly similar to the dialogical view of agency and the self, 
described above. They argue that recent attempts to theorise agency have neglected 
crucial aspects of the problem. In their view:
Agency is conceptualised as temporally embedded process of 
social engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), 
but also orientated toward the future (as a capacity to imagine 
alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to 
contextualise past habits and future projects within the 
contingencies of the moment) (p. 962).
They distinguish three different constitutive elements of human agency: The iteration 
element, which is the selective reactivation of past patterns of thought and action that 
are incorporated in practical activity and help sustain individual identities and 
interactions; the projective element, which is the imaginative generation of possible 
future trajectories of action, in relation to hopes, fears, and desires for the future; and 
the practical-evaluative element, the individuals’ capacity to make practical and 
normative judgements among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to 
the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of the presently evolving situations 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).
This concept stresses that agency is intrinsically social and relational and is filled with 
dialogic overtones. It can help us to understand how the therapeutic process affects the 
experience of agency as the way an individual understands their own relationship to 
the past, future and present makes a difference to their actions.
The identification of the constitutive elements of agency can aid research as it opens 
up the empirical challenge of locating, comparing, and predicting the relationship
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between different elements of agentic processes (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). 
Questions can be addressed such as how does the treatment process affect the 
experience of agency? How do these current concepts of agency inform therapy? And 
what part does the client’s agentic influence play in the therapeutic process?
This last question is of particular interest as Elliot and James (1989) conclude their 
review of research literature on clients’ experience of therapy by saying that clients 
are more planful and active in their approach to therapy than has been implied in 
previous research. Martin (1990) argues that research to look at clients’ agentic 
influence on the therapeutic process would provide valuable information on clients’ 
individual differences and might also provide information on common psychological 
processes. He says little research has focused directly on the clients’ experiences and 
intentions during therapy. Also of interest is how clients take their experiences in 
therapy and actively use them to modify their lives outside of the therapy session 
(Bohart & Tallman, 1996). To answer these questions a global level of analysis of 
client experience is required. Baillie and Corrie (1996) argue that if clients are asked 
to reflect retrospectively on their therapeutic experience as a whole, it is likely their 
accounts will convey the overall significance of their psychotherapy and its impact on 
other aspects of their lives.
Conclusion
In conclusion, modernist theories do not do justice to the concept of human agency 
and many of the difficulties inherent in these views can be overcome by adopting a 
postmodern perspective of the concept. Although a radical challenge to existing 
positivist theories these theories open up the concept of agency to empirical research 
so that questions of how the psychotherapeutic process affects client agency and how 
the clients’ agentic influence affects the therapeutic process can be addressed.
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Locating Personal agency: A question for Psychotherapy.
Abstract
Research on clients’ experiences of therapy has resulted in some theorists arguing that 
the awakening of clients’ ‘personal agency’ is one possible common factor that 
accounts for therapeutic change across therapies. But current debates around the 
concept of agency and selfhood appear to devalue the concept such that contemporary 
thinkers almost completely dissolve the human self. An account of human agency that 
attempts to do justice to individual selves (and concepts of freedom and responsibility) 
whilst still recognising the critical concerns of contemporary thinkers (the notion that 
human agency is embedded in cultural and historical contexts) is offered from within 
the hermeneutic tradition and the work of Bakhtin. This is a dialogical understanding 
of self and agency. The aim of this study is to bring clients’ phenomenology to bear 
on the theoretical debate around agency and the sense of self.
This paper reports findings from a qualitative study in which ten people who had 
experienced psychological therapy discussed their beliefs about their experience of 
treatment and how it impact on their lives. Interviews were subjected to interpretative 
phenomenological analysis. The analysis yielded 4 themes: 1) clients’ experience of 
processes and situations which enable/facilitate agency; 2) clients’ experience of 
processes and situations which block/constrain agency; 3) attempts at personal 
solutions; 4) experience of outcome of therapy.
Findings are considered in relation to contemporary therapeutic practice.
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Introduction
Human agency, the means by which an individual deliberately brings into being 
desires, goals and projects, has long been seen as a central defining feature of human 
beings (Harre & Secord, 1972). ‘Personal agency’ refers to the way in which people 
are understood as relatively active or passive and it can be characterised as a sense of 
power, control and autonomy over one’s self and the environment (Madill & Doherty, 
1994). It is also a psychological resource long believed to be associated with mental 
health. A number of theorists take the view that the broad range of clients’ difficulties 
can be understood, in a fundamental way, as a disruption of some sort in the 
experience of agency in their lives (Baillie & Corrie, 1996; Pollock & Slavin, 1998; 
Rennie, 1992) and that the very essence of psychotherapy may be increasing clients’ 
agency (Blow & Piercy, 1997; Hall, 1998; Jenkins, 1997). Blow and Piercy (1997) 
argue for the awakening of client’s ‘personal agency’ as one possible common factor 
that accounts for therapeutic change across therapies. Clients’ are also said to have an 
agentic influence on the therapeutic process (Elliot & James, 1989;. Martin, 1990; 
Rennie, 1992) with some theorists stating that what matters for therapeutic change is 
what the client does actively inside as well as outside the therapy session (Bohart & 
Tallman, 1996, 1997).
The quality of agency was found by Rennie (1992) to be one of the main themes that 
emerged from a qualitative study in which clients were asked to reflect on their 
experience of one hour of therapy. He concludes that it is tempting for therapists to 
view clients as passive participants or patients but that within the encounter clients are 
agents as well as patients and client agency plays a vital role throughout the 
therapeutic process. Hanna, Giordano, Dupuy and Puhakka (1995) carried out a study 
into clients’ experiences of therapeutic change. The focus of their research was to 
isolate and explore experiences of therapeutic change of the more intense variety. 
Findings indicated that what is important for clients’ is a sense of moving beyond 
contextual limitations through the enhancement of personal agency. These views may 
appear to be supported by Snyder and Taylor (2000) who carried out a meta-analysis 
of psychotherapy research and concluded that clients’ sense of agency in regard to 
therapeutic goals was successfully raised. However they assume that this can be
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generalised to other areas of the client’s life but cite no research in support of this. 
They also admit that much of the research they cite does not use the term ‘agency’ to 
explain what was transpiring in the psychotherapy outcome studies, but ‘it is their 
logically derived conclusion that the concepts map onto their definition of agentic 
thought’ (p. 102). This conclusion highlights a problem for research, the concept of 
agency itself and its definition.
The distinction between agency and other terms is indeed difficult to define. Agency 
is about the action of a person and action may be defined as someone’s doing 
something intentionally (Honderich, 1995). Agency can therefore be associated with 
a long list of terms: self-hood, motivation, volition, will, intentionality and choice. 
Another concept central to agency is self-efficacy; an individual’s belief that they can 
produce desired effects by their actions. Bandura (1998) argues that this is the 
foundation of human agency but, on the other hand, it may be argued that for the 
individual it is the feeling that we cause our actions by our own volition, the sensation 
of being a determined ‘doer’ that makes us feel as though we are in charge of our own 
minds. Even if this individual agency is an illusion and unconscious processes drive 
us our sense of agency is an integral part of the self; it helps us build our concept of 
self because it binds us to our acts in such a way that we become responsible for them 
(Carter, 2002). What is clear is that agency is about human intentionality and action 
and that this definition ties it closely into the concept of the ‘self. A self is conceived 
to be a subject of consciousness, capable of thought and experience and able to engage 
in deliberate action (Honderich, 1995).
Models of therapy however, have been governed by a predominantly modernist 
epistemology and this modernist notion of ‘self. Post-modern critics argue that this 
highly individualised and autonomous view of ‘self is overly idealised and “conceals 
any constitutive role of cultural context or social processes in its formation or 
resulting identity” (Richardson, Rogers, McCarroll, 1998, p. 501). Human action has a 
number of characteristics: i) it is directed towards realising projected outcomes that 
constitute the agents’ goals in acting, ii) it is situated in a context that must be grasped 
in terms of how it matters for the agent, hi) because it generally involves interaction 
with others and takes place against a backdrop of standards and conventions accepted
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by a social group, human action invariably has an evaluative significance for people 
(Guignon, 1998). Modernist conceptions of self and agency appear to address the first 
of these features but a variety of authors now agree that they fail to do justice to the 
other two (Josephs, 2000; Richardson & Zeddies, 2001; Sato, 1998). For models of 
therapy governed by this modernist epistemology problems thus reside in the 
limitations of interpretive systems which focus narrowly on intra-psychic events to the 
exclusion of their wider social context, or in overvaluing human agency and 
understating material constraints on our ability to choose our destiny (Pilgrim, 1992)
The difficulty that the modernist approaches have in doing justice to human agency 
has given rise to the concept of the 4 decentred’ self of postmodern constructionist 
theorists. This view deconstructs personal causation and relocates it to external 
context over internal dynamics. The activity and nature of the self are products of 
language systems and relations of power that firmly place human action in the context 
of culture and history (Neimeyer, 1998). Ideas of agency are based on the notion that 
our realities are socially constructed and language-constituted. Within this 
constructionist movement social constructionist theorists place a special emphasis on 
the role of language in social interchange. Concepts such as the self and identity are 
not fixed entities but ongoing projects, never finally achieved or fully formed, but 
always in the process of construction through social interchange (Shotter, 1995). 
Similarly our ways of being an agent are socially constructed. It is a conception of 
agency as located not within the individual but in shared discursive practices (Harre,
1998), human agency is embedded in an historical context and subject to deep 
‘cultural constraints’ (Richardson et al. 1998). The practice of psychology is 
increasingly integrating ideas from postmodernism and within psychotherapy this can 
be seen in the turn towards narrative and discursive therapies. A shift from positivism 
to constructionism means that therapists must move into a world of mutual influence 
and constructed meaning (Rubin, 1997).
However criticism of social constructionist attempts to get past modem individualism 
comes from critical realists who agree with the postmodern stance that we have no 
direct access to the ‘real’ world independent of our interpretation of things 
(Richardson et al, 1998) but take a different position about ontology. They believe
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that a reality does exist which socially causes events and that our interpretations tell us 
something about that ‘real’ world (Pilgrim, 2000). In their view discursive 
approaches to the self and agency ‘lose the subject’, that is they deliberately avoid the 
suggestion that human beings have any fundamental or internal ‘sense’ of themselves 
as a self. However for therapists working with individual clients a credible account of 
human capacities for self-reflection seems essential and indeed Parker (1999) argues 
that the capacity to be reflective (to think about oneself) is at the core of human 
agency and understanding and is the point of connection between the individual and 
the social.
The problems of both the modem ‘individual self and the postmodern ‘decentred self 
appear to be overcome within the hermeneutic tradition and the work of Bakhtin 
(Hermans, 1996). From an ontological stance of critical realism they offer a view of 
human agency that appears to both do justice to individual selves whilst still 
recognising cultural and historical contexts. In their view human understanding and 
existence have a fundamentally dialogical character. The shape of individual practices 
and experience results from the interplay and mutual influence between present and 
past, interpreters and events, readers and texts, one person and another and an ongoing 
inner dialogue among points of view (Richardson et al 1998). The result of this 
dialogue between different voices is the story an individual makes about their life and 
allows for a ‘self that is permeated by otherness and yet is the center of responsible 
action (Hermans, 1996). The self is dialogical and partly decentred.
The aim of this study is to explore clients’ individual experiences of therapy to see 
how in their accounts they implicitly conceive of their sense of agency and processes 
and situations that enable or constrain it. The ultimate aim of the study is to bring 
clients’ phenomenology to bear on the theoretical debate around agency and the sense 
of self it implies.
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Method
Participants
In order to generate diverse and comprehensive accounts, attempts were made to 
recruit participants from a range of therapeutic practices and irrespective of their 
presenting problem. An inclusion criterion for participants was that they were not 
currently in therapy, thus ensuring that the interview process would not affect the 
outcome of the therapeutic process. Ten participants were recruited through contacts 
at the author’s work placements. Potential participants were contacted by letter or by 
personal approach followed up by letter (See appendix I).
The ten participants were two adult males and eight adult females. Participants’ mean 
age was 32.5 years (range 21-46 years; SD 2.37). Their duration of therapy ranged 
from six weeks to 7 years (mean 18.2 months; SD 23.13) and time since therapy 
ranged from 9 months to 3 years (mean 17.3 months; SD 8.28). Three participants 
were unaware of the type of therapy they underwent. Of the seven who knew, one had 
psychoanalysis, three had psychodynamic therapy, one cognitive behavioural therapy, 
one systemic family therapy and one systemic individual therapy
The Interviews
A pilot interview was conducted with a colleague who had undertaken a course of 
therapy and this informed the subsequent interview schedule and participant 
interviews. The interview schedule was also developed with reference to existing 
literature and questions were clarified in response to reactions of early interviewees. It 
became apparent that there were problems in individuals’ understanding of the 
concept of agency and with using definitions. It was decided to bracket out this 
problem by not talking specifically about ‘agency’ but to investigate the way 
participants imply agentic processes.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted (see appendix II for interview schedule). 
Usually in qualitative approaches, the agenda is open to development and change,
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depending on the narrator’s experiences (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). This requires a 
relatively unstructured interview in which the interviewer is actively involved in 
following-up participants’ responses with prompts, used where necessary for 
clarification and to encourage expansion on the topic areas. As the focus is on the
substantive topic it is acknowledged that the interviewer plays a role in jointly
constructing the narratives. This approach therefore emphasises the meaning that is 
created within the research pair and as such the interview schedule is to be understood 
as a guide to the likely areas of exploration relevant to the research question.
The participants were interviewed face to face to elicit their accounts of their
experience of therapy and life after therapy. All were interviewed at a place
convenient to them, and the interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and an hour 
and a quarter. At the time of the interview participants were asked to sign a consent 
form to ensure that taping and the use of the interview material was agreed to (see 
appendix III) and demographic details of the participants were collected. The current 
training status of the researcher facilitates the use of counselling psychology skills as a 
research tool, where the role of the interviewer is primarily to encourage the 
interviewees to use their own language to express themselves. Therefore the method 
of interviewing was based upon an interactional style derived from counselling 
(Coyle, 1998). All interview recordings were transcribed verbatim, (see appendix v 
for example of one interview transcript).
Analytic Strategy
The data were analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) (Smith, 
1996). IP A provides a systematic framework to analyse participants’ experiences, 
cognitions and meaning making, as well as the interaction between the researchers 
interpretative framework and the participants’ accounts (Smith, Jarman & Osborn,
1999). IPA’s stance is that it does not claim that participants are describing reality 
(that is the actuality of what happened) but, rather, that they are describing what they 
perceive and experience as reality (what might be termed their ‘psychological 
reality’). Although IP A is concerned with what the individual thinks and believes in 
relation to the phenomena being investigated, it also recognises that the interpretation
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of the response is linked intrinsically with the researcher’s values and beliefs and with 
their engagement in the analytic process. Interpretations are subjective because it is 
not claimed that the thoughts of an individual are transparent within verbal reports, 
although the analysis is undertaken with the assumption that meaningful 
interpretations can be made about those thoughts (Smith et al. 1999).
Initially the analysis involved reading one transcript in depth and noting in the left- 
hand margin anything that appeared relevant or pertinent to the research topic. The 
transcript was read again and the right hand margin used to record themes that aimed 
to capture what was represented in the text. These themes included summaries of 
content, connections between different aspects of the transcripts and initial tentative 
interpretations. This was repeated for all the transcripts paying particular attention to 
commonalities and anomalies. The themes for each individual transcript were then 
analysed for collective patterns and connections. From these connections a table of 
master themes was produced, including a small number of super-ordinate themes with 
a number of sub-themes, each of which has identifiable instances within each 
transcript. Any super-ordinate themes that could have been based on the questioning 
during the interview process were rejected. The themes were then ordered to produce 
a coherent and logical research narrative.
Inevitably such an analysis involves a high degree of subjectivity as it is shaped by the 
researcher’s interpretative framework. As researchers we cannot be detached but must 
examine our subjective involvement because it helps to shape the way in which we 
interpret the interview data. But this ‘shaping’ also takes place at earlier points, for 
instance during the interviews. How does the researcher let the participant know their 
story made sense, how does she direct the content of the account through questioning, 
how and when are missing pieces asked for, as well as failure to ask for further 
information.
The process of analysis therefore included independent audit from the research 
supervisor. This verification of interpretations and emerging themes by a second 
reader ensures consistency and truthfulness in the research. Additional comments 
added by the supervisor identified potential problems in the analysis. In particular
111
how I often treated the participants’ accounts as unproblematic reflections of the 
actualities they purport to describe rather than their status as accounts and how 
occasionally the data do not quite substantiate my interpretations.
This subjectivity means that traditional criteria for evaluating research are not 
appropriate. Elliott, Fischer and Rennie (1999) have developed a framework for 
evaluating qualitative research studies in psychology. This criteria include grounding 
the analysis by using examples of the data to illustrate the analytic interpretations, 
providing credibility checks and the presence of a coherent, data-based story that 
communicates the findings persuasively. In this paper, interpretations are illustrated 
by extracts from the data with the aim of allowing the readers to assess the 
persuasiveness of the analysis for themselves. Quotation conventions include the use 
of square brackets that contain material to aid clarification and empty brackets to 
indicate that material has been omitted. To ensure confidentiality participants’ names 
have been replaced by an identification number and throughout the report material has 
been presented in a way that respects participants’ confidentiality.
Use of self in the research process
Qualitative research involves procedures that rely on the ‘person’ of the researcher at 
each stage of the process. The researcher is present in the selection of participants, the 
interviews and the analysis of the data. It could be said that the researcher is the main 
investigative tool in qualitative research (McLeod, 1999). Therefore an understanding 
of the motives, values, assumptions and experiences not only of our participants but 
also of ourselves as researchers constitutes a fundamental part of the research process.
My motivation to research this area stems from my practice as a trainee counselling 
psychologist and my attempts to integrate practice, research and theory. The ethos of 
therapy, on personal exploration and learning and on the concept of understanding 
‘the other’ that is the client sitting opposite from me, seeks to generate knowledge in 
context. As a trainee counselling psychologist working in NHS placements I rarely 
have the opportunity to ‘follow up’ on clients and hear their thoughts and feelings 
following their course of therapy. What have they found useful? Has change
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occurred and continued? This research is an opportunity for me to personally hear 
individuals’ accounts of their therapy and to perhaps start to get a ‘feel’ of the possible 
answers to these questions.
A second motivation stems from an interest in the current debates raised by post­
modern theorists. How can I as a therapist best deal with the postmodern proliferation 
of theoretical perspectives? By including these debates in my research I hope to be 
able to take responsibility for the knowledge base of my professional work.
Inevitably, the subjective perspective of the author impacts upon the form of analysis 
used in the research. Being aware of this, I have tried to examine my own biases prior 
to embarking on this research. I am aware that my gender (female), age, and position 
as a counselling psychology trainee could impact upon the analysis. For instance 
being female means I may be subject to culturally defined roles of what it means to be 
female and have a sense of my own agency. I grew up in the period of ‘woman’s 
liberation’ and consider myself a feminist. This inevitably impacts upon my own 
views. The research process has caused me to question whether in my therapeutic 
work I am guilty of promoting the view of an autonomous self who can ‘self actualise’ 
and thus not pay enough attention to my clients’ problems which result from real 
political and social constraints. Hopefully I will be mindful of these constraints in my 
future therapeutic work.
My training teaches the skills necessary to get close to clients. When collecting 
research data these skills allow me to collect sensitive data. This creates a unique 
situation with ethical dilemmas. I am aware that I am not my participants’ therapist 
and do not take on that role; at the same time the interview setting is similar to a 
therapeutic encounter. I was concerned that in sometimes reflecting back what had 
been said, with the aim of enhancing my understanding of the account, I might be 
construed as potentially offering some level of intervention. However I was aware 
that in-depth interviewing might evoke powerful emotions in participants.
This made me uncomfortable; in whose best interest is this process happening? These 
are not easy questions to answer from the ‘inside’. The fact that all of the participants
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in my research appeared to have enjoyed the process of talking about their therapy 
alleviated some of these misgivings. I hope that, if any of my participants had become 
distressed, my professional training would have allowed me to terminate the interview 
and carry out a thorough and sensitive debriefing, ensuring that the participant was not 
left in a distressed state.
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Analysis
The data provided a wide range of information regarding the participants’ experiences 
of therapy but keeping in mind the research aim the analysis of the data yielded four 
super-ordinate themes: 1) clients’ experience of processes and situations which 
enable/facilitate agency; 2) clients’ experience of processes and situations which 
block/constrain agency; 3) Attempts at personal solutions; 4) Experience of outcome 
of therapy.
Clients’ experience of processes and situations which enable/facilitate agency
Apparent from the clients’ accounts was that fact that their sense of agency is not 
static; it varies depending on situation and time. But for all participants it was 
possible to identify processes and situations that, according to their subjective 
experience, appeared to facilitated their sense of agency.
Confirmation/acceptance:
When given the opportunity to report on their subjective experience of therapy, it was 
evident that they were persons in interaction with another person, the therapist. The 
participants who experienced an overall positive outcome from their therapy (nine of 
the ten participants) reported that what was valuable in their therapy was the 
acceptance of their therapist.
I  suppose as much as anything it was feeling that there was somebody who was on 
your side, somebody who was kind o f validating your own thoughts and feelings, you 
know this sort o f sense that you had support in this, you weren ’t alone (1).
For this client it appears to be the mutual influence between herself and the therapist 
that gave her a sense of her thoughts and feelings being valid. Other participants were 
more explicit in saying that the confirmation of their therapist allowed them to be 
more active and create changes in their lives:
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I  mean whether it was just having someone sitting there kind o f understanding, kind o f  
pushing me on a bit but I  did start to do a lot whilst going there, I  started to teach 
French and that was something that Fd never had any experience o f doing. She didn Y 
push me to do it, she didn Y say go out and do it but somehow I  was able to (6).
Similarly participant 2 talks about the starting point for the process of change she 
experienced:
Unconditional acceptance was probably the biggest starting point. [] the fact that 
somebody accepted me, you can pour out all this stuff and someone says you ’re still 
OK and I ’m still here for you[] particularly with sexual abuse [] that’s probably the 
biggest thing that I ’ve got out o f it.
She believes that as a result of this:
[]I think that’s motivated me to do all sorts o f other things that I  once thought I  can Y 
do that. The fact that I  am going to do teacher training is amazing [] I ’m not hesitant 
to make friends and mix.
For her this came about by construction of a new self-narrative that the therapist’s 
acceptance allowed
My self-image has changed [] therapy has made me, the real me come out rather than 
being suppressed by what has happened to me.
From this start she continues to create changes in her life:
My goodness i f  I  hadn Y got this stuff sorted out I  couldn Y be doing what I  want to do 
now.
Interestingly, the one participant who experienced an overall negative outcome of 
therapy reports an experience of his therapist in which there appears to be no mutual 
acceptance:
I  don Y think it achieved very much [] he [the therapist] would come out with 
statements oh this is so and so you ’re suffering from and it didn Y make a lot o f sense 
tome [] I  don Y think it [therapy] made any difference at all.
But he later reported a significant event:
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Six months after my therapy I  got married and that was the major change in my 
lifestyle [] she was more supportive and then I  got myself off the drugs (9).
For him also the presence of a ‘confirming’ other appears to have enabled him to 
somehow mobilise his own agency to make changes in his life.
There is a sense in all these accounts that for these individuals to display their own 
agency the interaction with another was required and the quality of that interaction 
was crucial. This accords with Howe’s (1993) findings that what is important to 
clients for a successful therapeutic encounter is to be accepted and understood. From 
these accounts it is not always clear how this interaction results in increased agency 
although participant 2 hints at this in talking about the change in her self-image.
Changes in self narrative:
Indeed for most participants the process of therapy resulted in a positive change in 
their self-narrative that in turn appeared to allowe them to initiate other changes in 
their lives.
I t ’s also allowed me to gain confidence [J making more friends and to challenge 
myself(6)
I  do feel ever such a lot more confident these days and I ’ve got a better self-image as 
well [J That’s the biggest benefit [] It got my self confidence back I  was more 
capable o f dealing with it and sorting it out and thinking well yes I  want to make these 
changes for me (3).
[another useful aspect o f therapy] she almost seemed to understand me much better 
than I  ever did[] gave me the confidence in me [] to do things and get things rolling 
and then they kind o f sort themselves out [] to take the initiative really, that was that 
kind o f confidence thing. (5).
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The use of dialogue:
This theme included instances where participants found the actual process of a 
dialogue, whether between themselves and another or as an inner dialogue, useful in 
enabling their own agency. With reference to inner dialogue participant (1) says of 
her problem situation:
/  think o f it as a sort o f cost benefit analysis. How much benefit would I  get from 
doing this or not doing it? [] it still goes on.
Late in her account she again talks about this evaluation between positions and hints at 
contextual situations which may constrain her choices:
I  don Y just have free rein [] and when I  talked about cost benefit that was the sort o f  
thing. Well OK this might be in it for me but there is more than just me. And that’s 
appeared before hasn Y it just now in terms o f my son, there is much more, my life is 
much bigger than me. It is not just about me.
When asked if she would have considered this before her therapy her answer clearly 
showed how the relationship with her therapist helped in this process:
I  might have been able to do it but I  would have felt very much more alone in that [] 
I t ’s now a considered process with somebody who thought about it[] not gave me 
permission but legitimacy from someone else.
Other accounts also contained reference to the enabling process of dialogue:
I  think what happens in counselling you listen to yourself speak therefore you are 
listening to your inner thoughts a bit more clearly and I  think that is how it helps [] I  
mean even now days I  often find i f  I  have a problem and I  actually speak out loud it’s 
almost as i f  I  can hear my thoughts [] i f  I  listen to them through my own ears then I  
can understand them and it’s easier to decide what to do about it, to do something 
about it(6)
I  could use her [the therapist] as a sounding board because I  was worried that a lot o f  
the things I  was saying were irrational and paranoid. She could offer a different 
perspective on it and then I  could work out for myself whether I  really was being silly 
or it was justified (8).
118
just the process o f talking [to the therapist], making it words clarifies it in your mind, 
things become very tangled and embedded and by actually putting it into words it 
clarifies what you think about it [and another thing] I  write lists o f what is the bloody 
problem[] it’s almost the same as speaking (9).
It was useful to me to just go back and talk to myself as a child in a way and have that 
child listened to and taken seriously and believed and kind o f comforted. And it made 
me more aware o f the options I  had in terms o f acting upon, you know taking action i f  
I  wanted to (1)
One participant is explicit in how lack of dialogue hindered her in her first attempt at 
therapy. Describing the therapy as ‘a load o f crap ’ she went on to say:
It wasn’t entirely futile but it was no means as good as the second lot, which was 
excellent, you know progressed me on. Whereas the other one was more offloading 
things but not really dealing with it.
Researcher -  So it wasn’t enough to just talk about it?
No not really. It was just like a monologue instead o f dialogue (5).
She compares this to her second course of therapy:
she developed a really good understanding o f me over sort o f an eighteen month 
period and um that was really useful [] It helped really I  suppose to give me a better 
understanding o f myself, someone to bounce these things off, I  had a lot to talk about 
because I  hadn't talked about anything for twenty two, twenty three years whatever so 
I  had a lot to get out and I  needed to get it out there and see what kind o f information 
I  got back, that was really useful (5).
Although this participant had a lot to talk about there is a sense that what was useful in 
‘moving her on’ was the other’s, in this case the therapist’s, evaluation of the problem 
situation (issues of gender and being transsexual).
Participant (6) was encouraged by her therapist to use the Gestalt two chair technique:
I  had to almost literally sit on two different chairs and talk to him, but that actually 
helped, it sticks in my mind so I  think that somehow it might have worked (6)
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This could be interpreted as a form of dialogue that allows the participant to think 
about the problem from her own position and from the position of a significant other 
(her ex husband). The result of using this technique was that she moved from a 
position of no agency (7 felt that he had absolutely ruined my life and it was all his 
fault [] and I  lost my confidence, I  wasn’t doing anything) to what could be argued is 
the healthier position of: [] and I  realised it wasn’t all his fault, it was partly mine, I  
had to take some o f the responsibility.
Experiential learning:
It was clear from the accounts that the process of actually ‘doing’ (that is 
experiencing) things differently leads to new meaning and new ways of behaving.
You do it differently just by having a go [] things I  had talked about in the session I  
was watching out for them outside and I  was trying to change [] it all clicks together, 
based on something I  have actually gone and done (7)
But she reports that after 7 years in intensive therapy and only one year after it’s finish 
that:
Most um change has been since I  stopped [] it’s given me a chance to actually see for 
myself what I ’m like [] it felt I  wasn’t given time to put it into practice because the 
relationship with her was so intensive (7).
It was the thing o f doing it and proving yourself [] it was this kind o f action thing (4)
Obviously when you have had some success it’s easier for some more to follow, i f  
you’ve developed the confidence but I  think the therapy was sort o f fundamental in 
sowing some foundations for that (5).
This appears to support the claims of theorists who argue that what matters for 
therapeutic change is what the client does actively outside as well as inside the therapy 
session (Bohart & Tallman, 1996,1997). It also highlights the inter-relatedness of the 
client’s agentic influence on the therapeutic process and the influence of the 
therapeutic process on the client’s agency.
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Clients’ experience of processes and situations which block agency
Within their accounts of their experiences of therapy some participants talked about 
processes or situations that appeared to constrain or block their sense of agency.
In relationship with others:
Participants’ experiences indicate that there are constraints on their actions as a result 
of others. For example participant (1) says:
[There were] specific issues from past experience which Ifelt were appropriate to 
bring to therapy, or had wanted to at various times.
But in explaining why she had not previously gone to therapy: 
to be honest it was the label o f possible mental illness in a way and how that was 
regarded within my family which was very much medical um and there was a stigma 
and there was kind o f what it might mean i f  you had a record o f mental ill health in 
the long term. It might prevent you from getting certain jobs or there was very much 
that kind offear, fear o f what it might mean socially I  suppose.
Participant (8) explained that others’ views on mental illness had prevented her from 
seeking help:
/  had adopted that sort o f well there is nothing wrong with me, I  don’t need to see 
anybody, I ’m not mad kind o f thing.
Some participants implied that their sense of agency was blocked by their 
relationships with others.
I  was coping with myself but I  wasn’t coping with how my husband was in the 
problem, I  mean he hadn ’t been particularly sympathetic (2)
When I  was young I  used to hate my mum, we argued all the time. She tried to rule my 
life but one thing she couldn’t control was my diet (10)
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Practical constraints:
Some participants experienced practical constraints on their ability to take action.
That’s another significant thing actually, I ’m in constant chronic pain [] since 1981,1 
broke my back, so that is significant thing that affects why I  really um tried to take my 
life. It [the pain] prevents me from doing so many things (9).
I  did consider going back to therapy because I  was having a difficult time. But it 
wasn’t really viable because I  couldn’t afford it and because o f time. Finding 
someone to have the children as well (8)
The process of therapy:
Some participants reported that they felt that the actual process of therapy created 
problems. For instance participant (1) talks of the effect it had on her personal 
relationships.
I  think the process [of therapy] was encouraging that whole thing o f being self- 
absorbed. To the extent Ifelt that it might have been a way o f you know a way o f  
thinking about me and my own things too much. And that makes you less available to 
others [] it can be a withdrawing [] it creates a sense o f isolation 
In this instance inner-dialogue was a constraint on her ability to have ‘good’ 
relationships with important people in her life and in fact influenced her decision to 
stop therapy.
Participant (4) talks about a second attempt at therapy that was not successful: 
actually I  did go again [] but I  only went for one session because I  didn't like the 
counsellor so I  decided not to go back. I  was having problems with self-consciousness 
which I  have had since I  was little. But sometimes it gets worse and you know it's 
really at the front o f my mind and it was at the time [] but she wanted to focus on my 
relationship and I  was saying no I  want to focus on my self-consciousness and self- 
confidence problems but she kept coming back to the relationship all the time which I
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wasn't happy with and she was also quite flippant about one o f my problems as well 
about being self- conscious so I  just didn't go (4)
This experience could be interpreted as a lack of ‘true meeting’ between the therapist 
and her client. There is no confirmation of the participant’s feelings, just a sense of an 
T-it’ relating in which the other (the client) becomes an object
Attempts at personal solutions
Participants’ accounts of their therapy included the experiences that brought them to 
therapy. For many these included attempts to solve their problem situations by either 
trying to ‘make sense’ of them or by initiating some form of action.
Attempts to make sense of problem experiences:
I  thought it /panic attacks in social situations] might be down to irritable bowel (3).
It felt like the only legitimate way [of dealing with problem] was to become almost 
like physically ill (7)
For these two participants there is a sense of downplaying and localising 
psychological problems as physical condition. Tentatively it could be said that there 
is a kind of dialogue going on within the person to decide on an evaluative stance.
In a similar possibly unhelpful way one participant tried to explain her experiences in 
terms of a ‘normal’ life stage even though her presenting problem was described as 
recurring dreams of past sexual abuse:
Whether it was a sort o f mid-life crisis (2).
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Self initiated action:
All participants initiated some action before the decision to start therapy. These self­
initiated actions appear to indicate an attempt to actively change the problem situation 
and imply a sense of personal-agency.
[] I  think it was only as an adult that I  became more angry about what had happened 
um and so I  did pick up my own techniques for blocking out and sort o f or spending a 
lot o f time thinking about it and sort o f allowing myself to do different things in my 
head [] Whether I  would say it's helpful? Those are the things I  did and I  suppose as 
I ’m talking here I ’m thinking yes these were the ways I  was trying to deal with it, the 
intrusive aspect, this was something that came up and I  didn Y want it to (1)
Some participants used resources from their environment to help them cope with their 
problem:
I  had tried like meditation and acupuncture [] I  found it really difficult to meditate, I  
tried things like St. John’s Wort (3)
Well I  read a few books [] I  tried and sometimes I  kept it up for a week or two, things 
about stress, things like listening to yourself and working out routines and keeping 
diaries [] a few weeks later it would slip away and I ’d start feeling bad again (8)
These resources were not however sufficient in resolving the problem. These 
episodes indicate that in coming to therapy the participants are recognising that their 
own agency has been inadequate. Participant (4) says this in her own words when, 
towards the end of her account she considers whether she would go back to therapy:
I  wouldn't rule out going back [to therapy] [] I  always try the other things I  do, I  try 
them first, I  suppose i f  I  got to the point where that wasn't helping me then I  would try 
counselling again. (4)
However, only two participants initiated their own therapy. Six participants were 
persuaded by family or friends to attend. Two participants had to attend therapy. For
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one it was a legal requirement due to a drugs problem and one because of academic 
course requirements.
Experience of outcome
The nature of this study, asking for retrospective accounts of therapy, means 
participants’ experiences include the impact of their therapy
Beliefs around change:
In some ways it’s nice now because I  do still have this [] sort o f thoughts come up, i f  
that whole topic comes up in my head along with it is the therapy and that whole 
processes as well. So no longer is it just the intrusive thoughts it’s the intrusive 
thoughts plus what went on in the therapy and that quite often leads me to think about 
the therapy and the sort o f changes that were made there and the sort o f benefits there 
and it feels quite good. That there is this pairing now. I  might get the same frequency 
o f thoughts but it finishes quicker. I  don’t stay there. I  walk along with my therapist 
for a while and then I  come out. [] So I ’m more available [to others] (I).
The experience of this client resonates with Buber’s ideas that dialogical relating is 
not simply verbal dialogue but that two people’s dialogical life continues, even when 
they are separated in space, as the continual potential presence of the one to the other, 
as an unexpressed dialogue.
Clients’ accounts implicitly point to the enhancement of their personal agency as a 
positive outcome of therapy.
I'm in a position now that a couple o f years ago I  would never have deemed possible 
[] I've already gone beyond the mark o f what some people do I  suppose, I've realised 
that it's almost limitless the possibilities o f what you can achieve (5).
It definitely benefited cause I  mean in the long term I  reckon I ’m about 85% better 
than I  was, I  was in a complete state then [] now I  rarely get nervous. It took a
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number o f months after therapy to work out like that [ J I  turned my life around but not 
immediately [] I ’ve just managed to bring about gradual changes (3)
Once it finished that was when I  really sort ofgot myself together [] after therapy I  
made myself better [by] thinking more positively and doing things myself like starting 
yoga, keeping busy, going out socialising you know. Rather than sitting at home 
mulling over everything (4).
As if her agency was mobilised in therapy and continues, so she has a sense of her 
own actions bringing about change. She says of this process:
[] she helped me get it together, [] before I  went and I  might have had the idea that 
she was going to give me some answers [] so that's one thing I  found out, that you 
don't get answers from someone else which I  think was something I  knew semi- 
cons ciously anyway [] it's more focused on you as an individual being responsible (4).
New ways of handling problems:
Outcomes of therapy included clear indications that change for client’s leads to new 
ways of being and behaving in their personal worlds.
I  think I'm much more able to step out into something new so yes I  can do this and i f  I  
struggle I  have got resources that I ’ve gained from the counselling in order to help me 
through it, um so I  would be much more ready to jump into a new situation feeling 
that I  have got resources that I  can use to cope with it (2)
For two participants the ‘new way of being’ includes coping with problems by 
‘talking’ with others.
[ifproblems now] I  talk to people as well, like my friend who's very self-conscious like 
me you know i f  it's a problem about that I  talk to her and sometimes I  talk to my sister
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about things [] and even my mum, we've got closer over the last few years, talk to her 
about things as well (4)
in fact what I  actually do now and this may be a result o f the counselling is quite a 
good one I  think possibly that what I  tend to do is I  tend to talk about things before 
they become a problem as soon as I  realise something um to give an example cause 
one does spring to mind I  suppose I  could say it, um I  went to see my consultant and it 
was quite heady stuff you know talking about all sorts o f things and I  said to my 
friends oh I  need to talk to you about this cause like this was last year, about this time 
last year because it's not a problem at the moment but I  don't want it to become a 
problem, I  don't want it on my mind um so I  talked about it to my friends and what I  
always do now is I  talk about things before, as soon as I  realise there may be a 
problem around the corner with that I  talk about it so in effect it almost doesn't 
happen but the problem doesn't actually occur because it's been dealt with before, as 
soon as I  get a feeling about it I  talk. (5)
Metaphors of change:
The actual change process that an individual experiences is difficult to verbalise as 
evidenced by the powerful metaphors used to describe it. The participants may not 
have thought about the process before this research experience and therefore it is not 
surprising they use this type of language.
It was like you had this [] fairytale not an oracle or a fountain o f knowledge but this 
sort o f grotto you could go to say what you wanted [] There is almost this mysterious 
thing, it just sort o f happened that I  no longer have this fear (1).
I  don't think about it too much but it almost seems like unbelievable, I  wonder i f  I ’ll 
wake up (laughs) and it’s really funny because it's almost like it makes me think o f a 
film, I  watched sliding doors last night it’s almost like turn a different corner and I  
wonder where you 'd be you know it’s just like that. Um Fm glad I've gone where I  
went or whatever, it’s just believing in yourself really and sometimes it takes like 
counselling and so on to help you to develop that and realise that and umyea it just 
knocks me out (5).
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Overview
This study does not claim to be representative of therapeutic clients in general. It is 
clear that with only ten participants the generalisability of these findings is limited. 
However, the aim of this study is to gain an in-depth understanding of the experience 
of a small group of people. Thus conclusions presented here are made with reference 
to this particular group only and any relevance for others should be treated tentatively.
Because of the retrospective nature of the study the participants’ narratives will be 
incomplete. The telling of their story will be selective and effected by factors such as 
memory, motives and context. It will also depend on the context and history of earlier 
retellings. Overall the experiences of the participants in this study were positive. 
Rennie (1994) warns that there is the possibility that the passage of time enables 
clients to recount their overall experience in the interest of justifying the time, effort, 
and hope that went into therapy, at the expense of forgetting about or minimising 
some very real negative experiences. However if clients are asked to reflect 
retrospectively on their therapeutic experience as a whole, it is likely their accounts 
will convey the overall significance of their psychotherapy and its impact on other 
aspects of their lives. This is important not only for the specific topic under 
investigation but also because “experiences that trigger clients’ entry to therapy and 
clients' experiences of outcomes, especially regards life after therapy, are neglected 
themes of research” (Baillie & Corrie, 1996, p.299).
In future research the validity of the study would be enhanced if the participants were 
able at all times to review their narrative to verify the accuracy of what was said and 
to comment on interpretation of themes in and across their own narrative. Neutrality 
would have been aided by blind reading of the interview texts by a second reader who 
has no connection to the academic and clinical setting where the research occurs.
The aim of the study was to explore participants’ subjective experience of their 
psychological therapy to see how, within their accounts (or narratives), they implicitly 
conceive of their sense of agency, and processes and situations that enable or constrain
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it. Overall, the present findings have highlighted the complex nature of an 
individual’s sense of agency as it is represented in the present participants’ narratives. 
All participants’ in this study implicitly point to the enhancement of their sense of 
personal agency as a positive outcome of therapy. An interesting finding as the 
concept of agency was not explicitly referred to during the interview process.
All participants’ appeared to initiate action to actively change their problem situation 
before they made the decision to enter therapy. But the resources they used were not 
sufficient in solving the problem. This concurs with the view that the broad range of 
clients’ difficulties can be understood, in a fundamental way, as a disruption of some 
sort in the experience of agency (Baillie & Corrie, 1996; Pollock & Slavin, 1998; 
Rennie, 1992)
For most participants the enhancement of their sense of agency appeared to be 
preceded by a positive change in their self-narrative. It is not always clear what 
brought this about. There is a sense in all the narratives that for these individuals to 
enhance their sense of their own agency the interaction with another was required and 
the quality of that interaction was crucial. This accords with Howe’s (1993) findings 
that what is important to clients for a successful therapeutic encounter is to be 
accepted and understood. That dialogue helped in this process was obvious from the 
narratives, but of interest was the finding that for some participants internal dialogues 
were also important.
Overall the findings have highlighted that for the present participants the dialogical 
view of agency could be said to best ‘fit’ with their experiences. The sub-theme of 
confirmation/acceptance by the ‘other’ ties in closely to intersubjectivity theory, 
which argues that personal agency is produced and sustained by the support of others 
(Wheyway, 1999).
Many therapists work within modernist therapies and take for granted the notion of 
the individual autonomous self and that notion plays a pivotal role in their 
understanding of what does and should take place in therapy. If agency is located 
within an individual psyche, empowerment can occur in isolation from personal
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relationships or social systems. However, this is not the experience of participants in 
this study. The social constructionist perspective on psychotherapy provides a fruitful 
method for conceptualising some, but not all, aspects of client experience. It fails in 
particular, to capture the material and social contingencies of action. For the clients’ 
in this study their experience of agency involves physical, practical and biological 
aspects in addition to purely discursive aspects. This seems to accord with the critical 
realist view of human agency as involving intervention in an external causal order that 
can either constrain or facilitate action (Baillie, 1995; Baillie & Corrie, 1996).
It may be argued that the dialogical, partly decentred, view of human agency offers a 
way to do justice to individual selves (which does not undermine concepts of freedom 
and responsibility) whilst still recognising cultural and historical contexts. It also 
opens up the possibility to conceive of moral and practical issues regarding human 
agency. This concept stresses that agency is intrinsically social and relational and is 
filled with dialogic overtones. It may help us to understand how the therapeutic 
process affects the experience of agency and also help explain why the therapeutic 
relationship may be a key ingredient of change. If change in therapy is the dialogical 
creation of new practices and experiences and therefore the opening of opportunity for 
new agency then it may be useful for therapists to conceptualise the change process in 
this way.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I
Participant letter
Dear
Thank you for your interest in my doctorate research project. I am undertaking 
a Practitioner Doctorate in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology at the 
University of Surrey. This is an advanced professional psychology training in the 
practice, research and academic aspects of psychological therapy.
As part of my second year research I am interested in finding out about clients’ 
experiences of therapy and the impact, if any, on their life. In my research I am 
interested in finding out about people’s own accounts of therapy, in particular what 
brought them to therapy in the first place, their experience of the therapy itself and 
what, if anything, they take away with them once the therapy has finished. The 
purpose of this letter is to indicate what would be required from you if you agree to 
participate.
The interview should last for up to one hour during which you will be asked about 
your experience of therapy. The interview will be taped and some of your interview 
transcript may be used in my research report. This report will be read by my 
supervisors and examiners however your confidentiality is assured. The names of any 
people and places that may connect what is written in the report with you will be 
removed. The tape recorded interviews will be kept in a secure place at all times.
They will be transcribed and at the end of the project the actual tape recording will be 
destroyed.
It may be that talking about these sensitive issues will be upsetting. However you do 
have the right to stop the interview at any time and to withdraw from the study should 
you wish to.
If you are willing to participate in the study a date and time for your interview will be 
arranged. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me, or my research 
supervisor (Dr. Adrian Coyle), at the above address. If you are unable to participate in 
the study I thank you for taking the time to read this letter.
Yours sincerely,
Amanda Parsons
Researcher and Counselling Psychologist in training.
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Appendix II
Interview Schedule 
Introduction
Thank you for agreeing to this interview. With your permission I will tape the 
interview but first I would like to ask you to read and sign the consent form.
The Interview
a) I am interested in finding out about your experience of therapy but to get us started 
perhaps you could tell me when you undertook your therapy? How long did it last? 
How often did you attend? Do you know what type of therapy you had?
b) Did you have a presenting problem?
c) What, if any, are the different ways that therapy has been useful to you/unhelpful? 
For each way was there an aspect of therapy that brought this about?
[Encourage people to make a link between what they have learnt in therapy and how it 
affects their life, relationships, work, leisure, spiritual life. What has changed as a 
result of therapy and what have they been able to bring about as a result of therapy?]
e) Do these effects increase/decrease with time?
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Appendix III
Informed Consent Form
I agree to participate in a doctorate research study of ‘clients’ experiences of therapy’. 
I understand the purpose and nature of this study and I am participating voluntarily. I 
grant permission for the data to be used in the process of completing a doctorate 
research project, including any other future publication. I understand that data from 
the interview may be quoted in the research report to illustrate points made, but that 
no participant will be identifiable in that report.
I agree to meet for an interview of approximately 1 hour. I grant permission to tape- 
recording of the interview. I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any 
time without needing to justify my decision and without prejudice.
Research participant/date Researcher/date
I do/do not give permission for my taped interview to be used for further research. I 
understand that the tape will be deleted after completion of the project iff do not give 
permission.
Research participant/date Researcher/date
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Appendix IV
20 August 2001
Ms Amanda Parsons 
Trainee Counselling Psychologist 
Department o f Psychology 
University o f  Surrey
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800  
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 683811
Registry
Dear Ms Parsons
A qualitative study of human agency and psychotherapy (ACE/2001/38/Psyçh)
I am writing to inform you that the Advisory Committee on Ethics has considered the 
above protocol (and the subsequent information supplied) and has approved it on the 
understanding that the Ethical Guidelines for Teaching and Research are observed. 
For your information, and future reference, these Guidelines can be downloaded from 
the Committee’s website at httn://www.surrev.ac.uk/Surrey/AGE/.
This letter o f approval relates only to the study specified in your research protocol 
(ACE/20Ql/38/Psych). The Committee should be notified o f  any changes to the 
‘ proposal, any adverse reactions, arid if  the study is terminated earlier than expected;» 
with reasons. ; %-
Date o f  approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics: 20 August 2001
Date o f  expiry o f  approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics: 19 August 2006
Please inform me when the research has been completed.
Yours sincerely
Catherine Ashbee (Mrs) ;
Secretary, University Advisory Committee on Ethics
cc: Professor L J King, Chairman, ACE
Dr A Coyle, Supervisor, Dept o f Psychology
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Appendix V
Sample Interpretation Worksheet
Interpretation notes Narrative Emerging
themes
Initial problem - long 
standing
Own agency indicated
Explaining problem as 
‘normal’ life stage 
Agentic way of 
speaking
2nd problem linked to 
first
Participant links 
improved self-image 
to unconditional 
acceptance
Motivation =
Agency mobilised? 
Low self-esteem 
appears to hinder, 
block agency 
Int. use of words -  
counselling released 
her
Interesting she chose 
male therapist despite 
her claim to be anti­
men
Needed man to accept 
her
Lines 29-37
P- Right the first time it was um I suppose it was 
about my past and I've had, for many many years I've 
had quite um horrible dreams about past sexual 
abuse, and they seemed to get worse and worse for 
some reason, which I don't know why and that made 
me think it was time I did something about it I think 
it was sort of uh middle thirties, whether that's a sort 
of mid-life crisis, my children were starting school 
and I thought help I'd better get my act together. I 
don't know but, that's what precipitated the 
counselling, the second lot was more about um I 
suppose marriage problems and difficulties I was 
having in my marriage but it was in a sense related 
to the same problem.
Lines 71-130
P - so the sort of unconditional acceptance was 
probably the biggest starting point, and in fact that's 
probably the biggest thing that I've got out of it, you 
know, in total really, the fact that my self-image has 
changed because I know that I'm OK and that 
whatever has happened to me hasn't changed that, do 
you know what I mean.
R- Yes I do.
P- And I think that's motivated me to do all sorts of 
other things that I once thought oh I can't do that, I'm 
too stupid, you know, and all my life has been 
hindered by this low self-esteem if you like and I 
think the counselling has actually the thing that 
released me from thinking I was no good as a person. 
R- Was there a particular aspect of therapy that 
brought that about.
P -1 think, I mean for me it was partly because I had a 
male therapist, how that came about I can't really 
believe it because — the first time when I actually 
initially shared all this stuff, um and I can't believe I 
actually went to one because I was quite anti men 
anyway because I had this problem but I think I 
somehow, once I made the decision and someone had 
recommended this person to me I thought maybe this 
is a good combination, you know if I can find a man 
to help me, a man that's going to accept me that 
would all be part of the sort of healing process 
anyway so, so initially although it seems ridiculous
Attempt to 
solve /explain 
problem
Acceptance
another
b>
Change to self­
narrative
Agency
hindered by low 
self­
esteem/enabled 
by
unconditional
acceptance
Acceptance 
repeated (line 
71)
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Her perception -  eye 
contact = acceptance
Having someone 
coming along side her 
-  feels like a ‘true’ 
meeting’
Practical things to do
Trying out new things 
(practical again)
Changing thoughts 
(beliefs) helps change 
feelings
Still using techniques
the fact that he was male in the long term 
R- can you tell me more about that?
P- um I think the thing, the fact that he was there for 
me every week no matter what, um I know that's part 
of counselling but for me it meant a lot, that I knew 
that at that point I could talk to that person and 
obviously the fact that it was confidential made a 
difference to how I felt, um I think that how he was 
very helpful, he was, he seemed to have the right 
balance of being close to me but vet distant at the
same time so the empathy, is that it, I felt that he was 
really good at the, the empathy at coming along side 
me but at the same time not overstepping the
boundaries, and the eve contact that was very 
important, I mean I found that difficult for a long 
time, that those type of skills were actually important 
in conveying to me that he accepted me I suppose.
R -  What was difficult?
P -  um the eye contact, talking about things I had 
never talked about, especially to a man. But it got 
easier, um yes easier.
R- Mm
P- mm and I think I've been up and down since to be 
honest but after a little while I did maintain it because 
he gave me lots of helpful tips as to how to maintain 
iL yea I didn't really share that but um actually um 
one thing that, well he used the ABC thing of 
emotion which you probably know about, which is 
I've forgotten is it Ellis?
R -1 don't know. I think it is yea 
P- Yes um where he talked about its not the event 
that causes the consequent emotion it's the belief 
about the event, and he actually had me practising 
that about um you know just a month or two into the 
actual counselling whereby someone would say 
something to me and I would quickly feel hurt and 
rejected and I would, you know I began to learn what 
am I you know I'm feeling this what am I believing 
about this you know and changing my belief about 
what was said in terms of how I received it so that 
was particularly helpful in actually maintaining um 
what I felt about myself afterwards as well.
R- So that was something you managed to do when 
you were sort of outside therapy?
P- Yes I did keep that up.
R- And that was conscious?
P- It was conscious but now I almost do it, I still 
practice it I do and I, what I found is that it used to 
take me a while before I could change my belief but
Conveying
acceptance
Real meeting 
between 2 
people?
Acceptance
again
Experiential
learning
Internal
dialogue
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Another practical thing 
to do
Links therapy to 
achieving/aiming 
towards goals 
More able to pursue 
goals -  more 
intentionality
More confidence
now I actually almost do it within maybe a minute or 
two and I'm out of it you now before I sink into that
oh I'm no good or I feel rejected I'm out of it, s o ----
- Yes it's really useful, useful thing I've found.
R- Is that the thing you got from him that you used 
the most do you think or are there other things.
P- um I also used to write, um I mean he talks about 
um what are your, um the tapes that your playing you 
know in your head, what are you saying to yourself 
and there were a few that, a few tapes that were quite 
ongoing and consistent and I wrote them down on 
postcards. I used to write them down on postcards 
and I used to write on the other side of the postcard 
no this is not true I'm an OK person and I would 
actually get out the postcard when I felt this and turn 
it over and read the other side so they were quite sort 
of practical wavs.
Lines 187-216
R- can you make any sort of link between what 
perhaps your therapy and how it affects your life 
outside of therapy, say relationships or working life.
S- Um yes, I mean the fact that I'm actually going to 
do a teacher training in September is amazing 
because I would never have thought before I had 
therapy anyone would really want to listen to me you 
know let alone stand up and talk to a whole class of 
people but I think um it's made me realise that um 
what was I going to say, that's one of my problems, I 
get half way through a sentence and my mind goes 
blank.
R- That's OK.
S- In fact my counsellor said that was a defence 
mechanism, whether or not that's true or not, when I 
get slightly stressed or anxious.
R- Do you feel anxious now?
S- Um not too bad but a little bit sort of exposed I 
suppose.
R- That's understandable.
S- Yes um oh dear what was I saying?
R- You were talking about the link between what you 
had learnt in therapy and how it had affected your life 
outside, saying about doing the teaching course.
S- Oh right yes um I think you know one of the big 
effects for me is that it has made me realise that I'm 
not who I thought I was, or rather I am something 
that I thought I wasn't maybe in the sense that I 
actually feel great standing up and talking you know 
I'm quite happy doing presentations now standing up 
the front, in fact it gives me a real buzz and I think
Experiential
Increased self­
esteem 
Increased 
agency
Change to self­
narrative
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Improved
relationships/self­
esteem
More active 
pursuing things
Again more active 
greater agency?
that's probably the real me you know my personality 
in a sense deep down is quite equipped to do that but 
because of what happened to me um I didn't feel able 
to so I think counselling has made me if you like the 
real me come out um rather than be suppressed in 
some wav by what happened to me um I think 
relationship wise I would now think you know I've 
got no problem with thinking that people want to be 
friends with me, you know. I can go into new 
situations and make lots of friends and think you 
in know people like me you know I'm OK so I think 
relationship wise it's made a big difference I'm not 
sort of hesitant to make friends and mix in situations 
were I don't know people.
Lines 360-364
P- Yes definitely, I think I'm much more able to step 
out into something new so yes I can do this and if I 
struggle I have got resources that I've gained from the 
counselling in order to help me through it. um so I 
would be much more ready to jump into a new 
situation feeling that I have got resources that I can 
use to cope with it.
Experience 
of outcome
Active=agency?
New ways 
of handling 
problems 
Increased 
agency
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Locating Personal agency: A quantitative investigation.
Abstract
The concept of human agency is fundamental to psychotherapy, and yet some 
postmodern theorists posit an exclusively social account of ‘self that comes close to 
denying any sense of personal agency. A radically dialogical understanding of self 
and agency, from within the hermeneutic tradition, overcomes this problem. This 
research uses standardised questionnaires to examine this theory, measuring the 
association between an individual’s sense of agency and the reported quality of 
dialogues the individual engages in. 186 participants completed a questionnaire that 
included a measure of domain specific agency and Benjamin’s (2000) structured 
analysis of social behaviour rating scales. The results indicate that participants with 
higher agency report their social relationships as more affirming and more 
interpersonally engaged than participants with a lower sense of their own agency. 
Implications of these results for theory, practice and future research are discussed.
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Introduction
The concept of human agency, the means by which an individual deliberately brings 
into being desires, goals and projects, has long been seen as a central defining feature 
of human beings (Harre & Secord, 1972), but it is a concept that has been a problem 
for the social sciences since their inception (Rychlak, 1999). Are people capable of 
self-determination and personal choice, and if so how does this behaviour come 
about?
Under a modernist epistemology, the issue of free will/determinism1 appears to be 
neither settled nor irrelevant and continues to vex the construction of theories and the 
formulation of therapies (Slife & Fisher, 2000). Now we, as psychologists, find 
ourselves in the postmodern age (Kvale, 1992), an age when modernist concepts such 
as human agency become even more contentious. Of fundamental concern is that a 
proper, psychological notion of personal agency is lost in much postmodern work.
These are important issues for counselling psychologists. Although modernism is still 
thought to occupy much of mainstream psychology and psychotherapy, 
postmodernism is hailed increasingly as a ‘way of knowing’ for all psychologists to 
consider (Slife & Fisher, 2000). The practice of psychology is increasingly 
integrating ideas from postmodernism, and within psychotherapy this can be seen in 
the turn towards narrative and discursive therapies (Rubin, 1997). As we attempt to 
integrate postmodern ideas into our practice how should we understand ‘the self and 
‘agency’? If our aim, as we engage with individuals struggling with difficulties in 
their lives, is change then we must have some notion of whether our intentions and 
efforts towards this aim make a difference (Burr, 1998). Our views on this issue are 
relevant to both client change and therapeutic technique.
1 Rychlak (1999) suggests that freedom of will is a more informal and popular reference to agency.
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Throughout my training as a counselling psychologist2 I have engaged with the 
current debates raised by postmodern theorists. In particular these debates have 
alerted me to the importance of considering both the social and cultural context within 
which my clients are placed. My own socio-cultural position in terms of class and 
culture, and being educated to a high standard in western society, have all influenced 
my value system such that I have tended to favour individuality, action, logic and self- 
reliance. Reflecting on these values caused me to question whether I placed an 
overemphasis on them within my therapeutic work. To guard against this I was keen 
to integrate postmodern ideas into my practice. This task was especially difficult 
when I found myself working within contexts immersed in modernist ways of 
working.
Models of therapy have been governed by a predominantly modernist epistemology 
and a modernist notion of ‘self. This view grants primacy to individual isolated 
minds and views agency as a characteristic of individuals. This individualistic stance 
argues Josselson (1996) is part of the therapeutic message that has formed the spiritual 
core of our age. Postmodern critics argue that this highly individualised and 
autonomous view of ‘self conceals any constitutive role of cultural context or social 
processes in its formation. Postmodern constructionist theorists argue that the activity 
and nature of the self are products of language systems and firmly place human action 
in the context of culture and history (Neimeyer, 1998). In this view personal 
causation is deconstructed and relocated from internal dynamics to an external 
context.
However this exclusively social account of self and agency can come close to denying 
any kind of personal agency. As a result of relocating the centre of gravity away from 
the individual and into the inter-personal realm, the absence of ‘the person’ in any 
form makes it difficult to see how persons have the capacity to take action to change 
their lives or that of others (Burr, 1998). And it could be argued that for individuals 
the feeling that actions are caused by our own volition, the sense that we are active
2 An attempt has been made to weave some strands of personal reflection into the fabric of the report 
for a reflection on use of self within the research process.
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‘doers’ makes us feel that we are in charge of our own minds. This sense of our own 
agency, even if it is an illusion, is an integral part of the self (Carter, 2002).
An account of human agency that attempts to do justice to individual selves (and 
concepts of freedom and responsibility) whilst still recognising the critical concerns of 
contemporary thinkers (the notion that human agency is embedded in cultural and 
historical contexts) is offered from within the hermeneutic tradition3 and the work of 
Bakhtin (Guignon, 1998; Hermans, 2001; Richardson, Rogers & McCarroll, 1998; 
Tappan, 1999,). This is a radically dialogical understanding of self and agency.
A definition of ‘dialogical’ is by no means straightforward as the term invokes 
multiple meanings. In Bakhtin’s sense the perspective of ‘dialogical’ is much wider 
than that of dialogue as a face-to-face interaction: it is an epistemology of the human 
mind (Markova, 1997). In this view human understanding and existence have a 
fundamentally dialogical character. The shape of individual practices and experience 
results from the interplay and mutual influence between present and past, interpreters 
and events, readers and texts, one person and another and an ongoing inner dialogue 
among points of view (Richardson and Zeddies, 2001).
Bakhtin’s psychology is premised on the assumption that the 
‘authorship’ of the narrative one tells about one’s life is always 
a function of both self and other. The stories that self-as-author 
produces thus do not arise ex nihilo from a single, solitary 
mind, spoken by a single, monotonie voice. Instead such 
stories emerge from a dialogical relation that must be the 
primary unit of analysis. (Tappan, 1999, p. 118)
The inner self is a locus of dialogue and narrative enters not as a picture but as an act. 
One needs a story to participate in conversation that defines one’s identity and the 
particular conventions that govern the telling of self-narratives are critically important 
in the kinds of choices one makes in life Murray (1995). The dialogical self is also a
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storied self and explains the way the self can be permeated by otherness and yet still 
be the centre of responsible action4.
This concept stresses that agency is intrinsically social and relational and is filled with 
dialogic overtones. It may help us to understand how the therapeutic process affects 
the experience of agency and also help explain why the therapeutic relationship may 
be a key ingredient of change. If change in therapy is the dialogical creation of new 
practices and experiences, and therefore the opening of opportunity for new agency, 
then it may be useful for therapists to conceptualise the change process in this way. 
But for this we need to know what factors make dialogue possible and what block it.
Markova (1997) highlights complementarity as the main ontological assumption of 
dialogical relating; activities are mutually interdependent and attuned to the 
attunement of the other. From this she derives two further assumptions, co­
construction and recognition. Co-construction means that as the complements in 
question are interdependent, any change in one of them is change in the total system. 
Mutual recognition is defined by co-ordinated action. Human beings have the ability 
to recognise others as having human capacities and have the capacity to treat others 
accordingly. At the same time, the self expects the very same capacities to be 
recognised in him or herself by the other. We have a need for recognition and we also 
have a capacity to recognise others in return. The process of dialogue can be distorted 
by dishonesty, defensiveness, or force. But done poorly or well, it remains basic in an 
ontological sense. This is similar to the T-Thou’ of Buber’s true meeting. The 
confirmation of your existence as a unique subject occurs and in turn the other is 
recognised and confirmed. Indeed Buber puts dialogue at the ontological centre of 
life, meaning that you cannot come into being except through dialogue (Jacobs, 1998)
Recognition/confirmation is also found in intersubjective theory, which argues that 
speech doesn’t necessarily put an end to the struggle for recognition. It might fail to 
truly communicate for many reasons; in particular it might be a function of a
31 am aware that many consider postmodernism to mean the social constmctionist tradition. 
Postmodernism has produced various schools and movements (Anderson, 1996); the hermeneutic 
tradition is a different branch of postmodernism
4 For a more detailed discussion of these ideas see Parsons (2001).
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particular type of intersubjective relation. The struggle for recognition is intimately 
bound with an understanding of human beings’ relationships to their immediate 
environment and to the objects in that environment (Crossley, 1996).
Pollock and Slavin (1998) take a developmental view of agency and suggest, from 
psychoanalytic theory, that what is important is negotiation of recognition and mutual 
impact with parents early in life. Although a modernist perspective that locates 
personal agency firmly in the head of an isolated individual, the factor of recognition 
and mutual impact falls within the process of dialogue. And, if instead of a modernist 
notion of linear time, we instead embrace a temporal existence as posited by some 
within the postmodern tradition, the past can exist for us experientially only in the 
present (Gelven, 1989). This allows for the past to be a meaningful influence in the 
present without the present being a mere effect of the past. Many, if not all, of an 
individual’s present actions are oriented towards the future in the sense of 
expectations and goals. But these also only exist in the ‘now’, affecting one’s actions 
in the present. This temporal experienced realm is ‘reality’; however it is an 
interpreted reality rather than an objective reality (Slife & Fisher, 2000).
Much of the empirical work on agency has been conducted from an explicitly 
modernist perspective, granting primacy to individual isolated minds and viewing 
agency as a characteristic of individuals. Snyder (2000, 2002) has formulated a 
cognitive theory of hope that he defines as a positive motivational state that is based 
on an interactively derived sense of successful agency (goal-directed determination) 
and pathways (planning to meet goals). He has developed questionnaires to measure 
these two components (agency and pathways) of hope both as a trait and as situated 
across different life domains. A number of studies specifically related to the 
therapeutic process have used these measures. Higher agency (as measured by the 
hope scale) in therapists was found to positively correlate with higher agency in 
clients (Crouch, 1989). Clients’ positive expectancies to effectively utilise coping 
strategies (i.e. agency) strongly predict better psychotherapy outcomes (Kirsch, 
Meams & Catanzaro, 1990), and Hanna and Ritchie (1995) found that a sense of 
agency appears to play a vital role throughout the process of therapy.
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The quality of agency was found by Rennie (1992) to be one of the main themes that 
emerged from his qualitative study in which clients were asked to reflect on their 
experience of a therapy session. He concludes that it is tempting for therapists to view 
clients as patients. In coming to therapy clients signal that their own agency has been 
inadequate but as is shown by the clients’ own reflexivity in their experience of 
therapy, clients are agents as well as patients.
Rennie’s study explores subjective experiences but it does not explore the relational 
qualities of interactions between individuals. As Josselson (1996) suggests, 
psychology understands the self better than it understands connections between 
people. If these connections, or dialogues, are fundamental to our sense of our own 
agency and our self then we need to try and understand these connections better.
Although not directly related to an individual’s sense of agency Flum and Lavi- 
Yudelevitch (2002) carried out a qualitative study to investigate how qualities of 
connections with others are related to identity formation in adolescents. In particular 
they examined whether the capacity to carry on internal dialogue with the self related 
to the kind of dialogue carried out with others, using Josselson’s (1996) dimensions of 
relatedness that are primary ways in which we reach through the space that separates 
us to make connections. Those who favoured less dialogue with the self showed a 
more constricted pattern of relationship dimensions.
Previous research by this author (Parsons, 2002) attempted to gain a better sense of 
how individuals themselves implicitly conceive of their sense of agency and processes 
and situations that enable or constrain it. A qualitative study was carried out where 
ten people who had experienced psychological therapy discussed their beliefs about 
their treatment and the impact on their lives. Clients’ experience of processes and 
situations that facilitated agency included confirmation/acceptance by others. The 
process of dialogue, both external and internal, facilitated or blocked agency 
depending on their quality. In this study the sample was limited to people who had 
experienced therapy and the sample of the study was small; it could be argued that 
these findings were limited to the sample under examination.
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A potentially effective method for investigating connections with others is the 
Structural Analysis of Social Behaviour (SASB) developed by Benjamin (1974, 
1996). The SASB model and the related questionnaires permit operationalisation of 
interpersonal and intrapsychic relations with self and others. The model uses the 
concept of a two-dimensional interpersonal circle (IPC) to map social behaviour and 
the associated methodology may be used to study the relationship of social 
perceptions and self-concept. The rating scales, called Intrex Questionnaires, can be 
used to describe, in the past or present tense, raters’ feelings about both themselves 
and about their relationships with other people. For a more detailed description of the 
model see Benjamin (1996).
The SASB model and questionnaire have been used in a large number of reported 
studies. Wonderlich, Klein and Council (1996) examined the relationship of social 
perceptions and self-concept in Bulimia Nervosa. They concluded that female 
patients with bulimia perceived both parents as hostile and disengaged. Ichiyama and 
Zucker (1996) used the SASB questionnaires to characterise the phenomenology of 
self and other relationship experiences among subtypes of alcoholic men. Henry, 
Schacht and Strupp (1990) used the SASB system to study the interpersonal process 
between client and therapist and concluded that poor outcome was typified by 
interpersonal behaviours by the therapist that confirmed a negative client self-concept.
Although the SASB model is derived from Object Relations theory (a one person 
psychological model), a close look at the model (see appendix 1) shows that it 
measures the quality of many of the dimensions of relationships as defined by 
Josselson (1996): holding, attachment, mutuality, tending and care and identification.
Implications for counselling psychology
A number of theorists take the view that the broad range of clients’ difficulties can be 
understood, in a fundamental way, as a disruption of some sort in the experience of 
agency in their lives (Baillie & Corrie, 1996; Pollock & Slavin, 1998) and that the 
very essence of psychotherapy may be increasing clients’ agency (Jenkins, 1997; 
Rennie, 1992). Blow and Piercy (1997) argue for the awakening of client’s ‘personal 
agency’ as one possible common factor that accounts for therapeutic change across
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therapies. An understanding of processes that shape an individual’s sense of their own 
agency is therefore essential for counselling psychologists.
Research Aims and Hypotheses
The present study has two main aims. First, to use standardised questionnaires to 
explore whether an individual’s sense of agency is associated with the reported quality 
of dialogues the individual engages in.
Second, to investigate whether categories that arose in the qualitative study by Parsons 
(2003) could be generalised to a larger population using a quantitative approach and 
essentially ‘modernist’ methods.
Furthermore, a series of research questions will be addressed. Some of them will be 
approached in an exploratory manner due to lack of previous literature, whilst others 
will be expressed in terms of specific hypotheses:
1) An individual’s sense of agency will vary significantly across different life domains 
(i.e. social, romantic, family, work and leisure)?
2) How do reported relationship factors with others and self relate to an individual’s 
sense of agency? On the basis of aforementioned theory and previous research by the 
author (Parsons, 2003) it is predicted that:
a) Individuals with a lower sense of agency will perceive their social relationships 
as significantly less affirming and understanding and significantly more 
interpersonally disengaged and less friendly than higher agency individuals.
b) Lower agency individuals’ self-concepts (their relationship with themselves) 
will be characterised by significantly less self-accepting, self-nourishing and self- 
protecting relationship behaviour than higher agency individuals.
No other specific predictions will be made. However further exploratory analysis will 
be carried out.
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Method
Design
A cross-sectional survey design was used where the main dependent variable was 
an individual’s sense of agency and the independent variables were measures of 
interpersonal and intrapsychic relations with self and others.
Participants
As the study is interested in general trends there were no formal criteria for including 
participants in the sample. In order to make the results generalisable the participants 
were recruited using a random sampling strategy (e.g., Fife-Schaw, 2000). 
Specifically, a sampling interval approach was used to select participants from the 
population listed in Guildford’s Electoral Register and Bracknell’s Electoral Register.
Exploratory analysis included multiple regression. According to Field (2000) a first 
rule of thumb is to have at least 15 participants per predictor to obtain a reliable 
regression model. The maximum predictors in this study will be 8 SASB scores, thus 
120 participants were considered as the absolute minimum size required for multiple 
regression in the present study.
Measures
To gain a quantitative measure of agency the measures of hope developed by Snyder 
(1991, 1996) will be used. In this theory hope is made up of two necessary 
dimensions, agency and pathways. Individuals act on goals they set by using their 
agency and secondly, different ways or paths are formed to get to these goals. Using 
this theory of hope, Snyder has developed a reliable, valid individual measure of 
dispositional and domain specific hope.
Adult Dispositional Hope Scale (see appendix 2a)
The dispositional hope scale contains 12 items, 4 of which are constructed to measure 
agency, 4 to measure pathways components and 4 additional items are distractors. 
Each of the 12 items consists of a statement and a Likert-type scale that ranges from 1 
(agree) to 4 (disagree).
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The dispositional hope measure has been validated by Snyder et al. (1991). Internal 
consistency, for the total scale, Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .74 to .84. For the 
agency subscale, Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .71 to .76. Test-retest stability was 
tested with four samples and were .85, p  < .001, over a 3-week interval; .73, p  < .001, 
over an 8-week interval; and .76, p < .001 over a 100-week interval. Factor analysis 
was used to explore the presence of agency and pathways factors and the two factor 
solution appeared to be a viable one. They also concluded that the agency and 
pathways components are related but not necessarily synonymous.
Adult Domain Specific Hope Scale (see appendix 2a)
The Domain Specific Hope Scale (DSHS) is a self-report, 48-item inventory designed 
to measure an individual’s level of dispositional hope and agency specific to six life 
arenas; social, academic, family, romance/relationships, work/occupation, leisure 
activities. This scale has been chosen as an individual’s sense of agency may vary 
depending on context, and a measure is required that measures dispositional hope 
across life arenas. Within each of the six domain sections, participants are asked to 
rate the extent to which the item applies to them on an 8-point Likert scale, four items 
reflect agency and four reflect pathways.
The DSHS has adequate internal consistency, with an overall alpha of .93, and alphas 
for the domain subscales ranging from a low of .86 to a high of .93. Principle 
components factor analysis has corroborated the existence of six distinct domain- 
specific subscales. Concurrent construct validity and discriminant validity are high 
(Snyder, Rand and Sigman, 2002).
SASB Intrex questionnaires (see appendix 2b)
The medium form (16-item) version of the Intrex questionnaire (Benjamin, 2000) was 
used to assess participants’ reported self-concept or introject. The short form (32- 
item) version of the Intrex questionnaire was used to assess participants’ reported 
relationships with their significant other, mother and father (96 items in total). Each 
set of 36 items includes the other person focusing on and reacting to the participant 
and the participant focusing on and reacting to the other. Each item on the rating 
scales corresponds to a cluster on the full SASB model (see appendix 1). Each item
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was rated on a scale from 0 (never, not at all characteristic of the relationship) to 10 
(always, perfectly characteristic of the relationship).
Validity and reliability have been established with a variety of methods in a range of 
contexts. Generally those studies have used autocorrelations, factor analysis, and 
discriminant functions to show that rating scales are reliable, internally coherent, and 
able to differentiate among clinical and normal groups in predictable directions 
(Humphrey and Benjamin, 1986).
Procedure
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Surrey’s Ethics Committee (see 
Appendix 3). Each participant received a research pack which included a participant 
information sheet outlining the purpose of the study and providing specific 
instructions about taking part (see appendix 4), a questionnaire (see appendix 2), a 
demographics information form (see appendix 5) and a pre-paid envelope for the easy 
return of the completed questionnaire.
The participants were initially recruited by posting 140 questionnaires in the 
Guildford and Bracknell areas using a random sampling strategy from the populations 
listed in the electoral registers. Fifteen participants returned the completed 
questionnaire (response rate 10%). Due to time limitations it was subsequently 
decided to recruit participants via convenience sampling. Work colleagues and friends 
were asked to distribute questionnaires. A total of 559 questionnaires were 
distributed. One hundred and ninety four three participants completed the 
questionnaire (response rate 35%).
Ethical Issues
Ethical guidelines were followed throughout and particular attention was paid to 
issues of confidentiality. Participants completed the questionnaires anonymously. 
Their right to withdraw at any stage of the research was made explicit in the 
information sheet given to all participants. Each questionnaire was numbered to allow 
participants to contact me and ask for their questionnaire to be removed from the data 
should they so decide. No deception is involved in the study. Participants were given
155
information about how to contact the researcher (and research supervisor) should they 
wish to discuss their experience of completing the questionnaire or the overall 
findings.
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Results
Participants ’ Background Information
A total of 194 participants returned the completed questionnaire. Prior to analysis, 
all data were examined for accuracy of data entry and missing values. Three 
questionnaires were only half completed and in four questionnaires, participants had 
indicated a section of the SASB was not applicable. These were excluded from the 
data set. One questionnaire had extreme outliers in agency scores and was also 
excluded. Questionnaires with single missing values (less than 3% of items) were 
retained for analysis after means from available data were calculated and used to 
replace missing values (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Data were coded and analysed 
using SASB computer software and SPSS vl 1.5 software.
Table 1 summarises the participants’ background information, including gender, age, 
marital status, ethnicity, education and occupation for the whole sample.
Table 1. Summary of participants’ background information.
Participants:
No. of participants
186
Response rate
33%
Gender: Female Male
148 (79.6%) 38 (20.4%)
Age: Mean age (years) Range (years) SD (years)
41.90 19-76 14.86
Marital status: Category Participants (%)
Married 101 (54.3%)
Single 70 (37.6%)
Co-habit 3 (1.6%)
Divorced 11 (5.9%)
Widowed 1 (0.5%)
Occupation: Occupation category Participants (%)
Manager 12 (6.45%)
Professional 60 (32.25%)
Technical 39 (20.97%)
Administrative 36(19.35%)
Sales 13 (6.99%)
Process and Plant 6 (3.26%)
Self-Employed 1 (0.54%)
Student 3(1.61%)
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Retired 14 (7.53%)
Unemployed____________ 2 (1.07%)
Education: Level of Education
High School 
Diploma
1st Degree (Ba, Bsc etc.)
Higher Degree
PHD
Other
Participants (%)
72 (38.71%)
35 (18.82%)
69 (37.10%)
7 (3.76%)
1 (0.54%) 
2(1.08%)
Ethnicity: Ethnic Category Participants (%)
White British 141 (75.81%)
White Other 25 (13.44%)
Black African 2 (1.08%)
Black Caribbean 6 (3.26%)
Black Other 6 (3.26%)
Asian 6 (3.26%)
Agency and Life Domains
Exploration of the agency data for the different life domains (social, romantic, family, 
work and leisure) via boxplots highlighted one extreme value, a univariate outlier. 
This was checked to ensure it was not an error in measurement or data entry. It 
represented a legitimate value, but these extreme values can radically bias statistical 
result (Kinnear & Gray,2000). This case was removed before engaging in further 
analysis.
An examination of domain total agency scores across a number of demographic 
variables was carried out to ascertain whether the data could be treated as one data set. 
Mann-Whitney U tests4 indicated that there was no significant difference between 
men and women (U=2399.50, Z=-1.39; p=.19, ns). Kruskal Wallis tests4 indicated 
there was no significant difference based on marital status ((%2 (4) = 5.29, p=.26,ns), 
educational qualifications (%2 (6) = 4.26, p=.64, ns), profession (%2 (8) = 10.79, p=.21, 
ns) or ethnicity (%2 (5) = 2.17, p=.83, ns).
4 Non-parametric tests were used because the groups differed in size to a great extent
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The following statistical tests where thus carried out on the whole data set. Table 2 
shows mean agency scores for each life domain.
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviation and Range of Agency Scores For Life Domains.
Life Domain Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
social agency 23.15 4.898 8 32
romantic agency 18.97 6.202 4 30
family agency 25.62 5.862 6 32
work agency 26.88 3.485 18 32
leisure agency 25.43 5.574 7 32
A within subject analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out to determine whether 
there was a significant difference between an individual’s sense of agency across the 
different life domains. Mauchly’s test was significant (p-value < .01) indicating 
heterogeneity of covariance. Therefore a more conservative F-test is required and the 
Greenhouse-Geisser rows in the ANOVA summary table was used. The results 
indicated that overall participants’ sense of agency differed significantly over different 
life domains, F(3.466, 641.255) = 89.141: pO.Ol.
There is some doubt to whether, following significant main effects of within subject 
factors, the Tukey test affords sufficient protection against inflation of type 1 error 
rate (Kinnear &Gray, 2000). In the Bonferroni method ordinary t-tests are used for 
the pairwise comparisons but the error rate is divided by the number of planned 
comparisons. To achieve significance therefore, each t-test must show significance 
beyond the 0.05 level. In this case test statistics will have to be significant beyond the 
0.05/10 = 0.005 level for a comparison to be deemed significant.
A series of paired-sample T-tests were therefore performed to determine which of the 
life domains differed. Results indicated that the only domains not to differ 
significantly from each other were family and leisure domains. All other differences 
were significant (p < .005).
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Perceived Relationship Factors and Agency
Within subject domain agency scores were all highly correlated with the domain total 
agency score (p< .01). Therefore, in order to investigate general trends, the domain 
total agency score will be used in the following statistical tests. As shown in table 3 
correlations of participant’s domain total agency scores and SASB scores for clusters 
representing mother, father and significant other focused on the participant5 were in 
the expected direction. Clusters representing affirming, nurturing and protecting 
behaviours were positively correlated with participant’s sense of agency. Clusters 
representing blaming, attacking and ignoring behaviours were negatively correlated.
Table 3 - Correlations Between Agency Scores and SASB Cluster Scores 
For mother, father and significant other focusing on participant.
Domain total 
agency/ mother 
focus on rater
Domain total 
agency/ father 
focus on rater
Domain total 
agency and 
significant other 
focus on rater
CLUST1- Freeing .073 .135 .29101
CLUST2- Affirming .330D .38601 .32901
CLUST3- Nurturing .352D .41501 .2970*)
CLUST4- Protecting .2 9 2 r) .35001 .179(1
CLUST5- Controlling .055 -.064 -.150(1
CLUST6 -Blaming -.176(1 -.35401 -.130
CLUST7- Attacking -.260D -.142(1 -.123
CLUST8 - Ignoring -.332D -.35701 -.27601
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
In order to carry out group comparisons, participants’ domain total agency scores 
were used to classify participants into three categories: high agency, medium agency 
and low agency. Thereafter a series of planned contrasts examined whether the 
anticipated similarities and differences could be detected.
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Individuals with a lower sense o f agency will perceive their social relationships as 
less affirming and understanding.
SASB cluster scores were used to characterise descriptive differences among 
participants in each of the agency groups (low, medium and high) across each of the 
surfaces in the SASB model that represent mother, father and significant other 
focusing on the participant. As shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3 participants in the higher 
agency group report relationships characterised by more affirming, nurturing and 
helping behaviours than the low or medium agency groups.
Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to explore the differences between agency 
groups on the above cluster scores. The results indicated that for mother focused on 
participant, agency groups differed significantly on their scores on the ‘affirming’ 
cluster (F(2, 183)=3.61, p < .05), the ‘nurturing’ cluster (F(2, 183)=7.56, p < .01), the 
‘protecting’ cluster (F(2, 183)=5.82, p < .05), and the ‘ignoring’ cluster (F(2, 
183)=4.21, p < .05). Post-hoc Tukey tests indicated that the low agency group 
differed significantly from both the medium and high agency groups on all the above 
clusters (p<05). There was no significant difference between the medium and high 
agency groups.
For father focused on participant, agency groups differed significantly on their scores 
on the ‘affirming’ cluster (F(2, 183)=11.69, p < .01), the ‘nurturing’ cluster (F(2, 
183)=21.25, p < .01), the ‘protecting’ cluster (F(2, 183)=10.45, p < .01), the ‘blaming’ 
cluster (F(2, 183)=8.93, p < .01) and the ‘ignoring’ cluster (F(2, 183)=10.73, p < .05). 
Post-hoc Tukey tests indicated that the low agency group differed significantly from 
both the medium and high agency groups on all the above clusters (p<05). There was 
no significant difference between the medium and high agency groups.
5 SASB surfaces representing others focusing on participants were chosen for initial analysis as they 
represent a measure of what is happening to the participant in the reported relationship.
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For significant other focused on participant, agency groups differed significantly on 
their scores on the ‘affirming’ cluster (F(2,183)=13.60, p < .01), the ‘nurturing’ 
cluster (F(2, 183)=6.44, p < .05), the ‘protecting’ cluster (F(2, 183)=6.06, p < .05), 
and the ‘ignoring’ cluster (F(2, 183)=6.28, p < .05). Post-hoc Tukey tests indicated 
that the low agency group differed significantly from both the medium and high 
agency groups on all the above clusters (p<05). There was also a significant 
difference between the medium and high agency groups for cluster 2 (affirming).
The prediction that lower agency participants would perceive their social relationships 
as less affirming and understanding was supported. Significant differences were 
found for all three relationships in affirming, nurturing, protecting and ignoring 
behaviour. Reported relationship with father also had a significant difference in 
blaming behaviour.
Individuals with a lower sense o f agency will perceive their social relationships as 
more interpersonally disengaged and less friendly than higher agency individuals.
Although the cluster profiles used above are more directly related to the ratings and 
the SASB model, with 8 data points per surface and 4 surfaces per relationship (other 
focuses on participant, other reacts to participant, participant focuses on other, 
participant reacts to other) too many variables are created for analysis. In order to 
fully explore the characteristics of each reported relationship across each surface, 
pattern coefficients are used in the following statistical tests. Pattern coefficients 
provide an estimate of the degree to which a set of 8 clusters is oriented around the 
two axes: affiliation and interdependence. The first coefficient, the attack coefficient, 
expresses the central tendency of ratings on the dimension of friendliness versus 
attack. The second coefficient, the control coefficient, expresses the central tendency 
of the ratings on the basic dimension of control versus autonomy. The score for each 
interpersonal parameter is a correlation coefficient that may range from -  1.00 to 1.00.
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Table 4 summarises the results of Kruskal-Wallis tests6 comparing the low and high 
agency groups remembered relationships with their mother and father, and their 
relationship with their significant other. For ease of reference only the low agency 
and high agency groups are reported.
Table 4 -  Means and Chi-squared of Attack and Control Pattern Coefficients in 
Reported Relationship with Mother, Father and Significant Other for Low Agency and 
High Agency Participants.
Relationship with Mother
Low Aoencv 
M SD
Hiah Aoencv 
M SD A2
Attack (+) vs. friendliness (-) 
Mother attacks me -0.44 0.56 -0.61 0.52 8.00
Mother withdraws from me 0.56 0.42 -0.69 0.39 10.98
1 attack Mother -0.66 0.39 -0.69 0.41 1.95
1 withdraw from Mother -0.43 0.52 -0.55 0.54 10.63
Control/submission (+) vs. autonomy (-) 
Mother controls me 0.31 0.47 0.54 0.37 11.83
Mother Submits to me -0.05 0.55 0.47 0.59 3.25
1 control Mother -0.18 0.50 -0.01 0.51 4.17
1 Submit to Mother 0.22 0.48 0.35 0.51 4.44
Relationship with Father
Low Aoencv 
M SD
Hiah Aoencv 
M SD A2
Attack (+) vs. friendliness (-) 
Father attacks me -.20 .60 -.63 .48 34.27
Father withdraws from me -.26 .59 -.66 .42 32.34
1 attack Father -.41 .58 -.78 .29 31.24
1 withdraw from Father -.11 .58 -.66 .41 37.30
Control/submission (+) vs. autonomy (-) 
Father controls me .26 .47 .39 .46 6.01
Father Submits to me -.35 .50 -.02 .60 12.44
1 control Father -.42 .32 .04 .51 26.30
1 Submit to Father .02 .47 .33 .48 14.66
Relationship with Significant Other
Low Aoencv 
M SD
Hiah Aoencv 
M SD A2
Attack (+) vs. friendliness (-) 
Significant other attacks me -0.42 0.59 -0.70 0.41 9.34
Significant Other withdraws from me -0.53 0.47 -0.74 0.28 10.42
I attack Significant Other -0.54 0.49 -0.84 0.14 26.08
1 withdraw from Significant Other -0.32 0.51 -0.81 0.21 67.63
Control/submission (+) vs. autonomy (-) 
Significant Other controls me 0.11 0.51 0.12 0.48 2.72
Significant other Submits to me -0.92 0.50 0.03 0.51 3.45
1 control Significant Other -0.03 0.56 0.30 0.45 13.29
1 Submit to Significant Other -0.67 0.49 0.23 0.48 11.96
* p <  .05 **p < .01
6 Non-parametric tests were used as the pattern coefficients have marked bimodality.
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The prediction that participants with a lower sense of agency will perceive their social 
relationships as more interpersonally disengaged and less friendly than higher agency 
individuals was supported but with interesting differences between relationships. 
Considering the sign of the coefficients, low agency participants perceived their 
relationships with their fathers as characterised by less interpersonal engagement and 
more mutual hostile withdrawal than their relationship with their mother.
With respect to the dimension of control, low agency individuals reported 
significantly less control and more autonomy in most aspects of the relationship with 
their fathers (i.e. they saw their fathers as exerting less control over them and being 
more autonomous and they saw themselves as behaving with more autonomy in 
relation to him) than did high agency individuals.
Lower agency individual’s self-concepts (their relationship with themselves) will be 
characterised by less self-accepting, self-nourishing and self-protecting relationship 
behaviour than higher agency individuals.
SASB introject cluster scores are used as the self-concept is measured on only one 
surface. The cluster scores for each agency group are graphed in Figure 4. Between 
group differences were examined using one-way ANOVA. Results are presented in 
Table 5.
Table 5. Means (SDs) for Between Group Differences on SASB Introject Clusters 
with ANOVA Significance of F.
Low Agency Med. Agency High Agency F (2
Self-emancipation 34.10 (17.31) 39.15 (18.87) 41.50 (18.16) 2.64
Self-accepting 54.59 (20.32) 63.62 (20.40) 65.08 (19.17) 4.94
Self-cherishing 44.10 (22.07) 49.38 (23.89) 61.25 (17.53) 10.18
Self-protecting 53.69 (20.93) 59.62 (17.57) 72.33 (16.04) 16.40
Self-control 48.85 (21.06) 48.31 (20.94) 50.25 (26.92) 0.12
Self-blame 37.95 (28.10) 38.92 (23.34) 30.25 (21.90) 2.29
Self-hate 25.90 (23.37) 21.85 (22.56) 17.75 (22.37) 1.94
Self-neglect 29.92 (23.94) 30.38 (22.10) 26.17 (23.39) 0.61
**p < 0 .05
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Between group differences were assessed using post-hoc tests (Tukey’s test). These 
comparisons indicated that higher agency participants scored significantly higher than 
lower agency participants on all significant clusters (p< 0.05).
The prediction that lower agency individuals’ self-behaviour would be characterised 
by less acceptance, nourishment and protection than higher agency individuals was 
supported. But of interest is that there is no significant difference between groups for 
blaming, hating or neglecting self-behaviour.
Complementarity
Complementarity is defined as the process by which one member of a dyad takes a 
position on either of the two interpersonal surfaces (focus on self, focus on other) and 
the other member of the dyad will match him/her on the corresponding surface 
(Benjamin, 2000). Markova (1997) highlights this process as fundamental to 
dialogical relating as each member of the dyad is attuned to the other. Higher agency 
participants have been found to have social relationships that are more affirming and 
understanding. Further within subject correlations were used to assess levels of 
complementarity between agency groups. The within subject correlations are between 
each label (set of 8 clusters) with every other label. Results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6 -  Between Group Differences for Measures of Complementarity in Reported 
Relationships
Low Agency High Agency
Mean Mean
Mother focused/participant .54 .62reacts.
Father focused/participant .44 .60reacts.
Significant other focused .45 .76/participant reacts.
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These mean values are indicators of association only but they do show that 
participants with a higher sense of agency report more complementarity in their 
relationships, especially with their significant other.
Relationship factors as predictors o f sense o f agency.
A stepwise multiple regression was conducted in order to examine how much of the 
variation in an individual’s sense of agency could be accounted for by relationship 
factors. The attack pattern coefficients for each reported relationship (self, father, 
mother and significant other) focusing on the participant were used as predictors. 
These were chosen as there were strong significant differences between agency groups 
around the affiliation axes of the SASB model. The data were screened for normality, 
linearity and absence of multicollinearity7 and outliers.
At step 1, reported level of fathers’ friendliness versus attack was a significant specific 
predictor of agency scores (F(l,185)=22.10, pc.001) and it accounted for 10% (R2 
=.11,adjusted R2=.10) of the variation. At step three, the addition of attack pattern 
coefficients for ‘self-focus’ and ‘mother’s focus’ on participants provided a significant 
increase in the predictive power of the model (F(3,185)=15.14, pc.001) and all the 
variables accounted for 19% (R2 =.20,adjusted R2=.19) of the variation in participant’s 
sense of agency. The inclusion of attack pattern coefficient for significant other was 
excluded from the final equation because the beta weights are not significant.
7 It was decided not to also use attack pattern coefficients for participants reacting to others because of 
the existence of multicollinearity (Field, 2000).
Discussion
The main purposes of this study were 1) to use standardised questionnaires to explore 
whether an individual’s sense of agency is associated with the reported quality of 
dialogues the individual engages in and 2) to investigate whether categories that arose 
in the qualitative study of Parsons (2003) could be generalised to a larger sample 
when using a more powerful quantitative design.
The predictions that a) individuals with a lower sense of agency would perceive their 
social relationships as less affirming and understanding and more interpersonally 
disengaged and less friendly than higher agency individuals and b) that lower agency 
individuals’ self-concepts (their relationship with themselves) would be characterised 
by less self-accepting, self-nourishing and self-protecting relationship behaviour than 
higher agency individuals were both supported. These findings link individual agency 
to both relational factors with others and also with the self, essential factors for a 
dialogical view of agency ( Guignon, 1998, Tappan, 1999).
Several interesting findings emerged from the analyses. Complementarity is 
highlighted as the main ontological assumption of dialogical relating (Markova, 
1997). This concept is measured by the SASB questionnaire and results showed a 
positive association between higher agency individuals and complementarity. 
However a note of caution is needed. A methodological problem that arises when 
testing this process is that complementarity may be extant but not apply for everyone. 
For example if a participant’s mother was very controlling, they may go out of their 
way to act with the opposite behaviour i.e. to emancipate others. This pattern though 
is still directly related to the reported relationship with mother.
It was somewhat surprising that the reported relationship with father proved to be so 
significant to an individual’s sense of agency. This was not predicted and the reasons 
for it are unclear. Gender is unevenly distributed in the sample under study, 80% of 
respondents being female. The results found may be a function of difference in 
relationships between same and different sex parents. Alternatively they may be a 
‘true’ representation of dialogical relationships affecting agency in which case one
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could argue that this finding may be culturally specific. In western ‘individualistic’ 
cultures agency is often associated with ‘the masculine’, with communion seen as the 
orientation of the ‘feminine’.
The findings of this study are limited by several factors. First, the norms of the data 
are restricted in terms of their ability to characterise the population at large. N is 
relatively small; gender is unevenly distributed; ethnicity not adequately sampled. 
There appears to be a sampling bias in that higher level of educational qualifications 
and occupations are over-represented. One reason for this may be the ‘demand 
characteristics’ of the SASB questionnaires. It is a complex questionnaire to 
complete. Verbal reports were fed back to the researcher that some potential 
participants started to complete the forms but ‘gave up’ within a couple of pages. This 
was somewhat confusing as the SASB model and questionnaire has been used in a 
large number of reported studies. Participants include college students and psychiatric 
patients (Lorr & Strack, 1999), alcoholic men (Ichiyama & Zucker, 1996), bulimic 
women (Wonderlich, Klein & Council, 1996), eating disorder patients (Bjorck, 
Clinton, Sohlberg, Hallstrom & Norring, 2003) and therapists and their clients (Henry, 
Schacht & Strupp, 1990). The questionnaires therefore have a successful history.
Second, the measurement of agency used is based on a cognitive theory of hope 
(Snyder, 2002). The construct measured refers to the cognitive belief that goals will 
be achieved (Crouch, 1989). This definition sits somewhat uneasily in a study 
examining postmodern theories of agency and arguing that agency is situated action. 
However Snyder et al. (1991) characterise agentic thought as not only mental energy 
focused on goal attainment, but also as ‘a sense of successful goal-directed 
determination’ (p. 287).
A strength of this study is that it represents a first effort to assess the connections 
between people along different dimensions of relationship and relate them to the 
problematic concept of individual agency. SASB is a particularly useful method for 
this task because both interpersonal and intrapsychic constructs are measured and 
based on the same underlying dimensions. The relationship between relational factors 
and self-concept can therefore be assessed. Future studies may benefit from a more
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detailed examination of this factor. Indeed SASB questionnaires produce vast 
amounts of data that this study did not have the space to analyse. I am aware that the 
subjective perspective of the author impacts upon the areas chosen for analysis. The 
research hypotheses were derived from a previous study by the author (Parsons, 2003) 
but this will also have been influenced by subjective bias. Being aware of this, I have 
tried to examine my own biases prior to embarking on this research. I am aware that 
my gender (female), age, and position as a counselling psychology trainee could 
impact upon the analysis. For instance being female means I may be subject to 
culturally defined roles of what it means to be female and have a sense of my own 
agency. I grew up in the period of ‘woman’s liberation’ and consider myself a 
feminist. This inevitably impacts upon my own views. However the research is 
firmly placed within a theoretical context. The epistemological stance of the 
dialogical view of agency, from a postmodern hermeneutic tradition appears to 
eschew positivist science. By treating the questionnaire data as the participants’ 
subjective interpretation of their interpersonal relationships the author was able to 
investigate the topic using a modernist methodology.
In further research, it would be interesting to assess the connection between relational 
factors and participant’s sense of agency in each life domain (social, romantic, leisure, 
work and family). Measuring a variety of relationships i.e. friendships, work 
colleagues, would allow for a diversity of assessments across domains. A more 
diverse sample than the one in this study might show interesting differences between 
demographic groups, thereby placing individual agency more firmly in a social and 
cultural context.
In conclusion this study is not presented as proof that one theory is ‘truer’ than 
another in answering the free will dilemma. Rather it may help illustrate how a 
therapist in the postmodern hermeneutic tradition might handle the question of a 
client’s sense of agency, particularly as it seems to be important for therapeutic 
change. Choices are real choices, but they are continually grounded in an individual’s 
temporal and relational history (Slife & Fisher, 2000) in the ‘here and now’.
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If agency were located within an individual psyche, empowerment could occur in 
isolation from relationships or social systems. However, the concept presented here 
stresses that agency is an intrinsically social and relational process, filled with 
dialogical overtones. As therapists, we may affect this process by offering the client 
recognition as in Buber’s sense of I-Thou relating. Obvious maybe? But as Henry et 
al. (1990) concluded in their study using the SASB system to study the interpersonal 
process between client and therapist, ‘Apparently, even well-trained professional 
therapists are surprisingly vulnerable to engaging in potentially destructive 
interpersonal process’ (p.773).
The profession of counselling psychology is defined by its philosophical orientation 
and value system. There is an emphasis on giving primacy to the therapeutic 
relationship and the use of the relationship to facilitate change (Farrell, 1996). 
Intrinsic to this is a humanistic value system that highlights the uniqueness of 
individuals and the importance of their phenomenological world and the continual 
process of ‘being with’ rather than ‘doing to’ (Woolfe, 1996). A reading of agency as 
a social and relational process shows how interpersonal relationships affect an 
individual’s sense of whom they are. This confirms that what is important in the 
therapeutic endeavour is the unique human relationship whose outcome depends on 
the quality of the interpersonal transactions between the two participants.
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FOCUS ON OTHER
1-8, IGNORING & NEGLECTING
1-1, FREEING & FORGETTING
Appendix 1.
1-2, AFFIRMING & UNDERSTANDING
II. Invoke hostile autonomy I Encourage friendly autonomy
1-7, ATTACKING &
1-6, BELITTLING &
1-3, LOVING & APPROACHIN1
1-4, NURTURING & PROTECTING
1-5, WATCHING &
FOCUS ON SELF 2-1, ASSERTING & SEPARATING
2-8, WALLING-OFF & DISTANCING
II. Take hostile autonomy
2-7, PROTESTING & RECOILING
III. Hostile comply
2-6, SULKING & SCURRYING
2-2, DISCLOSING & EXPRESSING
I. Enjoy friendly autonomy
2-3, JOYFULLY CONNECTING
IV. Friendly accept
2-4, TRUSTING & RELYING
2-5, DEFERRING &
INTROJECTED FOCUS
3-6, DAYDREAMING & 
NEGLECTING OF SELF
3-7, SELF-REJECTING & 
DESTROYING
3-1, SPONTANEOUS SELF
3-2, SELF- ACCEPTING &
III. Oppress self
3-6, SELF-INDICTING & OPPRESSING
3-3, SELF-LOVING & CHERIS1
g g
3-4, SELF-NOURISHING & ENHANCIN
IV. Manage, cultivate sel
3-5, SELF MONITORING & RESTRAINING
Combined quadrant & cluster SASB models. Loma Smith Benjamin. Copyright 1999, University of Utah
Appendix 2a.
Questionnaire
Instructions: Take a moment to contemplate each of the following questions. Using the scale below 
circle the number that best describes your response to each question.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Definitely Mostly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Mostly Definitely 
False false false false true true true true
False
1 .1 can think of many ways to get out of a jam. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
True
8
2 . 1 energetically pursue my goals. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 .1 feel tired most of the time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4. There are lots of ways around any problem. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5 .1 am easily downed in an argument. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
6 .1 can think of many ways to get the things in life that 
are most important to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7 .1 worry about my health. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8. Even when others get discouraged, I know I can find 
a way to solve the problem. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9. My past experiences have prepared me 
well for my future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
10. I’ve been pretty successful in life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 1 .1 usually find myself worrying about something. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 .1 meet the goals that I set for myself. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS - Please take a moment to contemplate your social life. Think about your 
friendships and acquaintances and how you interact with others. Once you have this in mind circle the 
number that best describes your response to each question.
False True
1. I can think of many ways to make friends. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2. I actively pursue friendships. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3. There are lots of ways to meet new people. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4. I can think of many ways to be included in the
groups that are important to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5. I’ve been pretty successful where friendships
are concerned. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
6. Even when someone seems unapproachable,
I know I can find a way to break the ice. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7. My past social experiences have prepared me
to make friends in the future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8. When I meet someone I want to be friends with,
I usually succeed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Definitely Mostly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Mostly Definitely 
False false false false true true true true
ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS - Please take a moment to contemplate your love life. Think about your 
romantic relationships. Once you have this in mind circle the number that best describes your response 
to each question.
1. I can think of many ways to get to know 
someone I’m attracted to.
2. When I am interested in someone romantically,
I actively pursue him or her.
3. There are lots of ways to convince someone 
to go out with me.
4. I’ve been pretty successful in my romantic 
relationships.
5. I can think of many ways to keep someone 
interested in me when they are important.
6. My past romantic relationships have prepared 
me well for future involvement’s.
7. Even when someone doesn’t seems interested, 
I know I can find a way to get their attention.
8. I can usually get a date when I set my mind to it.
False True
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
FAMILY LIFE. Please take a moment to contemplate your family life. Think about your family 
members. Once you have this in mind circle the number that best describes your response to each 
question.
1. I can think of lots of things I 
enjoy doing with my family.
2. I energetically work on maintaining 
my family relationships.
3. I can think of many ways to include my 
family in things that are important to me.
4. I have a pretty successful family life.
5. Even when we disagree, I know my family 
can find a way to solve our problems.
6. I have the kind of relationships that I want with 
family members.
7. There are lots of ways to communicate 
my feelings to family members.
8. My experience with my family have 
prepared me for a family of my own.
False True
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Definitely Mostly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Mostly Definitely 
False false false false true true true true
WORK. Please take a moment to contemplate your working life. Think about your job and job history. 
Once you have this in mind circle the number that best describes your response to each question.
False True
1. I can think of many ways to find a job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2. I am energetic at work. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3. There are lots of ways to succeed at work. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4. Even if it’s a lousy job, I can find
something good about it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5. I have a good work record. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
6. My previous work experiences
have helped prepare me for future success. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7. I can always find a job if I set my mind to it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8. I can think of lots of ways to impress
my boss if the job is important to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
LEISURE ACTIVITIES (sports, music, art, reading, biking, etc.) Please take a moment to contemplate 
your leisure time. Think about the activities that you enjoy doing in your spare time. Once you have this 
in mind circle the number that best describes your response to each question.
False True
1. I can think of many satisfying things to
do in my spare time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2. I energetically pursue my leisure time activities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3. If my planned leisure time activities fall through,
I can find something else to do that I enjoy. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4. I can think of lots of ways to make time for
the activities that are important to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5. Even if others don’t think my activities are
important, I still enjoy doing them. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
6. My experience with hobbies and other leisure
time activities are important to my future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7. I have satisfying activities that I do in my leisure time. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8. When I try to perform well in leisure time activities,
I usually succeed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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Appendix 2b
This questionnaire asks about your attitudes and feelings toward yourself and others. 
Please answer the questions for how you really think or feel. Your initial reaction to 
each question will most often be your best answer. If part of a question seem s to fit 
while part does not fit it all, you should give the question a lower score.
Use this scale: NEVER ALWAYS
NOT AT ALL PERFECTLY
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Circle the number that best describes your response to each question. A rating of 
less than 5 indicates ‘false’, more than 5 indicates ‘true’.
P lease indicate how well each question describes YOURSELF
NEVER ALWAYS
NOT AT ALL PERFECTLY
1. Without concern or thought, I let
Myself do and be whatever I feel like. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
2. Without considering what might happen,
I hatefully reject and destroy myself. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
3. I tenderly, lovingly cherish myself. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
4. I put energy into providing for,
looking after, developing myself. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
5. I punish myself by blaming myself
and putting myself down. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
6. Aware of my personal shortcomings as well as my
good points, I comfortably let myself b e ‘as is’. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
7. I am recklessly neglectful of myself,
Sometimes completely “spacing out”. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
8. To make sure I do things right,
I tightly control and watch over myself. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
9. I let myself do whatever I feel like and
don't worry about tomorrow. 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 1 0
10. Without thought about what might happen,
I recklessly attack and angrily reject myself. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
11. I very tenderly and lovingly appreciate and
value myself. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
12. I take good care of myself and work hard
on making the most of myself. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
13. I accuse and blame myself for
being wrong or inferior. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
14. With awareness of weaknesses as well as
strengths, I like and accept myself "as is." 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
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NEVER ALWAYS
NOT AT ALL PERFECTLY
15. I carelessly let go of myself, and often get
lost in an unrealistic dream world. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
16. To become perfect, I force myself to do
things correctly. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Please indicate how well each question describes: YOUR SIGNIFICANT OTHER 
PERSON. This may be your husband, wife or partner. If you are not currently in a 
relationship please describe your last partner.
1. He/she lets me speak freely, and warmly
tries to understand me even if we disagree. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
2. He/she walls himself off from me and doesn't
react much. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
3. He/she puts me down, blames me, punishes me. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
4. Without giving it a thought, he/she uncaringly
ignores, neglects, abandons me. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
5. He/she learns from me, relies upon me, accepts
what I offer. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
6. He/she happily, gently, very lovingly approaches me,
and warmly invites me to be as close as I would like. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
7. With much sulking and fuming, he/she scurries
to do what I want. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
8. He/she clearly and comfortably expresses his/her
own thoughts and feelings to me. 0 1  2 3 4 5  6 7  8 9  10
9. To keep things in good order, he/she takes charge
of everything and makes me follow his/her rules. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
10. He/she thinks, does, becomes whatever I want. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
11. He/she knows his own mind and "does his/her own thing"
separately from me. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
12. Without thought about what might happen, he/she wildly,
hatefully, destructively attacks me. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
13. With much kindness, he/she teaches, protects,
and takes care of me. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
14. Without much worry, he/she leaves me free
to do and be whatever I want. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
15. He/she relaxes, freely plays, and enjoys
being with me as often as possible. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
16. With much fear and hate, he/she tries to
hide from or get away from me. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
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For questions 17 through 32, change from rating your partner to rating:
YOURSELF IN THIS RELATIONSHIP
NEVER ALWAYS
NOT AT ALL PERFECTLY
16. I let him/her speak freely, and warmly try
to understand him even if we disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
1 8 .1 wall myself off from him/her and don't react much. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
1 9 .1 put him/her down, blame him/her, punish him/her. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
20. Without giving it a thought, I uncaringly
ignore, neglect, abandon him/her. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
2 1 .1 learn from him/her rely upon him/her, accept
what he/she offers. 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
2 2 .1 happily, gently, very lovingly approach 
him/her, and warmly invite him/her to be
as close as he/she would like. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
23. With much sulking and fuming,
I scurry to do what he/she wants. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
2 4 .1 clearly and comfortably express
my own thoughts and feelings to him/her. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
25. To keep things in good order, I take charge
of everything and make him/her follow my rules. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 10
2 6 .1 think, do, become whatever he/she wants. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
2 7 .1 know my own mind and "do my own thing"
separately from him/her. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
28. Without thought about what might happen,
I wildly, hatefully, destructively attack him/her. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
29. With much kindness, I teach, protect,
and take care of him/her. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
30. Without much worry, I leave him/her free
to do and be whatever he/she wants. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
3 1 .1 relax, freely play, and enjoy being
with him/her as often as possible. 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
32. With much fear and hate, I
try to hide from or get away from him/her. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
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Please now indicate how well each question describes: YOUR MOTHER I 
MOTHER FIGURE WHEN YOU WERE YOUNG.
NEVER 
NOT AT ALL
ALWAYS
PERFECTLY
1. She let me speak freely, and warmly
tried to understand me even if we disagreed. 0 1
2. She walled herself off from me
and didn't react much. 0 1
3. She put me down, blamed me, punished me. 0 1
4. Without giving it a thought, she uncaringly 0 1
ignored, neglected, abandoned me.
5. She learned from me, relied upon me,
accepted what I offered. 0 1
6. She happily, gently, very lovingly approached
me, and warmly invited me to be as close as I liked. 0 1
6
6
6
6
6
8 9 10
8 9 10
8 9 10
8 9 10
8 9 10
8 9 10
7. With much sulking and fuming, she 
scurried to do what I wanted.
8. She clearly and comfortably expressed 
her own thoughts and feelings to me.
0 1
0 1
9. To keep things in good order, she took
charge of everything and made me follow her rules. 0 1
10. She thought, did, became whatever I wanted. 0 1
11. She knew her own mind and "did her own
thing" separately from me. 0 1
12. Without thought about what might happen,
she wildly, hatefully, destructively attacked me. 0 1
13. With much kindness, she taught, protected,
and took care of me. 0 1
14. Without much worry, she left me free to do
and be whatever I wanted. 0 1
15. She relaxed, freely played, and enjoyed
being with me as often as possible. 0 1
16. With much fear and hate, she tried to
hide from or get away from me. 0 1
8 9 10
8 9 10
8 9 10
8 9 10
8 9 10
8 9 10
8 9 10
8 9 10
8 9 10
8 9 10
For questions 17 through 32, change from rating her to rating: YOURSELF 
WITH YOUR MOTHER I MOTHER FIGURE WHEN YOU WERE YOUNG.
1 7 .1 let her speak freely, and warmly tried
to understand her even if we disagreed. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 8 .1 walled myself off from her and didn't react much. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 9 .1 put her down, blamed her, punished her. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10
10
10
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20. Without giving it a thought, I uncaringly 
ignored, neglected, abandoned her.
2 1 .1 learned from her, relied upon her, 
accepted what she offered.
2 2 .1 happily, gently, very lovingly approached her, 
and warmly invited her to be as close as she liked.
23. With much sulking and fuming, I scurried 
to do what she wanted.
2 4 .1 clearly and comfortably expressed my 
own thoughts and feelings to her.
25. To keep things in good order, I took charge 
of everything and made her follow my rules.
2 6 .1 thought, did, became whatever she wanted.
2 7 .1 knew my own mind and "did my own thing" 
separately from her.
28. Without thought about what might happen,
I wildly, hatefully, destructively attacked her.
29. With much kindness, I taught, protected, 
and took care of her.
30. Without much worry, I left her free to 
do and be whatever she wanted.
3 1 .1 relaxed, freely played, and enjoyed 
being with her as often as possible.
32. With much fear and hate, I tried to hide 
from or get away from her.
NEVER ALWAYS
NOT AT ALL PERFECTLY
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1  2 3  4 5  6 7 8 9 10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Now please indicate how well each question describes: YOUR FATHER / 
FATHER FIGURE WHEN YOU WERE YOUNG.
1. He let me speak freely, and warmly
tried to understand me even if we disagreed.
2. He walled himself off from me 
and didn't react much.
3. He put me down, blamed me, punished me.
4. Without giving it a thought, he uncaringly 
ignored, neglected, abandoned me.
0 1 2  3 4 5  6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
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NEVER ALWAYS
NOT AT ALL PERFECTLY
5. He learned from me, relied upon me,
accepted what I offered. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
6. He happily, gently, very lovingly approached
me, and warmly invited me to be as close as I liked. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
7. With much sulking and fuming, he
scurried to do what I wanted. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
8. He clearly and comfortably expressed
his own thoughts and feelings to me. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
9. To keep things in good order, he took
charge of everything and made me follow his rules. 0 1  2 3 4 5  6 7  8 9 10
10. He thought, did, became whatever I wanted. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
11. He knew his own mind and "did his own
thing" separately from me. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
12. Without thought about what might happen,
he wildly, hatefully, destructively attacked me. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
13. With much kindness, he taught, protected,
and took care of me. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
14. Without much worry, he left me free to do
and be whatever I wanted. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
15. He relaxed, freely played, and enjoyed
being with me as often as possible. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
16. With much fear and hate, he tried to
hide from or get away from me. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
For questions 17 through 32, change from rating him to 
rating:YOURSELF WITH YOUR FATHER I FATHER FIGURE WHEN YOU 
WERE YOUNG.
1 7 .1 let him speak freely, and warmly tried
to understand him even if we disagreed. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
1 8 .1 walled myself off from him and didn't react much. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
1 9 .1 put him down, blamed him, punished him. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
20. Without giving it a thought, I uncaringly
ignored, neglected, abandoned him. 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
2 1 .1 learned from him, relied upon him,
accepted what he offered. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
2 2 .1 happily, gently, very lovingly approached him,
and warmly invited him to be as close as he liked. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
23. With much sulking and fuming, I scurried
to do what he wanted. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
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NEVER
NOT AT ALL
ALWAYS
PERFECTLY
2 4 .1 clearly and comfortably expressed my 
own thoughts and feelings to him.
25. To keep things in good order, I took charge 
of everything and made him follow my rules.
2 6 .1 thought, did, became whatever he wanted.
2 7 .1 knew my own mind and "did my own thing" 
separately from him.
28. Without thought about what might happen,
I wildly, hatefully, destructively attacked him.
29. With much kindness, I taught, protected, 
and took care of him.
30. Without much worry, I left him free to 
do and be whatever he wanted.
3 1 . 1 relaxed, freely played, and enjoyed 
being with him as often as possible.
32. With much fear and hate, I tried to hide 
from or get away from him.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
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Appendix 4.
Information sheet for participants
Dear Sir/Madam,
My name is Amanda Parsons and I am currently undertaking a Practitioner Doctorate 
in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology at the University of Surrey. For my 
final year Doctorate research project, entitled ‘Locating personal agency: a 
quantitative investigation’, I am interested in investigating the different ways that 
individuals relate to others and in particular how these relationships affect the 
individual’s sense of agency (the means by which an individual deliberately brings 
into being his/her desires, goals and projects).
You are under no obligation to participate (if you do not wish to take part, please send 
the incomplete questionnaires back to me in the enclosed stamped addressed 
envelope). However, if you feel able to take part in my study please complete the 
enclosed questionnaires and demographic form. Your views and experiences are 
important to me and are needed to give an accurate picture as possible of the processes 
and factors that may affect an individual’s sense of agency. Please complete the 
questionnaires on your own and answer all questions as honestly as possible, there is 
no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers. Do not spend too much time on any one question.
Give each question a moment’s thought and then answer it. It has been estimated that 
it takes approximately 30 minutes to complete the questionnaires.
The project has received ethical approval from the University Advisory Committee on 
Ethics at the University of Surrey. Do not write your name on the questionnaire 
because I want your responses to be anonymous. Only my supervisor (Dr. Riccardo 
Draghi-Lorenz) and I will have access to the information you supply, thus your 
confidentiality is assured. Participants’ data will be held on computer in such a way 
that individuals cannot be identified. Collected data will be held in a secure manner 
and will be handled in accordance with the Data Protection act 1998. You may 
withdraw from the project at any stage. To make this possible each set of 
questionnaires is numbered and I advise you to make a note of your number so that I 
can withdraw your responses without compromising your anonymity. On completion 
of the study, all participants will have the opportunity of receiving general feedback as 
to the outcome of the study by contacting me on the above address or my email 
address (psm8ap@surrey.co.uk).
I would appreciate it if you could return the completed questionnaires in the enclosed 
stamped addressed envelope as soon as possible. Please do not hesitate to contact me 
if you have any queries about taking part in the study.
Thank you for your time and co-operation.
Amanda Parsons
Counselling Psychologist in Training
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Appendix 5
Demographics Information.
Finally could you please provide some information about yourself. Your responses 
will be ‘pooled’ with those from other participants in order to report what sample took 
part in the study.
Your age (in years):............................... .......................................................
Your sex (please circle): Male Female
Y our marital status (please tick) : Married .... Single ....
Divorced.... Widowed....
Co-habit....
Your occupation: ................................ .........................
Your highest educational qualification (please tick):
High School GCSE or equivalent 
High School ‘A’ level or equivalent 
Diploma (HND, SNR etc)
1st Degree 
Higher Degree 
PhD
Other (please specify)
Y our ethnicity (please tick) : White British .... White other ....
Mixed Race.....
Asian or Asian British:
Indian.... Pakistani......
Bangladeshi  Other Asian ....
Black or black British:
Black Caribbean .... Black African .
Black Other.....
Chinese.....
Other (please specify):.....................
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